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The Pulse

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How do we distinguish between Religious images and Sacred images? The Western history of art has explored various aesthetic routes through which paintings can teach us to imitate Christ and the saints. Paintings can engage us either by overwhelming our senses or by challenging them. This paper argues that while the Renaissance artist Caravaggio's realist style invites us to ponder the inward conversion of St. Paul, the contemporary artist Arcabas' abstract style presents the miracle of the conversion more immediately. It begins by retelling the Renaissance tradition of depicting the conversion of St. Paul, and then contrasts Caravaggio's painting as an inventive break from that narrative. Caravaggio's work serves as an important precedent to Arcabas' painting, yet Arcabas fashions the subject in a non-naturalistic way that harkens back to the aesthetic and spiritual effect of ancient sacred images.

I Have Fallen and Can't Get Up!: A Comparative Analysis of Caravaggio's and Arcabas' Paintings of The Mystical Conversion of St. Paul

Nathaniel Eberlein

The prominence of St. Paul in Christian thought originates in his extraordinary conversion on his way to Damascus. His instantaneous repentance from the worst of sinners to the leadership of the Church is a model that inspires many. He embarks upon the path to Damascus, "...breathing out threatening and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord..."¹ His hate is turned against Christ, and he intends to kill Christians. Midway along his journey, a blinding light shines around him and he hears the voice of Christ questioning his consuming desire to persecute Christians. Suddenly, Paul realizes that it is Christ whom he has been persecuting. Both Caravaggio and Arcabas depict Paul in the pivotal act of replying, "Lord, what wilt thou have me do?"² Although both artists utilize their contemporary styles to bring the miracle of St. Paul's conversion before the pious viewer, Arcabas best succeeds in mystically re-presenting the event.

The powerful retelling of Caravaggio's and Arcabas' paintings of St. Paul's Conversion are best seen in contrast to previous examples. This Biblical conversion was usually perceived as a dramatic one, with God physically intervening on the road to Damascus. Raphael's tapestry of the subject and Michelangelo's following depiction both place Paul on the ground, his arms outstretched, and his rearing horse fleeing the scene.³ This is an interesting innovation, as the account in the book of Acts makes no mention of Paul or his companions riding on horseback, and early Christian art does not include the horse in the scene.⁴ It is only after the twelfth century that the horse appears and acts as a dramatic prop. The scattering beast of burden causes the focus of the composition to rest upon Paul's blinded reaction, as he sprawls on the ground. Michelangelo goes so far as to depict Paul as blind with milky eyes that he tries to shield from the celestial light. Both Raphael and Michelangelo include groups of men who react with equal emotion to Paul's divine experience, but Caravaggio has reduced his composition to one companion.

These sixteenth-century Renaissance paintings have sought to emphasize God's power in the divine intervention. Both Raphael and Michelangelo paint the figure of God emerging from a group of clouds and thrusting his arm forward to deliver a shaft of light at Paul. The complex groups of figures also heighten the loud drama of the conversion. God's power is physically depicted. In contrast, Caravaggio has produced a quiet scene in *The Conversion of St. Paul on the Way to Damascus* (1601). He has drastically cropped his composition so as to exclude any sight of the heavens and any extraneous individuals. This simplified composition differs greatly from an earlier version he made of the subject (now in the Odescalchi-Balbi collection in Rome). The number of figures has been reduced from five to three, and the pictorial space has been made incredibly shallow.⁵ The horse is the predominant figure that takes up three quarters of the composition, an old man grabs the horse's bit, and Paul can be recognized by his vulnerable position on his back, arms outstretched.

This composition would be difficult to recognize for those who are not familiar with the Biblical narrative. Paul can be identified by his recumbent position and his Roman military dress. At his side, he bears the sword that is singular to his image in traditional Christian iconography. Caravaggio has chosen to paint him as a youth with dark hair, and

his eyes are closed to the illuminating light. The characterization of Paul as a young Roman soldier (seen in Raphael's *Conversion* as well) is an innovation of the classical revival of the Renaissance.⁶

The rearing horse has also conventionally turned its hindquarters towards the viewer creating a foreshortened anatomy that is reminiscent of Durer's sketches.⁷ It is possible that Caravaggio copied its anatomy from the collection of Northern prints owned by his close patron Cardinal del Monte.⁸ However, this horse is hardly moving in the composition, and its primary function seems to be to catch the light with his broad flank. The horse gently steps over Paul, as it is led away by the other man. Its tender tread is quite different from the dramatic "rearing" seen in the earlier depictions. The horse is charged with a silent potential energy in its illumination, tensed muscles, and its eye that is fixed at Paul on the ground. Paul too bears a quiet energy. The only evidence of his fall are the robes and armor strewn about him, but for a non-Christian viewer he might be choosing to lie upon the ground. Both his mouth and eyes seem shut, and his mystical encounter is inward. Caravaggio stresses a dramatic conversion that occurs behind the eyes, in the individual's mind. The lack of physical interaction with divinity can be clearly seen when juxtaposing this painting next to Raphael's *Conversion*.⁹

Both the horse and the man who leads him away are ignorant of what is going on.¹⁰ The beast warily eyes Paul who perhaps had startled him by suddenly falling off of his back. The man does not look at Paul and appears to be fixated on the ground or the horse's muzzle in his hands. He does not look up into the light. There are no clouds parting or divine hand delivering shafts of light. Caravaggio's contemporary, the painter Bellori, criticized this work for its apparent lack of action, which was apt by Baroque painting standards.¹¹ However, those who approach the composition seeking a dramatic retelling are like the horse and old man in the work. They are unaware of the inner transformation of Paul.

Strangely, it appears that the main force of the light reflects off of the white flank of the horse because of the directionality of the light striking Paul's face and chest. Caravaggio distinguished himself from the prevalent Mannerist style by using natural colors and avoiding painting the supernatural. While most contemporary painters were emulating Tintoretto's handling of color and depicting divinity (Tintoretto, *The Last Supper*, 1592-94), Caravaggio returned to the modeling and calm mood of Giorgione (Giorgione, *Pastoral Concert*, 1509).¹² Utilizing the directionality of the light in this way, the red of Paul's clothes are more

significant, and the painter successfully avoids depicting its source in the heavens. The presence of the invisible divinity in Caravaggio's work emerges through his depiction of visible forms.¹³

The only evidence of divinity comes through Caravaggio's depiction of light. For Caravaggio, lighting "suggests spiritual illumination without explicitly acknowledging it as a supernatural force."¹⁴ The light subtly reveals what is important, while the shadows hide what is inconsequential to the narrative. Its source is visually unknown; its rays protrude from the upper right-hand corner of the painting. Without this deliberate illumination, it is difficult to identify this composition as a miraculous scene from the Bible.¹⁵ Here Caravaggio uses what will become his signature chiaroscuro tenebrism, in which he models his figures by a single light source set against a pitch-black background. Its strong highlights and deep shadows direct the eye around the painting: first to Paul, then the poised muscles in the horse's legs, and to the furrowed brow of the old man. Even though they are psychologically separated from Paul, the emotive force exposed through the light affects them all and unites the three figures.¹⁶

Friedlaender believe the use of light directed towards psychological realism is Caravaggio's innovation. Whereas other painters have relished in the opportunity to paint landscapes lit by moonlight, or intimate compositions by warm candlelight (Georges de La Tour), Caravaggio abstained from such Romantic paintings.¹⁷ He never used light to create a sentimental atmosphere or to capture an expressionistic mood, but rather to direct the viewer to the subtle gestures of his characters. As exemplified by *The Conversion*, the light serves to unify the composition through naturalistic illumination and psychological impact interpreted differently by various figures. This stylistic effect is arguably what Caravaggio works toward throughout his career.¹⁸ The achievement of the tenebrist technique allows him to suggest the volume of forms and their solidity through hyper-realistic texture and colors.¹⁹

However, some unusual optical effects might suggest that Caravaggio overstates himself with this hyper-realism. Paul lies at an odd angle towards the viewer and makes a difficult figure to accurately depict in the Renaissance canon of proportions.²⁰ His raised arms appear massive next to his improperly foreshortened legs, and the horse's hoof is pointed towards the viewer in an unnatural contortion. The man holding the bit in the horse's mouth may be hunching over, but even then his arms would be unnaturally long and do not correlate

with the location of his shoulders. However, the odd perspective is in complement to the narrow dimensions of the chapel. The foreshortening applied to Paul may be reminiscent of Renaissance experiments in anamorphosis, this time applied so as to function within the cramped space.²¹

The wall made by the horse gives the sense of a shallow pictorial space, and thus visually suggests that Paul is tumbling out of the composition and into our world. This artistic decision emphasizes Caravaggio's theological intent.

Caravaggio has strayed from his contemporaries' characterizations of St. Paul. Most painters show Paul with his newly blinded eyes wide open, but here his lids are shut, and the calm expression on his face suggests a peaceful, or even joyful, spiritual transformation. His arms are poised in the traditional orans prayer, with palms open in order to embrace the divine vision that shines upon him.²² Perhaps they echo the outstretched arms of the *Crucified Peter* that Caravaggio painted across the chapel, implying his imitation of Christ and his dying to his old self. Paul does not reel from Christ, but accepts him. His mouth gapes half open as he replies, "Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?"²³ As Caravaggio has excellently depicted, the miracle of Paul's conversion is not the physical power of Christ's intervention, but the fact that a man who had turned himself so violently against God could repent in one moment.

The conversion lies in his heart.²⁴ No external divinity is shown, there is no physical presence of Christ, "...his presence can only be assumed."²⁵ The transcendent has revealed itself to Paul, and although his followers react to the light, they do not partake in its inner reality. Caravaggio's work lacks the source of light that we could attribute to the depiction of God, and therefore the pious viewer is redirected to contemplate his or her own inward convictions. The work is not sentimental, but theologically suggestive and a powerful mode of retelling the story of Paul's conversion. Few painters could balance such a naturalistic depiction with a supernatural presence.²⁶ Caravaggio anticipates the theater-like genre of Baroque painting, but few would ever match him in such a devotionally powerful composition.

This painting could be interpreted as Caravaggio's pessimistic account that intentionally "leaves God out."²⁷ It is common knowledge that he had a violent criminal history that lasted the second half of his life.²⁸ Contemporary sources say that he was a bitter man, that he hardly

praised the works of others, and that he may have suffered familial rejection.²⁹ He was quick to anger and made the aggressive statement of carrying a sword at all times. Puzzlingly, *The Conversion of St Paul* was made at the start of these records of criminal behavior (1600). The rise of his artistic ingenuity is accompanied by a violent temperament. His poor public image, however, did not hinder his rise to fame, nor does it dismiss the religious depth of his later paintings.

Caravaggio is not being pessimistic of the Christian faith in this work. He progresses away from the erotic irony of his early *Bacchus* (1595) and *Lute Player* (1596) paintings. His mature works draw upon a serious religiosity. Caravaggio did not imbue his works with an intellectual structure. His strength was in presenting an emotive force that made the Biblical subjects accessible to his audience. As a result, his contemporaries often criticized his work for being merely imitative of nature and lacking in ideals.³⁰ As we have seen from his painting of *The Conversion*, Caravaggio's realism was not geared towards merely recording Biblical events, but in making the transcendent immediate.

The work emphasizes the spiritual focus in Paul's individual experience and suggests the individual viewer. The horse is not just filler, for his position suggests a shallow pictorial space that forces the viewer to interact with St. Paul. In contrast to Caravaggio's first composition, Paul has been repositioned so as to lie before those kneeling before the chapel railing, and the ground plain has been dramatically tipped towards the viewer.³¹ The divine encounter intrudes into our own world. And rather than repeating Raphael's high-ranking centurion guise, Caravaggio has depicted Paul as a common Roman soldier.³² Caravaggio's Paul is not a powerful official whom God subdues, but a common man whose individual conversion the layperson can relate to. Such a personal religiosity was formed by Caravaggio's Counter-Reformation milieu.

A trend towards individualized faith had been building since the origins of the Renaissance. The Franciscan Revival encouraged laypeople to pursue a personal and emotional encounter with Christ, and the spread of devotionals by writers like Tomas a Kempis and Rudolf of Saxony popularized private meditation.³³ Such preliminary signs of individualized spirituality experienced wracking birth pangs in the Protestant Reformation of the 16th century. Luther arguably set a model for discerning scripture according to one's own reason and sensibility, and the Christian faith came under the scrutiny of individuals rather than communities. In reaction, the Catholic Church reincorporated in-

dividualized faith into devotional practices and used paintings to remind the public of its lineage to Rome.³⁴ The sober and mystical theology of St. Ignatius was a product of the Counter-Reformation. His *Exercitia* became a staple for the seventeenth century Catholic layperson. This religious tone can be found in the commissioned title of Caravaggio's piece: *The Mystery of the Conversion of St. Paul*.³⁵

When Caravaggio came to Rome he was most likely influenced by the teachings of the priest Fillipo Neri.³⁶ Neri espoused a faith that was rooted in simplicity and mysticism, and sought to make spirituality alive and personal to the Roman laypeople. He was popular in Rome and was close to the owners of the Contarelli Chapel, which Caravaggio would later adorn with his Matthew series.³⁷ Caravaggio's religiosity utilizes innovations in natural depictions to serve the subtle symbolism of early Renaissance painters like Roger van der Weyden, and Massacio's paintings in the Brancacci chapel.³⁸ Caravaggio was painting for Catholic churches, and thus his Biblical depictions served simultaneously a wider community and the private individual.³⁹

Spiritual self-reflection has been suggested in Caravaggio's other works. Most famously, his painting of *David with the Head of Goliath* (1610) has been interpreted as a remorseful meditation upon his own spiritual state. Paul was a violent man who turned his heart against God, but was able to repent in a dramatic moment. Caravaggio may have considered this story as a spiritual model, hoping for a divine intervention that would turn himself away from his own violent actions.

This turbulent persona is quite different from Arcabas, who chose to flee from the violence in his life.⁴⁰ Arcabas is a modern French painter who has painted primarily for Catholic parishes. He too has been admired for his iconographic innovation and spiritual content.⁴¹ His abstract style of painting sacrifices the naturalism of the human form in exchange for mystical truths.⁴² His painting *Saint Paul sur le chemin de Damas* (1984) was completed during his third style, in which his fusing of natural and abstract figures strongly emerged.⁴³

Arcabas was certainly looking at the precedent of *The Conversion* set by Caravaggio. Here, the narrative has been reduced to only Paul and his horse. Unlike Caravaggio's calm atmosphere, this work is accentuated by visual action. Arcabas' rigid forms constantly move the eye around the composition, never giving a chance for our focus to rest. Paul's position—upon his back with hands raised—is taken directly from Caravaggio's work, yet the apocryphal steed is utilized quite differ-

ently. Rather than lying prone on the ground, Paul is still (impossibly) atop his horse. Arcabas has made an abstract depiction of Paul caught in the moment of falling off his horse.⁴⁴

His cubist-abstractionist technique relays a recognizable, yet nigh incomprehensible scene. Contorted unnaturally upon the horse's back, Paul is encased in a golden *mandorla*, and both his figure and the horse are surrounded by white light. The characters are not set in a three-dimensional stage. Like many cubist painters, Arcabas has dismissed the human form and perspective that was perfected in the Renaissance in exchange for a new conception of pictorial space. Although the shapes of the figures have been simplified to geometric forms and splayed in a complex array, they retain enough recognizable features for the viewer to understand the dynamic composition.

Arcabas paints in a style that is reminiscent of synthetic cubism, with one foot in reality and one foot in abstraction. Arcabas distorts the human figure in a manner "reminiscent of Picasso's abstraction."⁴⁵ One may turn to Pablo Picasso's *Three Musicians* (1921) as a stylistic reference point.⁴⁶ This technique was achieved when Picasso began to make his collages, whose principles were then transferred into painting.⁴⁷ The cubist movement was an important step in art's progression towards abstraction because it shattered the "window into an alternate reality" that the illusion of perspective strove for. The medium of painting became "aware of itself" by denying any illusion of perspective and in unabashedly appearing as nothing more than paint on the surface of the canvas.

These are not naturalistic forms that engage in pictorial illusionism. The forms composing Saint Paul emerge from the horse's back, whose legs appear to be too numerous. The line by which Paul ends and the horse begins is lost in a *passage*—his shoulder blends into the horse's saddle. The forms of the figures are flattened. It seems as if Arcabas has cut out his shapes from paper and glued them next to each other on the canvas. The painter models certain forms with color (see the curvature of Paul's right arm) but not to create a perception of receding depth within the picture.

The various pigments are utilized so as to distinguish specific shapes to the viewer. This is most evident in the left-hand side of the painting where Paul's arm overlaps with two of his legs. The horse is painted mainly blue to distinguish him from the brown and gold limbs of Paul. It is difficult to make out the horse's limbs, which seem to be fading into the white background of the painting. The horse's hind legs

and Paul's right arm blur at the edges as if they are beginning to dissolve into the light that enshrouds them. The oil paint appears to have a thick application, and the scrapes of a pallet knife appear along the neck of the horse. Through this evidence of the artist's hand, the medium of the paint on the canvas announces its presence upon the picture plane.

Arcabas makes a curious choice in his composition. Rather than placing Paul upon the ground, he is twisted around upon the horse's back. This makes the scene even more dynamic and unreal. However, the painter's highly stylized forms do not offer a naturalistic depiction, and thus the positioning of Paul does not immediately strike the viewer as improbable. The tone set by Paul's precarious position contrasts against that of the placid horse.

Again, the focus is upon Paul and his inward change. Similar to Caravaggio's painting, the horse does not directly react to the divine encounter of his rider. The horse stares forward unblinking, and remains unaware of the excitement occurring in his saddle. We know that the horse is excluded from the divine intervention because of the golden field that encircles Paul alone. Even more removed from his Renaissance predecessors, Paul has lost any garment that could be reminiscent of a Roman centurion. He appears in a common brown tunic. Arcabas' Paul opens his eyes wide in shock, and his open gesture fully embraces the vision of Christ.

Like Caravaggio's work, the only sign of God is found through the depiction of light. The *mandorla* around Paul is traditionally a feature used when depicting transfigured divinity. (It is often found encircling Christ in traditional byzantine icons of the Transfiguration). Although turned on its side, it can be recognized by its almond-shape. The *mandorla* is painted gold and bears the insignia cruciform, that commonly appears in Arcabas' paintings (and almost functions as his second signature).⁴⁸ Visually enclosed in this womb-like state, Paul is becoming transfigured. The action of his spiritual transformation is literally heightened by his placement atop of the horse.

Although his forms could be called technically crude, the conception of Arcabas' composition is highly sophisticated. Arcabas always paints with the Christological narrative of the gospel in mind; his Old Testament subjects anticipate the coming of Christ, and New Testament figures look back to the Passion of Christ.⁴⁹ This mode of exegesis was first developed by Early Church theologians, who read the Old Testament as allegory and built their lives upon the revelation of God

through Christ. The death of Christ is visually present in Arcabas' cruciform symbol that is inescapable in this work.⁵⁰ Intentionally, it is echoed in the bridle of the horse and can be found in Paul's outstretched arms, mimicking a crucifixion. Accentuating what Caravaggio did not, Arcabas expresses the contrary ideas held together in the conversion.

His explicitly crucified pose reminds the viewer of the death that precedes the life of grace. Paul embarks on the road to Damascus in order to persecute Christians—against Christ. In order to accept his Savior, he must first die to his old self. In a divine moment, Paul changes from being the chief persecutor of Christians to setting off on the trajectory to becoming one of their most prominent leaders. Such a drastic sea change attests to the power of Christ's testimony. Like Caravaggio, Arcabas sees that the power of Paul's conversion is in the fact that his heart could be changed and that he could receive grace so quickly. However, unlike Caravaggio, Arcabas has visually articulated the transformative process through abstract Christological symbolism. His cubist technique is also an aid in placing the viewer before the miracle of the conversion.

Stylistically, Arcabas' painting presents the viewer with an alternate reality. Synthetic cubism was conceived in secular painting, but Arcabas has redirected it towards God. This modern abstraction was principally a rejection of traditional conceptions of beauty. Not only were religious subjects lacking in the medium, but also it intended to deconstruct the human figure. Cubism reflected the religious crisis of the twentieth century in producing an "artistic language of intentional ambiguity."⁵¹ It expressed an artistic vision, dividing the world into multiple contradictory ways.⁵² Picasso was enabled to create human forms that were not derived from the natural world, and thus found a freedom to reorder the human image as he desired.⁵³ This artistic style was proof of the twentieth century rejection of the divine image ordered in humans. The unique flatness of painting was emphasized through abstraction and removal of the illusion of perspective. In this surface self-consciousness, cubist paintings claimed to be a reality, rather than presenting the illusion of a reality. Arcabas wields the cubist technique without dismantling the human form and maintains its paradoxical potency to project another world.

Arcabas' painting presents a holy reality. The generous use of gold and the decidedly flat, geometric forms hearken back to the Byzantine icon tradition. Such religious icons serve as physical mediators of the

saint that they depict, and bring the pious viewer into a mystical encounter with divinity. Arcabas has reinvented their aesthetic techniques to make St. Paul present to the Christian worshipper. In the same spirit of the medieval artists that made religious subjects accessible through contemporary clothing, Arcabas has painted Paul in a modern suit, rather than in the costume of a Roman soldier.⁵⁴ If Caravaggio made Paul's conversion accessible through reducing his social rank, Arcabas has gone to further lengths to communicate a character that is even more like us.

Thus, the mystery of St. Paul's witness of Christ is represented more tangibly in the work of Arcabas than in the work of Caravaggio. Both have the same devotional goal: to bring the viewer into a direct encounter with the mystical conversion. Both draw the focus of the narrative to Paul's personal encounter with Christ and the impact of the grace that could change his heart, and both seek to make Paul accessible to the layperson. Yet the nearly identical compositions could not be stylistically further apart. Caravaggio uses heightened naturalism to relate the story as a prompt to solemn, inward meditation, while Arcabas combines modern cubism with ancient Byzantine tradition to make the miraculous present. Our minds encounter divinity through Caravaggio's painting, but holiness also exists artistically upon the canvas of Arcabas. His abstract technique utilizes the unique potential of painting to actualize the mystical.

NOTES

- ¹ Acts 9:1
- ² Acts 9:6.
- ³ Friedlaender, *Caravaggio*, 3-4.
- ⁴ Ibid, *Caravaggio*, 3.
- ⁵ Varriano, *Caravaggio*, 43.
- ⁶ Friedlaender, *Caravaggio*, 21.
- ⁷ Ibid., 7.
- ⁸ Varriano, *Caravaggio*, 29.
- ⁹ Friedlaender, *Caravaggio*, 22.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., 9.
- ¹¹ Friedlaender, *Caravaggio*, 9.
- ¹² Ibid., 11.
- ¹³ Bersani and Ulysse. *Caravaggio*'s, 51.
- ¹⁴ Varriano, *Caravaggio*, 43.
- ¹⁵ Friedlaender, *Caravaggio*, 10.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., 9.
- ¹⁷ Ibid., 12.
- ¹⁸ Ibid., 13-14.
- ¹⁹ Ibid., 17-18.
- ²⁰ Friedlaender, *Caravaggio*, 18.
- ²¹ Varriano, *Caravaggio*, 43.
- ²² Friedlaender, *Caravaggio*, 23-24.
- ²³ Ibid., 26.
- ²⁴ Friedlaender, *Caravaggio*, 26.
- ²⁵ Ibid., 26.
- ²⁶ Ibid., 27.
- ²⁷ Bersani and Ulysse, *Caravaggio*'s, 59.
- ²⁸ Varriano, *Caravaggio*, 73.
- ²⁹ Friedlaender, *Caravaggio*, 118.
- ³⁰ Ibid, *Caravaggio*, 120.
- ³¹ Varriano, *Caravaggio*, 43.
- ³² Friedlaender, *Caravaggio*, 21.
- ³³ Ibid, *Caravaggio*, 121.
- ³⁴ Varriano, *Caravaggio*, 74-75.
- ³⁵ Friedlaender, *Caravaggio*, 121.
- ³⁶ Ibid., 123.
- ³⁷ Ibid., 125.
- ³⁸ Friedlaender, *Caravaggio*, 128.

³⁹ Ibid., 131.

⁴⁰ Appleyard, "The Search," 5-6.

⁴¹ Appleyard "The Search," 2.

⁴² The human form, "must withdraw so as to signify that it cannot sufficiently express all that there is to say. It recounts the story but leaves room for another form of Presence." Ibid., 30,31.

⁴³ Ibid., 29.

⁴⁴ Boespflug, *Arcabas*, 146.

⁴⁵ Appleyard "The Search," 29.

⁴⁶ The affinity with Picasso is not mistaken, as Arcabas once painted a series entitled *Hommage a Picasso* (1986), Boespflug, *Arcabas*, 138-140.

⁴⁷ Janson, Penelope, Davies, *Janson's*, 953.

⁴⁸ Curiously enough, Arcabas has actually signed this painting twice, once in the outer rim of the *mandorla*, and again under the feet of the horse.

⁴⁹ Appleyard "The Search," 19.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 32.

⁵¹ Rosenblum, *Cubism*, 9.

⁵² Ibid, 9.

⁵³ Fry, *Cubism*, 13.

⁵⁴ Appleyard "The Search," 21.

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This paper examines the concept of freedom in “The Grand Inquisitor” from Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov. In this chapter of the novel, Ivan and the Grand Inquisitor condemn Christ for giving humans too much freedom, and espouse a regime founded on nihilism and liberal-socialism. I put forward that Dostoevsky argues against the extreme form of Enlightenment principles through the Grand Inquisitor. Although not entirely antagonistic to the Enlightenment’s emphasis on reason, he demonstrates how the Grand Inquisitor promotes a false form of freedom by creating a regime that excludes God and eradicates the possibility of a higher, moral end. In contrast to the Grand Inquisitor, Dostoevsky illustrates how Christ serves as a model of divine kenosis, so that humanity may undergo theosis to find true freedom.

Dostoevsky and the Enlightenment: A Call for Faith and Love

Katerina Levinson

How does Dostoevsky reflect an Enlightenment worldview through the Grand Inquisitor and Ivan? Could he actually be arguing against Enlightenment ideals through him? If this is the case, does Dostoevsky reject these principles completely, or does he accept them to a certain point? Can these ideals be reconciled with faith in God? What does Dostoevsky believe to be the best way for people to act for human flourishing? “The Grand Inquisitor,” a chapter “written” by the character Ivan Karamazov in Fyodor Dostoevsky’s novel *The Brothers Karamazov*, is a theodicy, provoking the question of how a just and loving God could allow humans to have freedom. The Grand Inquisitor is a ninety-year-old cardinal who condemns Jesus to be burnt at the stake for failing to “feed” the people.¹ According to the Grand Inquisitor, though humans want freedom at first, they will realize that it is not truly what they want, and will beg the Church to feed them.² The Grand Inquisitor asserts that “man seeks to bow down before that which is indisputable,”³ yet blames God for not making his divinity undeniable enough through miracles.⁴ Dostoevsky agrees with the Enlightenment’s praise

of reason to a certain extent through “The Grand Inquisitor,” but fears the extreme form of its application, which is nihilism and socialism. He believes that humans need, in addition to reason, a different faculty—love through faith—which is something that Enlightenment principles do not provide.

Background to the Enlightenment and Dostoevsky’s Response

The Enlightenment was a European intellectual movement beginning in the eighteenth century, characterized primarily by the idea that reason could advance every factor of society.⁵ The main hub of the Enlightenment movement was in France, where the philosophers espoused ideas about replacing traditional religious beliefs, and reforming society and politics through reason. This resulted in advancements in science and political philosophy.⁶

Enlightenment ideals were introduced into Russian culture with the reign of Catherine the Great in the latter half of the eighteenth century.⁷ Catherine desired Russia to be thought of as a “European state,” and in this effort she received praise from French philosophes like Voltaire.⁸ Though she desired to make Russia enlightened more in name than in truth (for fear of a revolution like the French Revolution), she still made a significant contribution to a distinct intellectual culture in Russia, which was pioneered by upper members of Russian society.⁹ Enlightenment authors like Diderot, Voltaire, and Rousseau were disseminated throughout Russia as a result.¹⁰ A consequence of these thinkers was a high regard for reason and science, and the importation of Enlightenment thought began to replace the primacy of faith.¹¹ Russia became more secularized as it began to view science as absolute truth above faith and to regard religion as mere myth.¹² Science was seen as a panacea for the improvement of human nature and society, particularly among the young and atheistic Russian intellectuals.¹³

Enlightenment thinkers shifted the conception of government from theocentric, where the state was modeled after an “eternal order,”¹⁴ to a more liberal form in which there was a “mutually beneficial arrangement among humans.”¹⁵ In this form each individual’s self-interest and natural rights were accounted for.¹⁶ Rousseau helped espouse a liberal ideology, in which human freedom is protected above all else by the ruling sovereign.¹⁷ Alexis De Tocqueville, an Enlightenment-era political philosopher, believed that humans become frightened of their “limitless

independence” when authority in religion or politics is nonexistent.¹⁸ They will raise up a master for themselves as “everything is moving in the world of the intellect, [and] they want at least that all be firm and stable in the material order.”¹⁹ De Tocqueville, does reason, however, that in a liberal society, the more equality people attain, the more equality they will want, until it will result in a loss of private property because “it alone still stands, an isolated privilege in a leveled society.”²⁰

The product of the application of reason to political thought in the nineteenth century was socialism. This doctrine advocates for public ownership of land and natural resources.²¹ Society as a whole is in control of property and resources to build a communality in which individuals “do not live or work in isolation but live in cooperation with one another.”²² Vissarion Belinsky, who was a Russian literary critic and contemporary of Dostoevsky, was a staunch proponent of socialism in Russia. For Belinsky, “socialism was the final and best fruit of Western civilization.”²³ Belinsky said, “the free and rational development of Russian national life coincides with the aspirations of Western socialism.”²⁴ Thus, according to Belinsky, reason in combination with the sphere of politics leads toward socialism.

Reason was also applied to religion to create a “natural religion.”²⁵ In its less extreme form, this resulted in deism. In its more extreme form, the application of reason to religion was skepticism and atheism.²⁶ The overemphasis of reason paved the way for nihilism, a nineteenth-century philosophical movement in Russia, which focused on a dependence on rationalism and utilitarian principles.²⁷ Nineteenth-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche espoused this philosophic paradigm.²⁸ Nietzsche particularly attacked Christianity because it justified suffering with the idea that it would be recompensed by salvation in eternity after death.²⁹ One of his primary concerns was that it prioritized the “unseen” over the visible and the “obvious,” distracting humanity from present life in the world.³⁰ The word “*nihil*,” meaning “nothing,” reflected the central belief in nihilistic thought that neither God nor absolute morals existed in the world.³¹ For Nietzsche, love was a faculty that only weakened man.³² The only thing thought to be capable of saving society was complete and absolute acceptance of science.³³

Dostoevsky agreed with Enlightenment thinkers in many respects. He concurred with Hobbes on interpreting Scripture in a new way and in founding the question of human social order upon natural law.³⁴ He was also in accord with Rousseau contra Hobbes’ idea of liber-

alism, which held that the political leader must care only for matters of commerce and money.³⁵ Furthermore, he and Rousseau both shared the idea of establishing a social contract on the creeds of civil religion, and the idea that the political leader must follow the order and example set by Jewish law.³⁶ Nonetheless, he concurred with Nietzsche's interpretation of Rousseau: though Rousseau called for an adherence to Christian principles, he sought to abolish the "transcendent basis of these principles" in an ultimate effort for liberal-socialism, which he adapted from Hegel.³⁷

According to Anna Schur Kaladiouk, Dostoevsky was a stern critic of Enlightenment thought because of its proponents' excessive confidence that reason alone provided the basis for certainty and was the sole foundation of the realm of knowledge.³⁸ Diane Oenning Thompson expounds on the fear Dostoevsky had upon seeing the Crystal Palace at the World Exhibition in London: this was a Tower of Babel for Dostoevsky, a foreboding of the end-result of society's strivings to assert the dominance of human nature through scientific advancements.³⁹ Rowan Williams describes how Dostoevsky also criticizes the Crystal Palace in his work, *Notes from Underground*, through his character the Underground Man:

The 'derision' with which the Underground Man regards the Crystal Palace of a future in which all needs are rational and can be rationally satisfied is the expression of a desire for a world in which human needs were not reduced to what could be rationally satisfied; if that is all there is, the palace will in reality be a 'henhouse.' And it is a proper matter for derision if the powers that be are constantly trying to persuade us that these squalid surroundings are actually splendid. If only we could really be convinced of that, these deeper desires could be forgotten, but the very existence of the desires begs the question, "Can I have been made for only one thing, to come at last to the conclusion that my whole make-up is nothing but a cheat?"⁴⁰

Thus, to reduce humans simply to beings that only need fulfillment of their rational needs is to strip away the entire meaning of life. Rationality does not offer true answers to life's most pressing questions; if rationality is all there is to satisfy humans, life is simply "a cheat." Thompson also notes how Dostoevsky saw science as a "finite truth," rather than a "complete truth," meaning it had its limitations.⁴¹

The Argument of the Grand Inquisitor:

The Grand Inquisitor's primary case against Christ is that He fails to provide for humanity in three key ways.⁴² The Grand Inquisitor references the three temptations Christ faced in the wilderness, and how the answer to these temptations predicts the future of human history.⁴³ The Grand Inquisitor seeks to illuminate the ideal human order for the perfection of human society, "which [is that which] satisfies the three basic human needs articulated in the temptations."⁴⁴ The first temptation Christ faced was the temptation to turn stones into bread.⁴⁵ In the second temptation Satan dared Christ to throw Himself down from the pinnacle of the temple so the angels would rescue Him and He could prove that He is the Son of God.⁴⁶ Finally, Satan tempted Christ with all of the kingdoms of the earth if He should bow down and worship him.⁴⁷ In withstanding these temptations, Christ also rejected miracle, mystery, and authority, which are the only powers that are able to take the "consciences of these feeble rebels."⁴⁸ Believing Christ to have condemned man to violence and suffering in rejecting these three powers, he claims that he will burn Christ at the stake the next day as a heretic.⁴⁹

In the first temptation, The Grand Inquisitor rebukes Christ for failing to give men pure, indisputable evidence for Him that would get rid of the necessity for faith.⁵⁰ The Grand Inquisitor is on the side of Satan: he thinks Christ should have given in to his call to transform the stones into loaves because few are able to withstand the desire for "earthly bread" over "heavenly bread"⁵¹—which would require faith. Christ believed freedom for humanity was essential to give to humans.⁵² Nonetheless, the Grand Inquisitor believes that freedom to desire heavenly bread does not make humans happy: one cannot ask virtue of people until they are fed.⁵³

In the second temptation the Grand Inquisitor specifically critiques Christ's rejection of miracle.⁵⁴ He does not believe humankind is strong enough to face such a temptation.⁵⁵ It would have been better

for Christ to perform the miracle because, human beings—“are they gods?”⁵⁶ They are not able to withstand the “free decision of the heart”⁵⁷ and follow God without miracles, and it should not be their fault that they are weak.⁵⁸ God acted as if he does not respect men at all because he demanded so much of them. Although, according to Him, there are a few men who *are* “gods,”—those able to endure suffering and Christ’s cross—most men are not able to tolerate what God endured.⁵⁹

The final temptation sees Christ denying men the universality of worship. Man longs for the universal, to be united together as one.⁶⁰ The Grand Inquisitor says that to capitulate to this temptation would have brought peace for all.⁶¹ All would have been able to bow down to “the mighty spirit” and fulfill this great need of theirs, to have someone take over the freedom of their conscience.⁶² Nonetheless, instead, God divided up mankind between the strong—the “chosen ones”⁶³—and the weak, and Christ denied the weak the ability to be united under one commonality.⁶⁴

For the Grand Inquisitor, freedom is not a means of liberating the human being, but rather a hindrance, subjugating him under more bonds. The freedom of which the Grand Inquisitor speaks is the freedom of reason, the freedom of conscience, the freedom of choice.⁶⁵ It is the ability for a person to decide whether or not there is a higher cause to serve. There is indeed bread all around a person, but there is not one clear and indisputable bread.⁶⁶ Thus, he believes “nothing has ever been more insufferable for man and for human society than freedom!”⁶⁷ for men still remain hungry.⁶⁸ Freedom is really a snare: humans would prefer to give up their freedom and “be enslaved,” so long as they are fed.⁶⁹ For the Grand Inquisitor, it is in the best interest of human happiness to submit freedom to a higher power, namely, the Church.⁷⁰ Its grand scheme of ‘salvation’ for the people is to take away their freedom, to “keep the mystery.”⁷¹ People need a clear cause for which to live, and so they go to the Church, where they are sustained and provided for.⁷²

What the Church offers its people, happiness in the subjugation of their freedom, is an inversion of the truth of the human condition. The people are told the only way to utilize freedom is to submit it to a false and artificial construction in the Church.⁷³ Rowan Williams explains:

...in the Inquisitor's great monologue, we see that a 'truth' which seeks the definitive exclusion of Christ for the sake of the compassionate management of human affairs can only be maintained by deliberate falsehood: by the denial that freedom is anything more than the choices enabled for reasonable beings in a state of security, by the persuasion that these choices are the same as real freedom, by the appeal to a clear system of rewards and punishments, so that moral choices are constrained by imagined consequences, and finally by the appropriation of religious rhetoric to sanction the static and controlled society that all this implies. From the Underground Man to the Inquisitor, the persistent theme is that truth 'outside' of Christ requires lying about the human condition.⁷⁴

The Church seeks to empower its people by taking away their freedom; but, instead, it offers only a false and distorted form of the truth. The idea that the people's needs can be fulfilled so easily by a rational and ordered system—by material needs and policies to provide for those needs—apart from Christ is to expropriate from them what it means to be human.⁷⁵

This construction does not offer any ultimate happiness, for the church leaders still remain dissatisfied. According to the Grand Inquisitor, the ability to bear one's pure freedom of conscience is only for the strong; the "miracle, mystery, and authority" that the Church offers the people is for the weak.⁷⁶ However, in either regard, whether one is a Church leader or a layperson, one still faces slavery. The lay-people, merely "entice[d] with a heavenly and eternal reward," are enslaved by false teaching of the Church.⁷⁷ Yet, what the Grand Inquisitor does not understand is that he and other leaders of the Church, who are undecieved and retain freedom of conscience, are also enslaved. Without a higher absolute authority to whom the church leaders may submit, they are chained to a frightening world that has no moral end.

Even the Grand Inquisitor does not believe freedom of reason to be a panacea, but rather foolishness. According to him: "Freedom, free reason, and science will lead them into such a maze, and confront them with such miracles and insoluble mysteries, that some of them,

unruly and ferocious, will exterminate themselves; others, unruly but feeble, will exterminate each other; and the remaining third, feeble and wretched will crawl to our feet....⁷⁷⁸ Freedom of reason pursued to its natural end results in violence or despair. Though, “there is nothing more seductive for man than the freedom of his conscience... there is nothing more tormenting either.”⁷⁷⁹ He regards freedom of reason as a great burden for mankind: “Instead of the firm ancient law, man had henceforth to decide of himself, with a free heart, what is good and what is evil, having only your image before him as a guide—but did it not occur to you that he would eventually reject and dispute even your image and your truth if he was oppressed by so terrible a burden as freedom of choice?”⁷⁸⁰ Humans empowered with the ability to reason freely will rely on themselves, rather than the image of God, as they search for truth. Thus, it only leads one away from God.⁸¹

Yet, the Grand Inquisitor is the quintessential example of the Enlightenment’s overemphasis on reason and science. Though he regards the liberation of the conscience as the worst of evils, he blames God for something that is his own doing. The Grand Inquisitor says that having been left without miracles by God, man “create[d] new miracles for himself, his own miracles this time,” though they might be “godless.”⁸² The “fire from heaven” brought by the “spirit of the earth” is modern technology, the “miracle” that creates bread from stones.⁸³ The Grand Inquisitor said he saw that there is no greatness in “achieving moral perfection of the will,” and so he went and “joined. . . the intelligent people.”⁸⁴ This is the Enlightened person, who wants to free himself from having any need of God. He wants to be able to assert that man alone, with his capability to reason, is all one needs. For Rousseau, true religion is that which is ‘near’ oneself: one is able to follow one’s reason toward conscience, which is the guiding morality for life placed by God.⁸⁵ There is no need to commune with God because He is unknowable. Thus, worship of God is the equivalent of using one’s capability to reason, which nearly negates any need of God. Alyosha, Ivan’s brother of faith to whom he tells the story of the “Grand Inquisitor,” correctly asserts that the entire secret of these “intelligent people” is that they do not believe in God at all.⁸⁶ When one relies solely on freedom to reason as a moral guide, there is no room for faith in God because there is no communion with God. It is not surprising, then, when the Grand Inquisitor admits to Christ that he works for “*him*.”⁸⁷ The result is the breakdown of ethics: anti-communality, brother destroying brother.⁸⁸

The Grand Inquisitor claims to love humanity more than God does, and thus thinks it necessary to build a secular Church. He tells Christ that the burden of having to choose Him when He has made himself “enigmatic” and disputable is “beyond men’s strength.”⁸⁹ As a result, he accuses Christ of not loving man at all, though He gave his life for them: “respecting him less, you would have demanded less of him, and that would be closer to love, for his burden would be lighter.”⁹⁰ The Grand Inquisitor seeks to divert people from this “pull toward the sacred” by creating a secular Church. This Church’s aim is to bring humanity together under a new form of communality, as it unites all through submission of their freedom to the Church.⁹¹ The Church will ‘love’ and care for these weak souls, as if it cares more about them than Christ does.⁹² Understanding the great cost that comes with replacing God, the Church takes on a new “responsibility,”⁹³ namely, that the Grand Inquisitor and his fellow leaders aspire to be “secular christ.”⁹⁴ They will allow the people to sin freely, and will suffer for the sake of the people; they will take on the punishment of the people and bear their sins.⁹⁵

The Grand Inquisitor is an archetypal nihilist because he seeks to become a god-like figure. Ivan desires to rid humanity of absolute moral truth which “[expresses] itself in notions such as ‘God’ and ‘immortality,’ [for it] is manifestly a propensity for self-deception.”⁹⁶ These ideas directly influence his creation of the character, the Grand Inquisitor, who denies to himself that there is a more supreme authority—God—than he. Denying the authoritative right of the Divine, he takes it upon himself to be a superman figure to save society.⁹⁷ In the nihilistic framework, one reaches an impasse when there is an acceptance that there is no absolute morality.⁹⁸ Without God, “everything is permitted,”—the natural end for Ivan’s worldview.⁹⁹ Thus one is faced with two choices, either a “denial” or “creation”—the latter being the choice of Nietzsche.¹⁰⁰ The act of creation is where one becomes a “superman” who takes up the position of God.¹⁰¹ The Grand Inquisitor sees himself as a savior of humanity, who will bear the burdens of the people and be their ultimate authority.¹⁰²

The Grand Inquisitor’s new secular “Church” is the equivalent of an Enlightened political regime, particularly a liberal-socialist form of government. Asserting that humans long to be rid of their freedom, the Grand Inquisitor speaks of how the Church will take it up, this “torment of personal and free decision.”¹⁰³ The Church will thereby “protect”

human freedom, as Rousseau calls the state to protect the rights of the individuals,¹⁰⁴ by keeping their freedom and enslaving mankind. This is a twist on the liberal conception of the protection of individual freedom, which was a prominent Enlightenment-era idea.¹⁰⁵ The Grand Inquisitor is also shaped by De Tocqueville: he presents his case as De Tocqueville does, highlighting the faultiness of a democratic system in maintaining the freedom of individuals.¹⁰⁶ The call of the Grand Inquisitor is the call of the liberal-socialist regime, in which mankind is brought into a “universal and general union.”¹⁰⁷ Joseph Frank summarizes Dostoevsky’s view of socialism by explaining that “propagandists” from the Catholic Church will “preach to the working masses...that while ‘formerly the main force of religion lay in humility,’ that time has passed. ‘Christ Himself commanded you all to be brothers [and] if your elder brothers do not want to accept you, then take up sticks and go into their homes and compel them to be your brothers.’”¹⁰⁸ The Church will create a unified brotherhood out of humanity through brother’s compulsion of brother, and ultimately in submission to the Church itself as a higher authority.

Dostoevsky’s Response to the Grand Inquisitor

Dostoevsky seeks to prove that the nihilistic worldview of Ivan and the Grand Inquisitor, which is the natural end of Enlightenment thinking, is paradoxical.¹⁰⁹ Ivan Karamazov fully embraces reason, and, as a scientist and atheist, reflects these views in the Grand Inquisitor.¹¹⁰ The Grand Inquisitor believes that truth is something tangible: he criticizes Christ for entering earth “empty-handed.”¹¹¹ Christ did not perform miracles, and thus did not satisfy the desire for empirical evidence demanded by the Grand Inquisitor. Hence, the Church replaces this need for a tangible, visible authority by establishing itself as its own authority. This “freedom understood as self-construction” is nihilism.¹¹² As a result, the Church offers the people only an empty authority to whom they can submit. But even the Church leaders, although they are the higher authorities, remain unhappy because they do not believe in serving a higher, absolute cause.¹¹³ Williams posits that Dostoevsky’s own view is that “atheism is effectively the end of culture, since it is bound to reduce human practices to the level of arbitrary constructs.”¹¹⁴ Without a higher being—a divine authority with absolute guiding moral principles—humans can only create artificial moral constructs which fail

to further society. The Church will allow lawlessness to reign in a system where there is no true redemption. Love of humanity does not equate to love of individual humans.¹¹⁵ As Dostoevsky said: “Those who love men in general hate men in particular.”¹¹⁶ Without any moral basis, they have created an order in which love does not exist.

Ivan is blinded to the concept of genuine love because of his desire to rid the world of absolute truth. This would not translate to humanity being founded upon love, but rather upon amorality. Ivan can only love a person on his own terms, and is unable to accept certain aspects of a person: “his bad breath, his foolish face, his ill manners—threaten Ivan’s sovereign selfhood...Despite his eager embrace of the world, therefore, Ivan wants to remain a solitary and transcendent judge over it...”¹¹⁷ Though Ivan, through the Grand Inquisitor, imagines a communal and united world, he lives in “autonomous and anti-communal terms.”¹¹⁸ Bruce Ward asserts that the Grand Inquisitor “cannot possibly love humanity; and, in the absence of love, his solicitude for human weakness must be regarded as an expression of contempt. His contempt may be mitigated by love to the extent that his nihilism is incomplete.”¹¹⁹ Ivan desires the ultimate good of humanity, its release from suffering, but is incapable of loving it because he does not believe in a divine, absolute authority from whom love originates. The Grand Inquisitor’s nihilist philosophy thus negates the possibility for him to love. When Alyosha approaches Ivan with a kiss in answer to the poem, “The Grand Inquisitor,” he merely dismisses it, and calls it “literary theft” because Ivan is unable to grasp the idea of love as the solution to evil.¹²⁰

In the political sphere, Dostoevsky believes in a kind of political regime that would agree with the Enlightenment ideal of liberal-socialism; but he only thinks it feasible when it is wedded to Christ’s message of love and faith.¹²¹ Even when he was a European liberal in his youth, Dostoevsky did not believe that a “scientific reorganization of society” would be able to answer the quandary of human suffering.¹²² For him, this was to “reduce the ultimate ‘mystery of man,’... to the question of social organization.”¹²³ Ivan thinks the authority of the Church and state can only be a dictatorial power that suppresses freedom and independence.¹²⁴ The Grand Inquisitor represents the idea that socialism, while seemingly expressing the good and overall welfare of humanity, really is the expression of something evil: it represents the death of liberty, and hence the disintegration of human dignity.¹²⁵ Liberal-socialism for Dostoevsky only leads to tyranny and the loss of

freedom.¹²⁶ Once Dostoevsky came to know Christ once again years later, he says, “I received Christ into my soul once more, whom I knew in the home of my childhood, and who I all but lost when in my turn I changed into a ‘European Liberal.’”¹²⁷ Following his conversion, he did not entirely abandon his former European liberalism, but modified it to his Christian ideals.¹²⁸ Joseph Alulis explains how this idea affects Dostoevsky’s writing of “The Grand Inquisitor.”

The form of the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor, an opposition between the Grand Inquisitor and Christ, serves another purpose critical to Dostoevsky’s intent. Christ’s message of love articulates a truth about what it means to be human that is essential to the human capacity to sustain freedom. This is the idea, presented in *Winter Notes*, that brotherhood is natural, and brotherhood means putting the other first. Dostoevsky’s lesson is that the liberal regime will not be able to preserve its liberty unless it inculcates the principle of self-abnegation and this principle reflects the truth that human beings by nature participate in some way in immortality.¹²⁹

For Dostoevsky, love can be defined as “love for the freedom of one’s neighbor,” as Orthodox theologian Georges Florovsky describes.¹³⁰ To love the freedom of another requires “self-abnegation” through faith, participation in immortality. Dostoevsky believes it is possible to create a true brotherhood when politics are combined with the communal embrace of love through faith. Faith redefines what it means to be human, so that when humankind is bound into brotherhood by love, the protection of the freedom of individuals naturally results.

In Orthodox theology, which shapes much of Dostoevsky’s work, the theological conception of *theosis* can be thought to replace the nihilistic ideal for god-like power through reason. Bishop Kallistos Ware describes *theosis* as a “process of divinization [that] . . . begin[s] here and now in this present life,” a process through which humans become gods.¹³¹ One is deified through prayer “in spirit and in truth,” partaking of the sacraments, and following the commandments.¹³² *Theosis* is a process that is founded upon love: men cannot become gods without “love of God and love of neighbor.”¹³³ This deifying process stands in contrast to the nihilistic ideal of becoming a godlike “superman,” in that it is only undergone through faith in God and love. Furthermore, it is in accordance with Dostoevsky’s political ideal of a regime founded upon faith, for the process of deification is what creates a true communality.

Ultimately, Dostoevsky differs from Enlightenment thinkers in that he believes the answer for human order to be found in rationality *in combination with* biblical revelation.¹³⁴ Although it may appear that faith and reason have an either-or relationship, the two are not mutually exclusive.¹³⁵ Rather, the solution to this apparent dichotomy lies in going back to the original teachings of Scripture.¹³⁶ For Dostoevsky, the two are entirely compatible. He believed that “reason, too, is on the side of God and immortality.”¹³⁷ Dostoevsky does not think reason and faith to be entirely in conflict with one another because the human’s ability to reach God is based “upon a faculty which is of a different order than reason, rather than simply opposed to it.”¹³⁸ Whereas reason is based on material understanding, the human’s understanding of God must be based on an immaterial understanding (138), that is, love which is from the heart (139).¹³⁹

For Dostoevsky, many scientists make the mistake of trying to conceive of deity with one’s own mind. Dostoevsky was particularly well-versed in the ideas of Nikolai Strakhov, agreeing with his ideas about the relationship between the observable, that which can be seen and observed in our own world, and the things that are beyond the observable.¹⁴⁰ According to Strakhov, the human imagination limits man’s capability to “confront a world where all familiar relationships are suspended” because it is so rooted in the empirical, as Kaladiouk explains.¹⁴¹ Thus, the human mind is simply incapable of conceiving of the “eternal” and “infinity.”¹⁴² In the same way, one cannot use one’s mind to fully understand God because he is immaterial and beyond mere imagination.¹⁴³ Natural scientists often try to “personify” God, and think of Him as “another variety of matter or force.”¹⁴⁴ However, it is impossible to think of a limitless and immeasurable God in this way. As Kaladiouk describes in recapitulating Strakhov, “the path leading to God lies not through imagination but through pure, self-controlling, and self-determining thought, free from the constraints imposed by the empirical reality that molds our imaginative resources.”¹⁴⁵ It is only through abandonment of the empirical imagination that one can truly come to conceive of the Deity.

Dostoevsky’s answer to Ivan lies in the use of a different limb than the empirical imagination: faith. Dostoevsky seeks to demonstrate that the dismissal of faith as a mere “act of self-assertion” neither provides any sense of morality nor any grand purpose to humanity.¹⁴⁶ However, as, Rowan Williams articulates:

If I recognize faith as generated from outside, by events in which the world appears unpredictably as grace and above all by the phenomenon of Jesus, what I do in the light of this irruption becomes a witness to the authenticity and independence of the source of faith—and thus to a reality that is not an item within ‘the truth’ about the world but is the context within which this ‘truth’ is fully illuminated.¹⁴⁷

Faith is not something that arises from pure science and reason. It is a “defiant declaration” that is opposed to the pure “rational fabric” of the world “within” the empirical imagination.¹⁴⁸ Faith comes from “without,” from a source independent from the human world. However, one is able to see the truth that lies in the world when one acquires eyes of faith. Dostoevsky’s message for the reader is that faith cannot be taken out of consideration in the equation.¹⁴⁹ It is not possible to explain or assert truth without faith in Christ.¹⁵⁰ Truth is found in the “sacred,” and the world is left devoid of depth when it is stripped of faith.¹⁵¹

Christ demonstrates in each of the temptations that the act of faith requires voluntary submission of freedom to a merciful and Higher Being.¹⁵² Christ’s rationale against the first temptation is that “man does not live by bread alone,” thus meaning that man cannot live by pure empiricism.¹⁵³ There must be some other faculty that man must use in order to live; this faculty is faith. In the second temptation, Christ withstood the devil and thus acted “proudly and magnificently, like God.”¹⁵⁴ In this He gave humans the freedom to believe without tangible evidence; the freedom to seek God rather than miracles.¹⁵⁵ God wants love that is free, not love that is obligatory because a miracle has been performed.¹⁵⁶ In the last temptation, Christ endows humans with freedom of choice, rather than compulsion to worship Him.¹⁵⁷ Dostoevsky adheres to orthodox theologian Vladimir Lossky’s idea that freedom of choice is evidence of sin “overclouding” human nature because humans are unable to recognize what is true.¹⁵⁸ Free submission of the will to God is that which allows one to endure the suffering that is wrought by human freedom.¹⁵⁹ True freedom is giving up one’s own will freely to be able to perform the will of God.¹⁶⁰

True freedom lies in the act of loving. Dostoevsky believes that the conclusion to which Ivan arrives—that is, rejecting what God has created—is “extreme blasphemy and the kernel of the idea of destruction of our time.”¹⁶¹ Furthermore, for Dostoevsky, the answer to humanity’s problem presented by Ivan is not answerable intellectually.¹⁶² The kiss of Christ is a symbol of freedom: “it literally secures freedom from the prison and it represents the freedom to refuse the argument over power and tragic necessity,” as Ralph Wood states.¹⁶³ Christ’s kiss is a powerful weapon against the resolved rationalist and scientific mind, so much so that the Grand Inquisitor lets Christ out of prison. As Williams describes, “Christ’s response to the Inquisitor’s delineation of the ‘real’ world is an act of gratuitous compassion—not the Inquisitorial compassion that seeks to remove the suffering by force, but a bare recognition of the Inquisitor’s imprisonment in the tragic contradiction of falsehood for the sake of truth.”¹⁶⁴ The kiss is a declaration of truth; it is a demonstration of the power of love and its ability to break the bonds of incarceration.

Dostoevsky uses Christ in the story to exemplify how human flourishing can only occur through love, that which science and reason do not teach. The Grand Inquisitor and Ivan’s rejection of suffering is also rejection of the possibility for forgiveness and healing.¹⁶⁵ The silence of Christ is the most profound response to Ivan and his Grand Inquisitor that could possibly be made; it is the only proper response to nihilism.¹⁶⁶ Because the Grand Inquisitor and the other Church leaders remain unhappy in the end, he demonstrates the void that persists without a higher authority to whom they can submit their freedom.¹⁶⁷ This fruitless attempt at “loving” humanity by “keeping the mystery” does not offer the hope of future redemption.¹⁶⁸ Christ’s silence “indicates his patient confidence” that evil can be undone and the kiss is proof that good can come from evil.¹⁶⁹ For Williams, echoing Dostoevsky, “Meaning comes by the exercise of freedom—but not *any* sort of exercise of freedom. By taking the step of loving attention in the mundane requirements of life together, something is *disclosed*. But that step is itself enabled by a prior disclosure, the presence of gratuity in and behind the phenomena of the world: of some unconditional love.”¹⁷⁰ True freedom is unconditional love enacted through faith in an absolute and merciful deity. This is a redemptive force that gives meaning to life and is able to undo the greatest of evils.

Christ sets a model of love through *kenosis* as the way to address evil and tyranny. Wood describes this “divine self-emptying” as the “emptying of human egoism for the sake of true charity.”¹⁷¹ The Grand Inquisitor’s “solution” to evil is to feed the hungry with bread, knowing that this will subdue individual freedom since “freedom and earthly bread in plenty for everyone are inconceivable together.”¹⁷² And those who do not submit their freedom will only commit greater evil and acts of violence that will end in anthropophagy.¹⁷³ Yet the kenotic act is not only an act of freedom but also an act of selflessness—of free submission of the will. One is strengthened by faith to forgo earthly bread by this action of love. Christ’s kiss empowers the human to use love as a response to tyranny. Christ sets forth the model for the proper reply when “this nonworldly freedom becomes apparent,” giving humans “a new capacity for reflecting or echoing that love.”¹⁷⁴ Thus Alyosha acts with a decisive step of *kenosis*, endowed with this ability to reflect Christ’s self-emptying model of love. His kiss to Ivan is a triumph over evil, a statement of belief over Ivan’s unbelief.¹⁷⁵

The Enlightenment’s stress of reason for the benefit of humankind is well intentioned, but is missing a key ingredient for the transformation of humanity: love through faith. The result of freeing one’s mind through total Enlightenment is ironic because it is opposite of freedom—it causes one to be imprisoned in a cage of strict rationality. It makes one independent from any need of God, invalidates the need for morality—nihilism—and creates a false and violent brotherhood in an effort to “preserve” freedom—liberal-socialism. For Dostoevsky, this is really the opposite of loving one’s neighbor, a suppression of human freedom. Dostoevsky uses Christ’s role in “The Grand Inquisitor” to demonstrate how one should act in the face of a nihilistic and liberal-socialist age to bring about true freedom. True freedom lies in something that reason does not offer. It requires the use of a different ligament, the ability to escape the empirical imagination in the exercise of faith. Love can be exercised unto its greatest potential through faith and *theosis*, following the model of Divine *kenosis*, for true freedom and brotherhood.

NOTES

- ¹ Dostoevsky, *Brothers*, 249.
- ² *Ibid*, 254.
- ³ *Ibid*.
- ⁴ *Ibid*, 254-5.
- ⁵ Nadis, *Enlightenment*, Accessed 16 Nov. 2016.
- ⁶ *Ibid*.
- ⁷ Ward, *Dostoevskiy's*, 12.
- ⁸ *Ibid*.
- ⁹ *Ibid*, 13.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid*.
- ¹¹ Thompson, *Dostoevskii*, 192.
- ¹² *Ibid*.
- ¹³ *Ibid*, 191.
- ¹⁴ "Enlightenment." *Britannica Academic*.
- ¹⁵ "Liberalism." *Britannica Academic*.
- ¹⁶ "Enlightenment." *Encyclopædia Britannica*.
- ¹⁷ Rousseau, *Essential*, 189.
- ¹⁸ De Tocqueville, *Democracy*, 418.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid*.
- ²⁰ Alulis, *Dostoevsky*, 211 qtd.
- ²¹ "Socialism." *Britannica Academic*.
- ²² *Ibid*.
- ²³ Ward, *Dostoevskiy's*, 23.
- ²⁴ *Ibid*.
- ²⁵ "Enlightenment." *Encyclopædia Britannica*.
- ²⁶ *Ibid*.
- ²⁷ "Nihilism." *World History*.
- ²⁸ "Friedrich Nietzsche." *World History*.
- ²⁹ *Ibid*.
- ³⁰ *Ibid*.
- ³¹ "Nihilism."
- ³² Renjen, *Ivan*, 21.
- ³³ "Nihilism."
- ³⁴ Ward, *Dostoevskiy's*, 5.
- ³⁵ *Ibid*.
- ³⁶ *Ibid*.
- ³⁷ *Ibid*.
- ³⁸ Kaladiouk, *Dostoevsky*, 419.

³⁹Thompson, *Dostoevskii*, 191-192.

⁴⁰Williams, *Dostoevsky*, 18-19.

⁴¹Thompson, *Dostoevskii*, 192.

⁴²Dostoevsky, *Brothers*, 252.

⁴³Ward, *Dostoevsky's*, 103.

⁴⁴Ibid, Ibid.

⁴⁵Dostoevsky, *Brothers*, 252.

⁴⁶Ibid, 255.

⁴⁷Ibid, 257.

⁴⁸Ibid, 255.

⁴⁹Ibid, 257.

⁵⁰Ibid, 252.

⁵¹Ibid, 253.

⁵²Ibid, 251.

⁵³Ibid, 253.

⁵⁴Ibid, 255.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Ibid, 256.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Ibid, 257.

⁶¹Ibid, 258.

⁶²Ibid, 257.

⁶³Ibid, 258.

⁶⁴Ibid, 253.

⁶⁵Ibid, 258.

⁶⁶Ibid, 254.

⁶⁷Ibid, 252.

⁶⁸Ibid, 253.

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Ibid, 259.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²Ibid, 254.

⁷³Ibid, 259.

⁷⁴Williams, *Dostoevsky*, 30.

⁷⁵Ibid., 228.

⁷⁶Wood, *Ivan*, 35.

⁷⁷Dostoevsky, *Brothers*, 259.

- ⁷⁸ Dostoevsky, *Brothers*, 258.
- ⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 255.
- ⁸⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 255, 258.
- ⁸² *Ibid.*, 255-6.
- ⁸³ Alulis, *Dostoevsky*, 212.
- ⁸⁴ Dostoevsky, *Brothers*, 261.
- ⁸⁵ Rousseau, *Essential*, 240-258.
- ⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 246-7, 261.
- ⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 257.
- ⁸⁸ Wood, *Ivan*, 34.
- ⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 261, 254.
- ⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 254-5, 256.
- ⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 254.
- ⁹² *Ibid.*, 253.
- ⁹³ Williams, *Dostoevsky*, 229.
- ⁹⁴ Wood, *Ivan*, 34.
- ⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 259.
- ⁹⁶ Ward, *Dostoevsky's*, 126.
- ⁹⁷ Renjen, *Ivan*, 22.
- ⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.
- ⁹⁹ Ward, *Dostoevsky's*, 126-7; Renjen, *Ivan*, 21.
- ¹⁰⁰ Renjen, *Ivan*, 22.
- ¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 21.
- ¹⁰² Dostoevsky, *Brothers*, 259.
- ¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 258, 259.
- ¹⁰⁴ Rousseau, *Essential*, 189.
- ¹⁰⁵ "Liberalism." *Britannica Academic*.
- ¹⁰⁶ Alulis, *Dostoevsky*, 210.
- ¹⁰⁷ Dostoevsky, *Brothers*, 257; Alulis, *Dostoevsky*, 212.
- ¹⁰⁸ Alulis, *Dostoevsky*, qtd. on 212.
- ¹⁰⁹ Ward, *Dostoevsky's*, 139.
- ¹¹⁰ Kaladiouk, *Dostoevsky*, 417.
- ¹¹¹ Dostoevsky, *Brothers*, 252.
- ¹¹² Wood, *Ivan*, 35.
- ¹¹³ Dostoevsky, *Brothers*, 259.
- ¹¹⁴ Williams, *Dostoevsky*, 230.
- ¹¹⁵ Wood, *Ivan*, 32.
- ¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

- ¹¹⁷ Ibid., 30.
¹¹⁸ Wood, *Ivan*, 30.
¹¹⁹ Ibid., 127.
¹²⁰ Wood, *Ivan*, 34; Dostoevsky, *Brothers*, 263.
¹²¹ Alulis, *Dostoevsky*, 211.
¹²² Ward, *Dostoevsky's*, 29.
¹²³ Ibid.
¹²⁴ Wood, *Ivan*, 35.
¹²⁵ Alulis, *Dostoevsky*, 211.
¹²⁶ Ward, *Dostoevsky's*, 5.
¹²⁷ Ibid., qtd. on 31.
¹²⁸ Ibid., 33.
¹²⁹ Alulis, *Dostoevsky*, 211.
¹³⁰ Williams, *Dostoevsky*, qtd. on 182.
¹³¹ Williams, *Dostoevsky*, 7, 236.
¹³² Ibid., 236.
¹³³ Ibid., 237.
¹³⁴ Ward, *Dostoevsky's*, 6.
¹³⁵ Ibid.
¹³⁶ Ibid.
¹³⁷ Kaladiouk, *Dostoevsky*, qtd. on 419.
¹³⁸ Ward, *Dostoevsky's*, 137.
¹³⁹ Ibid., 138, 139.
¹⁴⁰ Kaladiouk, *Dostoevsky*, 433.
¹⁴¹ Ibid.
¹⁴² Ibid.
¹⁴³ Ibid., 433, 434.
¹⁴⁴ Ibid.
¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 434.
¹⁴⁶ Williams, *Dostoevsky*, 38.
¹⁴⁷ Ibid.
¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 44.
¹⁴⁹ Dostoevsky, *Brothers*, 229.
¹⁵⁰ Ibid.
¹⁵¹ Ibid.
¹⁵² Wood, *Ivan*, 35.
¹⁵³ Dostoevsky, *Brothers*, 252.
¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 255.
¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

- ¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 256.
¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 257.
¹⁵⁸ Wood, *Ivan*, 33.
¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 35.
¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 33.
¹⁶¹ Dostoevsky, quoted in Kaladiouk, *Dostoersky*, 424.
¹⁶² Williams, *Dostoersky*, 38 ; Wood, *Ivan*, 31.
¹⁶³ Wood, *Ivan*, 31.
¹⁶⁴ Williams, *Dostoersky*, 30-31.
¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 39.
¹⁶⁶ Ibid, 136.
¹⁶⁷ Dostoevsky, *Brothers*, 259.
¹⁶⁸ Ibid.
¹⁶⁹ Wood, *Ivan*, 34.
¹⁷⁰ Williams, *Dostoersky*, 44.
¹⁷¹ Wood, *Ivan*, 32.
¹⁷² Dostoevsky, *Brothers*, 253.
¹⁷³ Ibid., 258.
¹⁷⁴ Williams, *Dostoersky*, 31, 44.
¹⁷⁵ Wood, *Ivan*, 34.

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This paper is an examination of 1 Corinthians 11:17-34, a biblical passage in which Paul gives the Corinthian church advice about the proper way to receive communion. Paul wrote to the church in response to reports of division in the community, and his instructions regarding this important ritual are meant to affirm unity within the church, particularly between the poor and wealthy in the community. Because the Corinthian church was treating communion as a private meal, poor members of the community were being unduly excluded. Paul redirects the church, encouraging them to practice communion according to the biblical tradition so that they might stand united in the body and blood of Christ.

Unity in 1 Corinthians 11:17-34

Hannah Rogers

In 1 Corinthians 11:17-34, Paul displays that the Lord's Supper should be a unifying force in the church as opposed to the divisive force it had become within the Corinthian community. In my reading of the text, I examine how the Corinthian church was distorting the Lord's Supper. I also inquire as to how exactly Paul expects the Lord's Supper to unite the Corinthians. Furthermore, I consider what changes, if any, Paul wants the Corinthians to make to their actual practice of the Lord's Supper. After a close examination of the text, I believe it is likely that the division present in the Lord's Supper stemmed from the sharp divide between the rich and poor, and that Paul's instructions concerning the Lord's Supper were written to steer the Corinthians away from treating the Lord's Supper as a regular meal. In this way, the poor would no longer be alienated during the taking of the Lord's Supper, and the community could authentically celebrate the death and resurrection of Christ.

1 Corinthians 11:17-34 comes from Paul's letter to the Corinthians. In this text, Paul expresses displeasure with the divisive manner in which the Corinthians take the Lord's Supper. The main problem in the Corinthians' celebration of the Lord's Supper is that they treat it

as a personal meal, where some eat heartily and others go hungry. Paul scolds them for this practice, saying that such behavior shows disrespect to the Lord and to the community.

Paul then explains the origin of the Lord's Supper, saying that the practice was given to him by Christ. Jesus instructed His followers to eat the bread and drink from the cup both in remembrance of Him and as a proclamation of His death.

Paul next explains the seriousness of the Lord's Supper. Those taking the Lord's Supper ought to examine themselves closely. Those who do not consider themselves or the body and blood of Christ call the judgement of the Lord upon themselves. Paul asserts that it is because of their lack of discernment that several of the Corinthian church members are sick and dying. Paul says that those who do not take the Lord's Supper seriously will be disciplined by the Lord in order that they not be condemned with the world.

Paul finishes this section by again exhorting the Corinthians to eat the Lord's Supper as a community, promising to give further instructions on his next visit.

Contextual Analysis

During the first century, Corinth was a Roman colony filled with Greek influence. Located in the Peloponnese, Corinth was reinstated as a Roman colony in 44 BCE after an unsuccessful rebellion against the Romans one hundred years earlier.¹ The Roman government re-founded Corinth in hopes that its prime location would help Rome "develop trade links with Greece and with lands farther east."² The city grew and became a successful commercial center in Rome.³ Because of trade, there were people from many different parts of the Roman Empire represented in the population.⁴ As such, there was a large amount of diversity in Corinth. In addition, Corinth's success generated great wealth in the city. Some people became quite rich, but a significant segment of the population remained extremely poor.⁵ Consequently, most of the people in Corinth lived in poverty. All in all, Corinth was a diverse city comprised of differing nationalities, wealth, and religious practices.

It is in this atmosphere that 1 Corinthians was written and read. This letter was written by Paul "in Ephesus, about the year 54 [CE]."⁶ Paul had visited Corinth before; Acts records that Paul presented the gospel there "when Gallio was proconsul of Achaia" (Acts 18:12).

Scholars date Gallio's consulship at around 51 CE.⁷ In the three-year gap between Paul's visit and his letter, a great amount of conflict had arisen within the Corinthian church. Paul specifically mentions this conflict in the beginning of his letter, stating that "it has been reported to me by Chloe's people that there are quarrels among you" (1 Corinthians 1:11). Some of these arguments had to do with "the problem of strife and jealousy over former teachers."⁸ Others were related to church practice, especially disorder in worship.⁹ Other divisions within the church were the result of wealth disparity with "some socially 'strong' elite members [initiating] many of the problems."¹⁰ The diversity of religious practices, nationalities, and wealth present in Corinth was causing a large amount of division within the church in Corinth; Paul wrote his letter to address these quarrels.

One specific issue Paul addresses is the practice of the Lord's Supper. Background knowledge of Corinth's practice of the Lord's Supper is integral for understanding 1 Corinthians 11:17-34. Scholars agree that the church in Corinth was not practicing the Lord's Supper as modern church-goers typically do. Instead, they were incorporating the Lord's Supper into a typical Greco-Roman banquet, taking the elements in the setting of a community meal.¹¹ The bread would be served during the normal part of the meal, and the wine would be served after the meal was over, as was typically done during a Roman meal.¹² One aspect of the meal that contributed to the division within the Corinthian church is the practice of seating guests according to rank; the lowest members were typically served in the atrium, which served as an overflow space for the actual dining room, or triclinium.¹³ "Such guests complained about being served inferior food.... [compared to] those in the highest position."¹⁴ A dinner done in this way highlighted the wealth disparity present in Corinth and most likely facilitated more division within the church. In his letter, Paul encouraged the members of Corinth to avoid disunion and practice the Lord's Supper in a truly communal way.

Literary Context

1 Corinthians 11:17-34 takes place right after a discussion on the appropriate head coverings for men and women, and right before Paul elucidates spiritual gifts and the Body of Christ. Both of these sections also focus on unity within the church. Although at first glance Paul's instruction for women may seem divisive, a deeper reading shows that Paul is attempting to show the dependence of both sexes on God. He

states that “in the Lord woman is not independent of man or man independent of women... but all things come from God” (1 Corinthians 10:11). Essentially, Paul is pointing out that all members of the community, male or female, need to be unified under God. Similarly, after verses 17-34, Paul talks about spiritual gifts, telling the people of Corinth that “there are varieties of gifts, but the same spirit” (12:4). Throughout this section, Paul explores how the diverse gifts present in the Corinthian church should contribute to unity rather than disturb it. It is in this section that Paul’s metaphor of the Body of Christ is elucidated, which further encourages the Corinthians to be unified despite their differences. Considering that 1 Corinthians 11:17-34 is placed between two sections devoted to the promotion of church unity, it is likely that Paul intended for the instructions contained in this section to also contribute to unity in the Corinthian church.

The theme of church unity is one continued throughout the entire book of 1 Corinthians. Paul begins the book by scolding the Corinthians, rebuking them for the factions present in the church, and continues the discussion throughout the letter. One example of this, which is also important for understanding the symbolism in chapter 11, is Paul’s discussion of the Lord’s Supper in chapter 10. Paul states that “because there is one loaf, we, who are many, are one body, for we all share the one loaf” (10:17). This statement establishes the connection of the bread of the Lord’s Supper with the church community, and emphasizes the unifying force of this connection.¹⁵ This symbolism is later built upon in chapter 11. Throughout Corinthians, Paul often speaks directly concerning unity amongst the believers, and even when he is not explicitly speaking of church unity, this theme informs the practical and theological instruction Paul gives.

Formal Analysis

1 Corinthians 11:17-34 is a discourse included in the larger context of a letter. As such, it is an argument engineered to specific people in certain situations. The passage itself presents a theological idea that is geared to affect the practical situation of the church in Corinth. The instructions offered in this passage depend upon the theological explanation and apply directly to the particular circumstances of the Corinthian church.

Analysis of the Structure and Movement of the Text

The broad structure of this passage is chiasmic. The first section is related to church practice, describing a certain situation in the Corinthian church that ought to be remedied. The second section is a theological narrative, telling the story of the Last Supper in order to make a theological statement. The third section further explores the theological argument, explicating the ramifications of the theological narrative. The fourth section returns to the specific practice of the Corinthian church, this time focusing on the solution to the already present problem.

The first and last sections of the discourse are practical in nature, focusing on specific events in the Corinthian church. These two sections are connected through the phrase “when you come together” (11:18; 20; 33; 34). This phrase occurs once at the beginning and again in the middle of both sections, establishing the practical nature of these portions of the discourse. This statement informs the Corinthians that the problems being discussed are found in their own gatherings and must be changed. However while both sections deal with practicalities, there are differences between the two which are enhanced by the structure. In the first section, Paul uses the phrase “when you come together” to introduce the problem in the church. This phrase introduces critiques such as “there are divisions among you” and “it is not really to eat the Lord’s Supper [that you meet]” (11:18; 20). The purpose of this section is to deal with the problem occurring in the church; therefore, Paul uses the phrase to introduce what the Corinthians are doing wrong. In contrast, Paul uses this phrase in the fourth section to introduce solutions. Here this phrase precedes the statements “wait for one another” and “it will not be for your condemnation [that you meet]” (11:33; 34). Paul uses the same phrase in both sections to establish a similar concern with practicalities, but he changes what follows the phrase in a manner that achieves two different objectives, one problem-related and the other solution-oriented.

The second and third portions are concerned with providing a theological discussion of the problem. These two sections are connected through parallel statements that link the theological understanding of the Lord’s Supper with its practice. These statements are connected through the phrase “eat this bread and drink the cup” (vv. 26). The first statement asserts that “as often as you eat this bread and drink the cup, you proclaim the Lord’s death until he comes” (vv. 26). This

phrase reminds the church that its practice of the Lord's Supper goes beyond a simple meal or fellowship. Rather, it is a proclamation of what is central to Christianity: the death of Christ. As a result, how it practices the Lord's Supper becomes very important. The second statement occurs at the beginning of the third section of the discourse and has a similar effect. It asserts that whoever "eats the bread or drinks the cup of the Lord in an unworthy manner will be answerable for the body and blood of the Lord" (v. 27). This again establishes the importance of the Lord's Supper, reminding the church that this practice represents what is central to the Christian faith. However, this statement is not a simple repetition of the previous sentence, just as the third section of Paul's discourse is not a simple reiteration of the theological narrative in the section before it but rather an expansion of it. The statement in section two simply implies the importance of the Lord's Supper, while the statement in the third section adds the idea that eating the Lord's Supper in "an unworthy manner" will have consequences (v. 27). These consequences stem from a neglect of the theological importance of the Lord's Supper and make Paul's practical advice in the first and last sections vital for the Corinthian church.

Detailed Analysis

1 Corinthians 11: 17-22

Paul begins this passage by changing the tone from the former set of verses. At the beginning of the previous discussion, Paul affirms his praise of the Corinthians before he begins giving them instruction. Now, however, Paul uses the phrase "I do not praise" (11:17). In doing this, he connects the beginnings of both passages, creating a contrast between the tone of the first passage and the tone of the second. While the previous discussion concerns what the Corinthians are doing partially well, here Paul presents a topic that is being performed in the community "for the worse" (11:17). "Here, the tone becomes one of positive blame."¹⁶ From the outset of the passage, Paul makes it clear that something has gone wrong in the Corinthian community. The entire passage should be read in light of the fact that Paul is addressing a serious problem in the church. Thus, this section is not just a theological exposition of the Lord's Supper; it is an attempt to posit a practical solution to a problem.

Next, Paul explains the issue. He states that “there are divisions among” the Corinthians (11:18). This is no surprise to the informed reader of Corinthians. Paul speaks against the divided nature of the community throughout the entire letter. Paul is not surprised by these divisions either; he states that “there have to be factions among” them in order that it may become clear who is genuine (11:19). This verse is troubling because it seems to run counter to Paul’s purpose for writing to the Corinthians. If divisions amongst the church are necessary, why does Paul command that “there be no divisions among” them in 1 Corinthians 1? Godet claims this strange statement refers to “a process of purifying” that occurs after a great time of revival that gave the church community a temporary spiritual intoxication.¹⁷ The sort of divisions mentioned by Paul would serve to weed out those whose spiritual experience is temporary from those who are invested in the Christian way of life.¹⁸ This is likely what Paul means, seeing as he is striving to completely unify the community in Christ. Thus, the factions present a chance for continual discernment in the Corinthian community. This is also seen in the Greek word used in the passage. The word αἰρέσεις, usually translated as “factions,” can be taken to mean “choices,” “options,” or “courses of action.” Therefore, “the verse emphasizes the necessity of making decisions.”¹⁹ In essence, Paul’s statement about divisions emphasizes the need for discernment within the church. Those in the church community must be able to determine what it means to be a true Christian. The theme of discernment is important to Paul in this passage; the Lord’s Supper is a part of a process of discernment that brings the community to a more unified state in Christ.

Paul moves on to explain the specific division within the Corinthian church. He states, “When you come together, it is not really to eat the Lord’s Supper” (17:20). As stated earlier, when the community gathers, each “goes ahead with [his] own supper,” with some poorer members going without (11:21). The private meal was emphasized over the communal partaking of the Lord’s Supper.²⁰ Paul ends this section with a string of rhetorical questions aimed at shaming the private meals of the Corinthian church. Their homes, not the communion of believers, are the places for these meals. Paul also states that the Corinthians’ rejection of the unity of the community “[shows] contempt for the church of God” (11:22). This statement is vital to understanding why Paul is trying to fix the problem in the Corinthian church. When he explains the importance of the Lord’s Supper as ritual, Smit states that “a text such

as 1 Cor 11:17-34 is not just about ‘how Christians should celebrate a meal’ but... about who Christians are.’²¹ In their practice of the Lord’s Supper, the Corinthians have showed contempt for who they are. What is at stake in the issue of the Lord’s Supper is the Corinthians’ identity. In order to fix the problem, Paul must explain to them how they are to define their community and how they should be unified. Unsurprisingly, their identity and unity comes through the body and blood of Christ.

1 Corinthians 11:23-26

This section is what was referred to above as the theological narrative. Here, Paul recounts the tradition of the Last Supper and begins his theological justification of the solution he eventually presents to the community. He begins this section by stating that what he recounts he “received from the Lord” (11:23). This phrase means that Paul received these words from the tradition of the church, which “derives finally from Jesus.”²² Thus, Paul is relating a tradition of which the Corinthian church is a part.²³ The fact that Paul has to recount this to them is indicative of their implicit rejection of the church community and its tradition. This verse is also employed by Paul to establish the connection between the church community and the body of Christ. Paul explicitly states that he receives this tradition from Christ, implying that Christ “is the community.”²⁴ This connection of Christ and the community is one of many in this theological section and serves to deepen the guilt of the Corinthians, who, in rejecting tradition and the community, have rejected Christ himself.

Verses 24-25 deal with the actual narrative. While there is clearly intertextuality here, it is unlikely that Paul used the accounts of the Lord’s Supper in the Gospels, as his account was most likely written down first.²⁵ The biggest difference between the gospel accounts of the Lord’s Supper and Paul’s account is Paul’s inclusion of the phrase “in remembrance of me.”²⁶ This phrase illuminates why Paul includes a theological section in his instruction. The remembrance of Jesus’ death and resurrection is vital for the life of the church community. The practical problem facing the Corinthians can only be solved in true communion with the Lord. Paul writes this passage to give an ethical dimension to the theology of the Lord’s Supper. The ritual of the Lord’s Supper, in Paul’s mind, gives shape to the actions of the community.²⁷

The last verse of this section further contributes to the ethical dimension of the Lord's Supper. Paul states that through the Lord's Supper, Christians "proclaim the Lord's death until he comes" (11:26). The word used for proclamation here is *καταγγέλλετε*. This word means "to proclaim," but it can also mean "to advocate certain customs or ways of life."²⁸ This implies an active dimension to the proclamation of Christ; one is not simply proclaiming a person, but a way of life. Therefore, the manner in which the church lives is a part of the proclamation typified in the Lord's Supper. Adamo furthers this point, arguing that the ethical dimension of the proclamation is also seen "when we perform this ceremony."²⁹ The action is necessary for the proclamation of Christ to extend into the ritual itself. Thus, how the ceremony itself is performed is vitally important. Paul clearly recognizes this fact as he is giving instructions here in order to change the Corinthian's practice of the ritual.

1 Corinthians 11:27-32

In this section, Paul gives further theological justification for why the Lord's Supper is so vital to the church's identity. Here Paul further establishes the seriousness of the Lord's Supper by introducing the idea of consequences. In verse 27, Paul uses the word *ἔνοχος*, typically translated from Greek as "answerable for." However, in this context the word has a special meaning: "guilty of sin against."³⁰ Thus, the one who eats or drinks unworthily commits a sin against "the body and blood of the Lord" (11:27). What Paul means by the body and blood of Christ must be clarified, as he uses this language frequently within the next few verses. Scholars such as Gibbs and Das argue for a sacramental interpretation of the phrase, while scholars such as Porter speak against such arguments.³¹ When determining what kind of meaning this phrase has, the context of the passage must be examined. As Paul talks about the Lord's Supper, "he is dealing on two planes at once, the horizontal and the vertical," the horizontal being the social problem in the church and the vertical being the relationship between the Corinthians and the Lord.³² This is seen in the structure of the passage, which includes a theological section positioned between two practical sections. Paul furthers this connection between the horizontal and the vertical by applying the symbol of the body to both planes. Thus, when Paul refers to

the body, he is using it as a symbol for both Christ and His church. Therefore, whoever participates in the Lord's Supper unworthily disrespects his relationship with both God and his brother.

Furthermore, Paul asserts that "all who eat and drink without discerning the body, eat and drink judgment against themselves" (11:29). Based on the double symbolism of the word body as used by Paul, I posit that Paul is here instructing the Corinthians to use discernment regarding both their relationship with Christ and their relationship with their fellow Christians.³³ Here again, we see the theme of discernment. Earlier, Paul stated that the Corinthians must be able to discern the genuineness of their community. In verses 28-29, he continues that line of instruction, telling the church to "examine" itself and to "discern the body." It is important that he only commands them to discern the body. If he had chosen to tell the Corinthians to discern the body and blood of Christ, this phrase would have appeared to refer exclusively to the symbolism of Christ in the Lord's Supper. However, Paul's reference to the body calls to mind the symbolism he establishes in 1 Corinthians 10 and builds on later in 1 Corinthians 12. For Paul, the body of believers is the body of Christ. The vertical aspect of the Lord's Supper is intimately connected with and meant to inform the life of the church body.³⁴ The community is enhanced and formed by the ritual of the Lord's Supper. Thus, the body stands as a symbol for both the person of Christ and the church. Therefore, in this verse Paul is telling the Corinthians to choose to live in a way that respects Christ and the body of believers.

The next verse contains a very interesting statement: apparently, due to the Corinthians' lack of discernment "many of them are weak and ill, and some have died." Some scholars have interpreted this physical weakness as merely spiritual or moral.³⁵ Godet rejects this interpretation, saying that spiritual weakness "preceded the profanation of the Supper, and was the cause of it as much as the effect."³⁶ However, it seems unlikely that physical illness inevitably follows unworthily partaking of the Lord's Supper. Rather, Godet posits, and I agree, that the physical illness overtaking the Corinthians is a specific judgement from God to the community.³⁷ This interpretation allows us to take Paul at his literal word without having to account for the lack of physical illness among those taking the Lord's Supper unworthily in other situations. On another note, this statement adds to the symbolism Paul is establishing. The Corinthians failed to discern the body as they take the Lord's

Supper, so now their own physical bodies are being punished. Paul managed again to connect a theological ritual with the practical well-being of the church community.

Paul finishes off his theological narrative by stating that “we are disciplined so that we may not be condemned along with the world” (11:32). The word for world used here is *κόσμῳ*, which refers to more than just the physical world; it also implies the created universe. Furthermore, *κόσμῳ* connotes a created world that is “especially hostile to God.”³⁸ If the Corinthian church examines itself before taking the supper, it will be seen as separate from hostile creation. Thus, we again see that discernment serves to unify the Corinthians, showing which of them are truly cut off from the world and united in Christ. The Lord’s discipline, which, in the case of the Corinthians, is in the form of physical illness and a reprimand from Paul, serves to separate His community from the hostile world. A failure to discern is to reject the mission of the church; it is to fail to be separate from a world that disrespected the body of Christ to such an extent that it nailed Him to a cross.

1 Corinthians 11:33-34

In the final section of the passage, Paul returns to the practical life of the Corinthian community, this time with a solution. According to Smit’s ritual paradigm, this solution is a form of “ritual negotiation.”³⁹ Smit believes ritual negotiation to be natural to the formation of a community; when there is ritual failure, there must be ritual negotiation in order to maintain the integrity of the community.⁴⁰ This “adaptation constitutes an invention of tradition...to correct a ‘newer’ practice by referring to an ‘older’ one.”⁴¹ Paul saw the private meals of the Corinthians to be a ritual failure, leading to the division of the community, which should be united in the body of Christ. He has referred to the older, already established tradition in his relation of the theological narrative. In this last section, he presents a ritual negotiation that will lead to a correction of the failure in the community and its reunification. Thus, Paul tells the Corinthians to “eat at home” if they are hungry (11:34). The private meal, in which certain brothers are neglected, has no place in an act that represents the essential unity of the church. This statement is a command from Paul to abandon the practice of partaking of the Lord’s Supper in the typical banquet setting. These kinds of meals should happen in private. The purpose of Paul’s instruction here

is to redefine the Lord's Supper in the Corinthian community in order to form their identity as a community separated from the world and unified through the sacrifice of Christ.

Synthesis

1 Corinthians 11:17-34 is an attempt by Paul to connect the theology of the Lord's Supper with a practical problem in the Corinthian community. This problem stemmed from the deep divisions in the community, which were augmented by the way the Corinthians were practicing the Lord's Supper. Paul illustrates in the theological section of his argument that the manner in which the Corinthians practice the Lord's Supper matters. If this ritual is a proclamation of Christ's death and resurrection, it must not be distorted. A misrepresentation of the Lord's Supper will lead to an identity crisis for the community, as it has in the Corinthian church. Thus when Paul tells his audience to eat at home, he is in fact telling them to cease taking the private meals that give rise to division within the community. This may seem extreme, but Paul clearly has strong feelings on the matter; he ardently desires for the Corinthian church to change their ways. What should be a unifying symbol for the body of believers has been twisted into a private meal that alienates the poorer brothers and sisters. If the Corinthians do not change this, they will suffer with respect to their physical health and the unity of their community.

Theological Interpretation

In this passage, Paul was telling the Corinthians to make a change in their Lord's Supper ritual. What does that mean today, when many of us are following Lord's Supper rituals that have been in place for hundreds or thousands of years? I believe it is fair to say that the situations in our churches are not too far off from that of the Corinthian church. The separation of the poor from the wealthy is pronounced; the two groups are often separated so drastically as to meet in different buildings, never coming into contact with each other. This passage calls us to be unified, to break down the class barriers that bind us, to reach out and share the body and blood of Christ with our brethren. This practice will unite and fulfill us more than anything else can. At the heart of Paul's message is a reminder of the power of Christ. Discerning His body and participating in His supper will unify the church in a way that surpasses all other attempts of humankind to band together.

NOTES

- ¹ Keener, *1-2 Corinthians*, 6.
- ² Proctor, *First and Second Corinthians*, 5.
- ³ Ibid.
- ⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵ Ibid.
- ⁶ Ibid., 7
- ⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸ Winter, “The ‘Underlays’ of Conflict and Compromise in 1 Corinthians,” 142.
- ⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰ Keener, *1-2 Corinthians*, 10.
- ¹¹ Ibid., 97.
- ¹² Ibid.
- ¹³ Ibid., 96.
- ¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵ Perry, *Exploring the Evolution of the Lord’s Supper in the New Testament*, 67.
- ¹⁶ Godet, *Commentary on St. Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 2.134.
- ¹⁷ Godet, *Commentary*, 2.139.
- ¹⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁹ Porter, “An Interpretation of Paul’s Lord’s Supper Texts: 1 Corinthians 10: 14-22 and 11: 17-34,” 36.
- ²⁰ Ringe, “Hospitality, Justice, and Community: Paul’s Teaching on the Eucharist in 1 Corinthians 11:17-34,” 61.
- ²¹ Smit, “Ritual Failure, Ritual Negotiation, and Paul’s Argument in 1 Corinthians 11:17-34,” 169.
- ²² Perry, *Evolution*, 64.
- ²³ On page 191 of “Ritual,” Smit claims that this narrative was new to the Corinthians, but this is unlikely, considering that, according to Perry, it was a part of the church’s tradition and did not spontaneously arise from Paul. In addition, Paul uses the aorist form of the word for “handed on,” implying that the handing on of tradition has already occurred.
- ²⁴ David Adamo, “The Lord’s Supper in 1 Corinthians 10:14-22, 11:17-34,” 43.
- ²⁵ Adamo, “The Lord’s Supper,” 36.
- ²⁶ Adamo, “The Lord’s Supper,” 44. See Adamo for a further discussion on the differences between the several accounts of the Lord’s Supper.

²⁷ Smit, "Ritual," 169.

²⁸ Barbara Aland, et al., eds., *The Greek New Testament: Fourth Revised Edition with Dictionary*, 93.

²⁹ Adamo, "The Lord's Supper," 46.

³⁰ Aland et al., *Greek New Testament*, 61.

³¹ Jeffrey A. Gibbs, "Exegetical Case," 161; A. Andrew Das, "1 Corinthians 11:17-34 Revisited," 205; Porter, "Interpretation of Paul," 42.

³² Das, "1 Corinthians Revisited," 201.

³³ On page 42 of "An Interpretation" Porter contradicts this, saying that personal communion is not implied in this verse. However, if Christ is supposed to symbolically nourish the community, it is necessary that the individual partaking of the Lord's Supper be in some way focused on communion with Christ.

³⁴ Smit, "Ritual," 59-68.

³⁵ Porter, "Interpretation of Paul," 36.

³⁶ Godet, *Commentary*, 168.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Aland et al., *Greek New Testament*, 103.

³⁹ Smit, "Ritual," 191.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

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This paper explores several definitions of culture that have been proposed by anthropologists, from Edward Tylor's in the nineteenth century at the outset of cultural study to modern day definitions used by the United States government. The author then proposes a definition of culture that is a combination of the definitions previously examined, including both qualitative and quantitative measurements: culture is a set of beliefs and knowledge, manifested through patterns of traditions, rituals, and material evidence that constitute the achievement of human social groups in an evolving system. The new definition is then applied to the case of Kennewick Man, a 9,000-year-old skeleton found in Kennewick, Washington, that was claimed by four separate tribes in the area. In order to determine whether to repatriate the ancient remains or hand them over to scientists for study, the Secretary of the Interior had to interpret the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA). The author finds that Kennewick Man was culturally associated with the claimant tribes, which is required for repatriation according to NAGPRA. The definition introduced in this paper can be used to determine cultural association from an anthropological or archaeological perspective, and it is intended for use in cases where cultural association is unclear.

Culture and its Applications: A Case Study of Kennewick Man

Charlotte Weston

In the past several decades, the objectivity and reliability of anthropological definitions of culture have been hotly debated. A recurring problem occurs with such ambiguous definition of culture, which stands in contrast to the unbending nature of a scientific law. Within the United States, culture has held many definitions for different groups of people, and it becomes difficult for both anthropologists and lawmakers to decide which definition is the most comprehensive. When a definition of culture or cultural affiliation is called into question, which

definition should the government use? Is it possible to remain unbiased while using a subjective definition? In Native American communities especially, variances in definitions of culture can lead to misunderstandings between the government and a tribe. In this essay, I will examine several definitions of culture that span the length of the field of anthropology. After this analysis, I will create what I see as a workable definition of culture, and I will apply it to the case of Kennewick Man, a set of 9,200 year-old human remains found in Kennewick, Washington.

Anthropology arose as an academic field during the 1870s in Britain. Edward Tylor, a famous twentieth century British anthropologist, defined culture as “The complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, [etc.] and any other capacities acquired by man as a member of society.”²¹ A century later, Kroeber and Kluckhohn were two anthropologists who studied Native Americans in the United States during the 1950s. The pair of social anthropologists compiled a list of cultural definitions in their 1952 book, including their own definition:

Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiments in artefacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other as conditioning elements of further action.²

In the present day, the United States Department of the Interior offers a definition of culture that it uses to conduct cultural resource management: “The knowledge which people use to live their lives and the ways in which they do so.”²³ This definition is used in conjunction with the National Park Service’s definition that says culture is “a system of behaviors (including economic, religious, and social), beliefs (values, ideologies), and social arrangements.”²⁴ The variety in these definitions of culture stems from the belief in academia that there is no single way to describe or define the patterns that make up one society’s ideology.

As one of the first scholars to study anthropology in a scientific manner, Sir Edward Burnett Tylor is often considered the founder of cultural anthropology. His definition of culture, published in 1858, was one of the first and clearest definitions provided by anthropologists. In his book, *Primitive Culture*, Tylor states that the “past is continually needed to explain the present, and the whole to explain the part.”⁵ Tylor, like his contemporary Charles Darwin, believed that culture had evolved from primitive cultures with animistic religions to the civilized states of Western Europe. It is because of Tylor’s beliefs about cultural evolution that the word “knowledge” in his definition most likely refers to level of advancement in a particular society. The “knowledge, beliefs, [etc and . . .] capacities” that Tylor describes most likely vary according to preconceptions about cultural complexities during the nineteenth century. Primitive cultures such as hunter-gatherer bands and tribal societies would still be considered cultures within this definition, because they still consist of knowledge and beliefs, even though Tylor probably considered these to be inferior to the knowledge and beliefs of his society.

It should be noted that Tylor’s definition also uses “man” as the assumed dominant member of society. Whether this was intentional bias or not, Tylor’s use of “man” rather than “men and women” or even a gender neutral phrase such as “person” reflects the literary patterns of his time. Beginning in the 1970s, female anthropologists would argue with the use of the word “man” in sweeping definitions of culture. According to Anderson-Levy, a well-known feminist anthropologist, this genre of anthropology arose as a critique of Eurocentric and male-biased anthropologies that had previously been the norm.⁶ While Tylor’s definition made assumptions about cultural evolution and the other, feminist anthropology argued that the use of unfair premises such as Tylor’s in anthropological literature caused major gaps in the study of societies and culture. Therefore, Tylor’s definition of anthropology cannot be fully accepted due to the biases inherent in its creation.

In their book *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*, Kroeber and Kluckhohn make the distinction between the extremely subjective use of the word culture as it had been before Tylor and “the ethnographic and modern scientific” term that was in use during the twentieth century.⁷ They describe the modern word “culture” as “a state or condition . . . in which all human societies share” with super-organic properties. Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s definition also stands

in contrast to the discussions of culture used in the earlier twentieth century that were still considered synonymous with “civilization.” In fact, anthropologists from the early twentieth century had struggled against the eugenics movement and other social biases that used words like “civilized” to describe the Western elite. The word culture was much more readily accepted in the United States and Germany than in England and France, where it was used as “culture or civilization” until the mid-twentieth century, and even in the United States, “culture” was used in the same manner as “society.”⁸ Eventually, anthropologists such as Kroeber and Kluckhohn were able to establish “civilization” as a term to describe historical groups of people. On the other hand, culture came to be known as the word used to describe the traditions of a particular group of people. It was not until the 1950s that culture would become grounded as a key component of anthropology and secure its place in the field of natural science.

In contrast to earlier writings, Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s definition of anthropology focused on culture in terms of symbols and patterns without relying on the human aspect, as Tylor did. While Tylor combines cultures of knowledge, beliefs, and capacities that cannot be assigned empirical values, Kroeber and Kluckhohn use a more scientific definition that deals with quantitative patterns, although these may or may not be explicit. Culture is seen as a “product of action” and the patterns that comprise it “[constitute] the distinctive achievement of human groups.”⁹ For these men, the achievements of human groups could be seen through patterns and the products of these patterns, namely “artefacts.”¹⁰ Additionally, they mention that culture is made up of traditions and values that “act as conditioning elements to further action,” which refers back to the more widely accepted definition of culture as a set of intangible beliefs and knowledge.¹¹ By this time in anthropology, the processual era had dawned and science was a main focus, but the origins of culture could not be forgotten in the course of modernization.

One aspect of Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s definition that appears in Tylor’s is the word “acquired” that refers to enculturation. Although this term is still mentioned in the former definition, it is less clear about the role of enculturation in the cultural building process across generations. Kroeber and Kluckhohn may have specifically avoided the use of the term “acquired” because of the associations that “culture” had up until that point. Well-read men and women of Tylor’s day, until a short

time before Kroeber and Kluckhohn wrote, believed that “culture” referred to an acquired sensibility, much in the same way that a “cultured” person is one with a taste for the finer things. Culture, in the original German, meant something that is acquired over time, like a specific skill or taste for a certain food.¹² In modern social circles, the word culture is still used this way. However, the anthropological term culture refers to a state of society that possesses certain rules and characteristics that make that particular society unique from others. Kroeber and Kluckhohn called these rules and characteristics “patterns” and “symbols” that can be achieved by a society and preserved through “artefacts” and traditions.¹³ In doing so, they maintained objectivity and avoided confusion, but they also failed to emphasize the cycle of enculturation and change as it occurs naturally in all cultures.

The United States Department of the Interior utilizes a definition of culture for the purposes of cultural resource management, and it is crucial that its definition encompasses any artifact or ecofact with affiliation to a particular culture. Two definitions are used in conjunction: Handwerker’s definition of culture from his 2002 article, “The Construct Validity of Cultures,” and a definition created by the National Park Service. Handwerker’s definition references the “knowledge [people] use to live their lives,” much like Tylor’s definition. The National Park Service’s definition uses mostly intangible, qualitative words in its definition, such as beliefs, social arrangements, and behaviors. Due to the nature of cultural resource management, the primary use for these definitions, it is in the best interest of the National Park Service to keep these definitions as general as possible so they may be applied when deemed necessary without going into specific detail about the minutiae of a particular culture definition. However, the use of this definition in practice has the potential to negatively affect decisions made by the Department of the Interior, as vague definitions leave too much interpretation up to the potentially biased reader.

Both of these definitions imply the continuation of culture, rather than portraying it as a static concept of the past. In Handwerker’s article, “The Origins and Evolution of Culture,” culture is referred to as a constantly evolving process. The National Park Service’s definition allows for the evolution of culture over time, as social arrangements can become more or less complex as some become popular and others fall out of use. Additionally, both of these definitions were meant to be used alongside ethnographic study, according to the National Park Service.¹⁴

Ethnographic research includes much more qualitative study, as opposed to the quantitative study implied in Kroeber and Kluckhohn's definition. However, if these definitions are used to perform cultural resource management that goes beyond the scope of ethnography and into the realm of the material past, a definition that includes qualitative or archaeological elements would be useful.

A comprehensive, agreed-upon definition of culture has not yet been achieved in academia, and the attempts to do so in the last half of the twentieth century led to more confusion than clarity. Because of the unique elements of anthropology, new definitions of anthropological culture appear. Different conceptions of anthropology can be applied to a variety of problems in the study of culture. Specifically, the definition of culture is used to determine cultural affiliation according to the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) in the United States. Without an exhaustive definition of what they are looking for in a particular find, the Department of the Interior and the Army Corps of Engineers have difficulties repatriating human remains and grave goods back to the tribes that claim them. However, the argument has been made that even things such as medicinal knowledge and ritual are cultural property that cannot be taken and resold without the consent of the tribe. In cases like this, scientists and government agents are left to postulate how cultural affiliation is truly determined. An effective definition of culture would answer both of these questions, address the origins of culture, and delineate where culture is heading next.

Taking into account both the tangible and intangible aspects of culture, an ideal cultural definition would promote equality and diminish bias. I argue that culture is a set of beliefs and knowledge, manifested through patterns of traditions, rituals, and material evidence that constitute the achievements of human social groups in an evolving system. Tylor's use of the word "knowledge" addresses concerns about intangible knowledge possessed by cultural groups, and its inclusion in this definition indicates that cultural knowledge is indeed a resource that can be owned by a particular group. By including "belief" and "ritual," which both Tylor and the National Park Service reference in their definitions, religion and the activities surrounding it are encompassed in the definition. Additionally, the intangible aspects of culture can be tracked and measured through the observable patterns they produce, referenced in Kroeber and Kluckhohn's definition. These patterns can range from religious rituals to coming-of-age ceremonies to grave goods buried

alongside the dead, but each is a manifestation of the ideology of the particular culture with which it is associated. Lastly, it is important to reference the evolving nature of culture because of its relevance in the study of cultural definitions. Tylor's definition took evolutionary theory into account to determine the value of culture, and while this view is generally considered to be incorrect when applied cross-culturally, cultural evolution can be a useful tool to study one culture over a period of time.

One of the major difficulties in determining cultural definitions deals with the application of the definition in real-world scenarios. For this reason, different schools of cultural theorists utilize different definitions to prove their respective points. In this case, I will utilize the above definition of culture to analyze the case of Kennewick Man and determine how culture can be used to determine his connection to the four tribes that claimed his remains for repatriation under NAGPRA.

Two teenagers found human remains on the banks of the Columbia River in July of 1996.¹⁵ They reported the remains to the police, who called in a local anthropologist to perform an analysis of the bones. Initial radiocarbon dating placed the human remains between 8,340 and 9,200 years ago, a time predating recorded history. He was buried without grave goods and had an arrow or spear point embedded in his hip from an injury that occurred twenty to twenty-five years before his death. Several Native American tribes, including the Colville, Nez Perce, Umatilla, and Yakama, initially claimed the human remains as their own, citing "religious and social traditions" that dictate that the skeleton "of an ancestor . . . should be buried immediately."¹⁶

The Secretary of the Interior viewed the facts of Kennewick Man's case in January of 2000 and declared the remains to be "Native American," as per NAGPRA. This decision relied "solely on the age of the remains and the fact that the remains were found within the United States."¹⁷ The remains were taken into the custody of the Army Corps of Engineers as they were about to be transferred to the Smithsonian for further testing. The scientific community lamented their inability to continue testing on the remains, which could have yielded untold knowledge regarding Paleolithic Americans.

The decision of the Secretary of the Interior was based upon the area in which the human remains were found and their age. Experts examined the remains and determined that while certain traits, such as the shape of the skull, resembled those of European ancestry, they also

resembled a small group of bones found in the United States attributed to Native Americans.¹⁸ When a group of scientists contested the Secretary of the Interior's decision, a court was called upon to determine the validity of the cultural affiliation claimed by the Four Claimant Tribes. In order to be repatriated under NAGPRA, the remains must be "of, or relating to a tribe, people, or culture that is indigenous to the United States."¹⁹ The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted this policy to mean that NAGPRA requires "that human remains bear some relationship to a . . . tribe, people, or culture to be considered Native American."²⁰ Because Kennewick Man was not buried with grave goods and can only be studied biologically through his remains, the question of culture can only be answered by studying contemporary cultures in the same area.

In 2008, a Paleolithic stone tool site was found along Bear Creek in Washington that yielded bifaces, scrapers, and hammerstones.²¹ These fragments were found in a layer of 10,000-year-old peat that dated to the end of the last Ice Age. Archaeologists also found six projectile points, including some that had concave bases and others that resembled Clovis points. According to Mann, Clovis points are chipped from fine, brittle stone and have sharp edges.²² They have been found all over North America and date to the end of the last Ice Age. The projectile point found in the pelvis of Kennewick Man also had sharp edges and was carved from basalt, also a brittle stone with sharp edges. The relation of these two types of projectile points provides a connection between a culture that Kennewick Man was in contact with and an existing culture in Paleolithic Washington. Archaeologists Watters and Stafford believe that the Clovis point was a product of the Clovis culture, which could have produced both instances of projectile points discussed here.²³ Because of this projectile point, Kennewick Man can be related to contemporary Paleolithic cultures in Washington, such as the one that inhabited the Bear Creek site and the Marmes Creek site.

According to my definition, culture is a set of beliefs and knowledge manifested through patterns of traditions, rituals and material evidence that constitute the achievements of human social groups in an evolving system. Kennewick Man can be related to the Clovis culture and others who existed in Washington 10,000 years ago using this definition. Material evidence of cultural knowledge is provided in the projectile points found. The existence of the projectile point is a manifestation of material evidence that constitutes the achievements of human

social groups. Therefore, if Kennewick Man can reasonably be related to cultures already present in the United States 10,000 years ago, then, according to NAGPRA, his remains should be repatriated to the Four Claimant Tribes.

Through a definition that combined ideas from the early and mid-twentieth century, as well as contemporary anthropological culture definitions, it could be determined that Kennewick Man was related to a culture that was indigenous to the United States, namely the Clovis culture. Although the projectile point found in Kennewick Man's pelvis was not categorized as part of the Clovis culture, characteristics of the point allow for the reasonable assumption that the technology used to make both types of points was related. This assumption relates back to the knowledge element of the culture definition, which is known to evolve over time in terms of human achievements. Viewing the past with this definition in mind, a shared culture is visible in Kennewick Man's remains through the projectile point's common characteristics with Clovis projectile points. In this case, material evidence provided an opportunity for scientists and archaeologists to make a comparison between two findings that date to a time before written history. By studying material evidence found with Kennewick Man and other 10,000-year-old sites, and by using the definition of culture created in this essay, a clear connection can be made between Kennewick Man and Native American groups in Washington State. Kennewick Man's remains are demonstrably Native American. On February 17, 2017, his remains were repatriated to the Four Claimant Tribes and reburied according to traditional practices.

Sir Edward Tylor presented the scholarly community with one of its first definitions of culture, which was succeeded almost a century later by two processual anthropologists seeking to redefine their field for modern science. Within the United States, the National Park Service and the Department of the Interior possess their own definitions of culture that are used to determine cultural affiliation. The example of Kennewick Man illustrates the shortcomings of those definitions and provides an alternative definition that more comprehensively answers the question of cultural affiliation. It must be stressed that there is tremendous importance in the inclusion of material evidence with the accomplishments of human societies, as this enables scientists and the government to delve deeper into cases of cultural affiliation, drawing comparisons and creating a clearer picture of the prehistoric United States.

NOTES

¹ Edward Tylor 1858.

² A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn 1952, 181.

³ W. Penn Handwerker 2002.

⁴ “Cultural Anthropology Program” 2016.

⁵ Tylor 1858.

⁶ Lisa Anderson-Levy 2016.

⁷ Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952, 10.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 181.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Don Ringe 2006.

¹³ Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952, 181.

¹⁴ “Cultural Anthropology Program” 2016.

¹⁵ Jean Taylor 2001.

¹⁶ *Bonnichsen v United States* 2004.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ F. P. McManamon, 2016.

¹⁹ 25 U.S.C. §3001(9).

²⁰ *Bonnichsen v United States* 2004.

²¹ Blake De Pastino 2015.

²² Charles Mann 2013.

²³ *Ibid.*

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In Odes 1.17, Velox amoenum, Horace creates a liminal intellectual space, fragile but productive for poetry, through his interaction with Greek and Roman cultural and poetic paradigms. This poem seems to enact a transfer of poetic practice from the Greek world to the Roman world and from the epic to the bucolic genre: Tyndaris (named after—or equivalent to—Helen of Troy) is invited to escape the jealousy of Cyrus and come with Horace to the pleasant Lucretilis. Faunus, Horace says, leaves his favorite spot, Lycaeus, in Greece, to visit Lucretilis in Italy. Even the language of the poem, a natively Latin text based on Greek models, illustrates this. However, I argue that much more is going on in this poem than a mere transfer of Greek matter into a Roman context. It is not a simple one-way importation; instead, the conceptual border between Greek and Roman life and between epic and bucolic genre is made porous in both directions. I explore how Horace situates his lyric craftsmanship in a liminal space positioned simultaneously between Greek and Roman and between epic and bucolic. Neither extreme can quite dominate, nor can either be neglected. This liminal conceptual space, placed in a version of the pastoral locus amoenus, is (like the pastoral world) fragile, but it is the home of the lyric muse, the place where poetry happens.

Poetry in the Middle: Lucretilis and Conceptual Spaces in Odes 1.17

Jamie Wheeler

Horace is proud to be Roman. He celebrates Roman heroes, mentions Italian places, and references Latin literature. At the same time, he was part of a Roman intellectual elite that in many ways longed to be Greek—more literate, more creative, more culturally confident. Horace modeled himself on Greek writers as eagerly as he evoked a Roman context, a cultural borrowing he himself compares in *Odes* 1.9 to Sabine wine served in a Greek jar. At one level, the same phenomenon appears to be characteristic of *Odes* 1.17, an invitation/seduction poem

describing the pleasures of Lucretilis, an Italian place, and addressed to Tyndaris, a girl named after the Greek heroine Helen. It seems clear that this poem enacts a transfer of poetic practice from the Greek world to the Roman world, a cosmopolitan poet's Romanization of existing Greek forms. An analysis of Horace's allusions also reveals that he is adapting epic material into a bucolic form. However, I argue that this poem is more complex than a wholesale transfer of Greek practice into a Roman context, or of epic matter into a pastoral context. The conceptual space in which Horace works—a space which he identifies with the physical space of Lucretilis—is defined by the positioning of the lyric genre between epic and pastoral and by the positioning of his cultural identification between Greek and Roman, in each case drawing on both options and never quite committing to either.

Odes 1.17 is addressed to a woman named Tyndaris, but she is not mentioned until the third stanza. It is a poem of invitation, and the first two stanzas celebrate the place to which he invites her: Lucretilis, a rustic retreat in Italy where the poem's speaker (partially but not entirely identifiable with Horace) keeps goats. He describes the safety in which his goats live, carefree and protected by the god Faunus. In the third stanza, he invites Tyndaris to join him in this pleasant place and to sing. The gods protect him and his retreat, he claims in the fourth stanza, because of his own status as a poet. Next, as a topic for Tyndaris' song, he suggests Circe and Penelope, two Odyssean figures here envisioned as participants in a love triangle. In the sixth stanza, he offers her wine—but not too much; as the seventh stanza assures her, she need not fear with him the kind of violence that she can expect from Cyrus, a previously unmentioned character who is apparently the lady's other suitor. The ode has a pastoral charm, but it also addresses complex issues of poetics, genre, and place.

While not as celebrated as some of its neighbors, the comparatively brief 1.17 has garnered its share of critical attention, including several important article-length studies. Edinger provides a reading of the entire poem, focusing especially on Horace's attitude toward his own work and poetry in general. Edinger concludes that Horace advises Tyndaris "to seek the proper place for her art: the countryside and the protection of Faunus, as opposed to the city and the ambiguous attentions of Cyrus."¹ Edinger's work should be read alongside Nagel's later article, which opposes him on several points. Nagel believes that the speaker in 1.17, far from offering Tyndaris a safe place to practice

her art, is himself a talented seducer, a comic version of Paris seducing Helen.² Likewise, Edinger interprets Tyndaris' song about Penelope and Circe as referring to their dignified Homeric characterizations, whereas Nagel suggests the transmutation to lyric has reached even those epic ladies, who are reinterpreted as participants in a stormy love triangle.³ She concludes that this lyric speaker is a dangerous figure, aligned with Circe and Paris.⁴

Pucci agrees that Horace's landscape is a model or symbol for his world of poetry, but he argues that the world of poetry is by no means as idyllic as it first seems.⁵ The genre-bending in which Horace engages admits both war and seduction—both at once, in the case of Cyrus' erotic violence—into the rural utopia he seemed to be setting up.⁶ Toohey notes the rejection of elegy and the importance of *pietas*, especially connected with “the metaphorical landscape of poetic inspiration.”⁷ Pursuing the thread of landscape, he argues that the poem's description of Lucretilis is a “symbolic description” of “the world of art,” and “the transformation of Greek into Roman” indicates a focus on Horace's own art.⁸ Putnam offers an interpretation much like Edinger's, in which the power of Horace's verse creates a protected, enclosed “magic world” into which Tyndaris, despite her Greek roots, fits perfectly as Horace's Italian muse.⁹ He associates Tyndaris/Helen's relocation from Greece to Italy with her relocation from epic to lyric, but more than simply becoming a heroine of lyric, in Putnam's interpretation she becomes herself a poet who has “parity” with Horace and with the landscape she embodies.¹⁰

Critics have consistently picked up on the poem's concern with the epic-bucolic axis (lyric balanced in the middle), as well as the Greek-Roman axis and the importance of landscape. I argue that, using proper names and literary allusions among other techniques, the poem positions itself in the middle of both these dualities, a conceptual space mapped onto the location celebrated. Like the protected “withdrawn valley” (*reducta valle*) of Lucretilis, Horace's poetic space is settled safely in the middle of both the generic and the cultural axes, avoiding dangerous extremes while allusively drawing on both cultures and both genres.¹¹

Horace's experimentation with genre is intimately linked to his evocation of landscape. His obsession with place is so great that Commager suggests he is interested in the land as much as the lady, since “Tyndaris. . . seems virtually an aspect of the landscape.”¹² This would be more than appropriate for a pastoral poem, a genre in which

the love affairs are often merely a colorful detail in a description of rural life. However, as much as Horace seems to model himself on bucolic, he shows equal interest in epic. Most prominent among his epic references is the name of Tyndaris herself, the poem's addressee. "Tyndaris," that is, "daughter of Tyndareus," would usually refer to Helen. Horace, however, does not situate himself in Paris' place (a role he rebuked just two poems earlier), seducing the famed Helen of Troy, epic's most lovely heroine. His Tyndaris is Helen in a sense, but she is a lyric Helen. She is not invited to provide a *casus belli* by fleeing to a great city, inspired by a great passion; she is only invited to share a glass of wine and a literary evening away from a boorish boyfriend. To give a simplistic summary, Horace creates lyric by importing epic matter into a pastoral context; however, it is necessary to recognize that in this transfer, both the epic and the bucolic elements turn into a lyric *tertium quid*. Horace does not veer from Troy to Arcadia and back. Instead, he establishes himself safely in the lyric world between both extremes.

The first line of *Odes* 1.17 announces Horace's generic awareness, beginning with a bucolic reference. He describes Lucretilis as "pleasant," or *amoenum*, a word that evokes the concept of the *locus amoenus*, a characteristically pastoral space. Hu explains that it is "often identified with the physical landscape of the pastoral world," but more specifically refers to a version of that landscape which forms an "especially serene or alluring [place] of repose."¹³ Harrison (2007b) speaks of the country in Horace, especially in the *Odes*, as a "rural landscape of inspiration" and a "place of moderation and restraint," a characterization rooted in this pastoral, bucolic idea of singing shepherds, as well as in the cult of Pan.¹⁴ The next stanza expands on this association: as Horace describes his country retreat with his trademark specificity, he calls it a "grove," or *nemus*.¹⁵ This word reinforces the peaceful pastoral quality, since a shady grove is a paradigmatic *locus amoenus*. The safety of the "wandering" (*deniæ*) animals, at peace from marauding predators, evokes a Golden Age.¹⁶ Nisbet and Hubbard indeed point out that this type of Golden Age scene is characteristic of pastoral poetry (they cite Virgil's *Eclogue* 4) and connected in another pastoral work with the figure of Faunus, whom Horace also references.¹⁷

Horace then begins to draw material from epic while retaining his orientation toward bucolic. The designation of wolves as belonging to Mars hints at this new element in the poem, since Mars, as patron of war, is a deity associated with epic deeds.¹⁸ The next line introduces Tyndaris,

whose name evokes epic at its greatest. Nisbet and Hubbard attempt to connect her to pastoral poetry through “the Arcadian Evander,” who “was son of Timandra, daughter of Tyndareus,” but this is an astonishingly tenuous connection to draw in view of the much more obvious epic connection.¹⁹ Tyndaris is a version of Helen or at least a reference to her.^{20,21} Tyndaris/Helen, like Mars, is a keyword for epic. However, the Martial wolves are excluded from Lucretilis, while Tyndaris is admitted—just as the god Faunus is present as a protector but not in his other role as Pan the god of panic.²² This indicates that Horace is not simply treating epic material in a bucolic style, but picking out the appropriate elements from both genres to enter his lyric world. The safety of the she-goats, which is dependent on their presence with Faunus in the “safe grove,” is parallel to the safety offered to Tyndaris, connecting the bucolic setting with the epic material; both are displaced from their native genres and welcomed into the place Horace describes.²³

The fifth stanza reveals further details about the physical place that is being imbued with such symbolic resonance. It also expands on Lucretilis’ relationship with both epic and bucolic, using literary references to position the valley safely between these two genres:

hic in reducta valle Caniculae
 uitabis aestus et fide Teia
 dices laborantes in uno
 Penelopen uitreamque Circen. . .²⁴

Here in a withdrawn valley you will avoid the Dog-star’s heat, and on a Teian string you will speak of those taking pains over one man, Penelope and glassy Circe. . .

In reducta valle is another keyword for a bucolic-type location. Interestingly, however, the same phrase recurs several times in epic, specifically in *Aeneid* 6.703 and 8.609, where it describes, respectively, Elysium (called in 6.705 a *nemus*, just like Lucretilis) and the idyllic woodland setting where Venus appears to Aeneas. Although Virgil was writing a true epic, rather than merely flirting with the genre in Horatian fashion, he uses this phrase much as Horace does here to mark a setting in which the epic crosses over, if only briefly, to the bucolic. The “Teian string,” according to Nisbet and Hubbard, refers to “the lyre of Anacreon of

Teos,” the archaic Greek lyricist, and with their focus on the bucolic side of *Odes* 1.17 they point out that “the pastoral note of the *Anacreonta* is even more relevant to our poem” than its amatory turn.²⁵ Nevertheless, this pastoral/lyric song in a pastoral location is not only sung by a lyricized epic heroine, it concerns two other epic heroines—presumably themselves lyricized, as Tyndaris’ song seems to imagine a love triangle among Penelope, Circe, and Odysseus. Horace uses literary references and allusions to position Lucretilis as a protected space between the extremes of epic and lyric practice.

The other key aspect that defines Horace’s conceptual space is the interaction between Greek and Roman paradigms. The very meter in which Horace writes, a fundamental construct presupposed by any actual verse, is Greek, and not merely Greek but alcaic—the meter characteristic of Alcaeus, Horace’s primary model for *Odes* 1 among the archaic Greek lyricists.²⁶ Yet his language, a still more fundamental precondition for poetry even than meter, is Latin, and a Latin rather more free of Graecisms than much of Horace. Individual instances throughout the poem, from proper names to poetic allusions, likewise point simultaneously toward Greece and toward Rome. Critics note how Horace draws on Greek sources for his Latin poetry, but the relationship here is not merely a one-way trip along the Greek-Roman axis.²⁷ Horace portrays himself as a Roman doing a Greek thing, but on top of this Graecizing he adds a layer of Romanizing: he is doing the Greek thing in a Roman way. *Odes* 1.17 articulates, in its evocation of Lucretilis, the conceptual space created by this complex double transfer of cultural material, which happens in tandem with the negotiation of genre.

Lucretilis, of course, is a physical place in Italy (although its identification is uncertain), while Lycaeus, Faunus’ usual home, is in Greece.²⁸ The reference to Faunus is also an allusion to the Greek Pan, performed, however, in a way that emphasizes the incompleteness of Horace’s Graecization. Faunus, while in a sense the Italian equivalent of Pan, is also definitely Italian and not Greek; Nisbet and Hubbard emphasize that, although the “Greek imagination contributes most of the detail” to the portrayal of Faunus in the poem, “Horace’s Faunus . . . remains a truly Italian deity, sanctified by deeply rooted local cults.”²⁹ Thus, to have him leaving the Greek mountain of Lycaeus to visit Horace in the Italian valley of Lucretilis is to have an Italian figure leaving a Greek place to visit an Italian one. This is not a mere transfer of Greek culture into Italy; Horace’s inspiration, symbolized by Faunus, is at least partly

Latin in origin, even if acquired by way of Greece. The boundaries of cultural allegiance grow porous here, inviting a Romanizing of the Greek as well as a Graecizing of the Roman, just as Faunus replaces Pan and then moves from Greece to Italy. This takes place in the context of the first hint at generic self-definition (*amoenum*) and, especially, in the context of the physical space to which Horace is referring. Lucretilis is a real place, but in this treatment of it, it serves to mediate between Greek and Latin culture, just as it mediates between bucolic and epic genres.

The wolves of Mars and the musical Tyndaris have already been noted as two symbols of epic to which Horace responds differently. This indicates the poet's power over the lyric space that allows him to include one epic element and exclude the other, and this power of selection extends to the cultural axis as well. The difference between the wolves and Tyndaris, besides the fact that one fits into the lyric space and the other must be excluded, is that one is almost stereotypically Roman while the other is extremely Greek. The wolves of Mars, *Martiales*. . . *lupos*, who are kept away from the sheep in Lucretilis, reference the foundation myth of Rome and the she-wolf that nursed the sons of Mars (appropriately referred to here by his Latin rather than Greek name).³⁰ Tyndaris, on the other hand, as a version of Helen of Troy (referred to in the Greek style with a Greek-declined patronymic), appears in what may be considered the "foundation myth" of Greek culture, the works of Homer. While the *Iliad* fills a somewhat different place in Greek culture than the legend of Romulus and Remus does in Roman culture, they do share similar roles — especially from a Roman perspective, since the Romans saw Homer's epics as a source of national self-definition much like their own early mythology (Virgil's *Aeneid* deliberately imitated this quality). Horace's interactions with Greece and Rome in establishing his conceptual space can thus be summarized as follows: beginning in an ostensibly Roman place (Lucretilis), he brings into that place a Roman figure (Faunus) returning from a Greek place where he has become Graecized (adopted the attributes of Pan). He then mentions but excludes the very Roman wolves, and he introduces a Greek figure who is, as appears later, fleeing an Eastern figure (Cyrus). He is thus adding a layer of Greek influence over his Roman space, but as the next stanza reveals, the poet himself, the creator of the poetic space, remains Roman.

Horace's next thoughts, at the center of the ode, turn to the speaker's own status as a poet and as a Roman. He identifies poetic inspiration as itself a form of negotiation between Greek and Roman. This central stanza is important enough to be worth quoting in full:

di me tuentur, dis pietas mea
 et musa cordi est. hic tibi copia
 manabit ad plenum benigno
 ruris honorum opulenta cornu. . .³¹

The gods keep me; to the gods my piety and muse are dear. Here for you a rich abundance of the honors of the field will flow to the full from a generous horn. . .

Pietas is perhaps the single most characteristically Roman quality there is, at least according to the Romans. After all, *pius Aeneas* himself, so designated in Horace's own time by Virgil, is the archetypal Roman hero of Latin literature. By predicating this quality of himself, the speaker affirms the Roman presence in the poetic paradise of Lucretilis. Further, he associates his *pietas* with his *musa*, that is, his poetic inspiration. Commager even argues that Horace's *pietas* is equivalent to his *musa*.³² Horace is far from invoking the (modern) stereotype that Greeks are creative and Romans copy them; rather, his own inspiration is as Roman as it is Greek. Putnam argues that in this stanza Tyndaris becomes the speaker's "own private, Sabine muse," despite her ostensible Greek ethnicity.³³ It is true that Lucretilis becomes more Greek under the influence of Horace's poetry, but it is equally true that Tyndaris—and the *pius* poet's own craft—becomes more Roman, or rather that both move toward a third identity, properly belonging to neither culture, and thus open to Horace's selected poetic influences from both. Pucci argues that the *copia* offered by this landscape is too opulent for the *tennis* Callimachean poetry characteristic of a withdrawn, bucolic *locus amoenus*. Instead, it evokes the "great genre" (*genus grande*) and a different kind of Golden Age, the Augustan golden age of Roman greatness, yet the poem is clearly set in a *locus amoenus*. At the same time as we learn that the gods—specifically, it appears, the simultaneously Greek and Roman Faunus/Pan—protect Horace in the sacred space of Lucretilis, we learn that this space is defined by its position.³⁴ It is balanced, as we have seen,

in the space between epic and pastoral, which is called lyric; it is at the same time balanced in a space between Greek and Roman, which has no name but defines Horace's poetic realm.

A conclusion studded with proper names brings the poem to a characteristically Horatian close with a brief gesture toward an as-yet-uncovered facet of the poem's topic. The space of Lucretilis can accommodate both epic and bucolic, both Greek and Roman, because it excludes the shared enemy of each dichotomy, the barbarian East. The poem's conclusion mixes—quite literally *confundet*—Greek and Latin proper names (*Semeleius*, *Thyoneus*, *Lesbiū*, *Marte* [21, 22, 23]), and then reveals something that brings Greece and Rome still closer together: their shared opposition to the East, to the Greeks' enemies in Persia as to the Romans' in Scythia.³⁵ Cyrus' name is likely an allusion to the king of Persia.³⁶ The Roman poet invites his Greek addressee to a common ground where they are both welcome, but Cyrus, hypothetically Persian, is emphatically not. In the same way, epic and bucolic poetry both stand in contrast to Cyrus' boorish, *incontinens* violence. In these stanzas, Horace creates a shared space, a neutral ground, balanced between Greek and Roman—not merely a Roman veneer laid over a Greek art, nor a Greek figure transplanted into a Roman context, but a true meeting place for the two traditions. The exclusion of their common enemy affirms that Lucretilis plays this role, and the fact that Tyndaris participates in the speaker's own poetic enterprise demonstrates that such a space is necessary for the creation of poetry.

In some ways, all of Horace's poetry is programmatic. His own work as a poet is never far from his mind, no matter what the apparent subject of the ode. This is certainly true of *Odes* 1.17, *Velox amoenum*, which adds to the interest in poetic self-definition a concern for the description of a very particular landscape. It quickly becomes evident that the "landscape" Horace is interested in is not merely a particular place in the Sabine hills, but also—identified with the country retreat—the world of his poetry. This world is defined partly by its lyric genre, conceptually positioned at the meeting place of the epic and bucolic genres, partaking of both and belonging to neither. It is similarly positioned at the meeting place of Greek and Roman culture, but there is no straightforward name for this cultural intersection as there is for the generic intersection. Only the poem itself fully delineates Horace's creative space, which it defines and on which it depends.

NOTES

- ¹ Edinger, *Horace*, 331.
² Nagel, *Lyric*, 53.
³ Edinger, *Horace*, 57.
⁴ Nagel, *Lyric*, 60.
⁵ Pucci, *Horace's Banquet*, 259
⁶ *Ibid.* 275-78.
⁷ Toohey, *Structure*, 116.
⁸ Toohey, *Structure*, 118. Qtd. in Commager, *Odes*, 348-52.
⁹ Putnam, *Structure*, 339, 362.
¹⁰ *Ibid.* 374, 366.
¹¹ Horace, *Odes*, 1.17.17.
¹² Commager, *Odes*, 352.
¹³ Hu, *Locus Amoenus*.
¹⁴ Harrison, *Town*, 244-45.
¹⁵ *Odes*, 1.17.5.
¹⁶ *Ibid.* 4-9.
¹⁷ Nisbet and Hubbard, *Commentary*, 219.
¹⁸ *Martiales*, 9.
¹⁹ *Ibid.* 221.
²⁰ Nagel, *Lyric*, 59.
²¹ Griffiths, *Odes*, 69.
²² *Odes*, 1.17.2.
²³ *Ibid.* 5; Edinger, *Horace*, 308.
²⁴ *Odes*, 1.17.17-20.
²⁵ Nisbet and Hubbard, *Commentary*, 224.
²⁶ Hutchinson, *Horace*, 40
²⁷ Edinger, *Horace*, 311; Nagel, *Lyric*, 55.
²⁸ *Odes*, 1.17.1.
²⁹ Nisbet and Hubbard, *Commentary*, 218.
³⁰ *Odes*, 1.17.9.
³¹ *Odes*, 1.17.13-16.
³² Commager, *Odes*, 330.
³³ Putnam, *Structure*, 358.
³⁴ Pucci, *Horace's Banquet*, 260-2.
³⁵ *Odes*, 1.17.23.
³⁶ Nagel, *Lyric*, 60.

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Nathaniel Eberlein is a University Scholar senior from Gatesville, Texas, studying the intersection of Great Texts and Art History. He has worked as a museum student worker at the Martin Museum of Art at Baylor as an art history teaching-assistant to Dr. Heidi Hornik, and now conducts tours at the Armstrong Browning Library. He also helps head Baylor HRC's Running Club on trail runs through Cameron Park, and enjoys discussing texts in the William Carey Crane Scholar's program. Nathaniel has received two research grants from the Allbritton Institute to study paintings in Vienna and Amsterdam, and he has traveled overseas to participate in the excavation of the Late Roman synagogue in Huqoq, Israel. He plans to return to the dig this coming season, and he will begin teaching at Great Hearts, San Antonio this coming fall.

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Katerina is a senior University Scholars major from Austin, Texas, concentrating in Great Texts and Spanish. She has written her honors thesis on *Don Quijote*, arguing that Don Quijote's faith is an effort to revive a 'poetic' reality in an otherwise lackluster and 'prosaic' world. She has traveled to Spain to present her research on *Don Quijote* at a Spanish symposium. She has also presented a paper on "El Burlador de Sevilla" for Baylor's Scholars Week, for which she won an Outstanding Presentation Award. She is passionate about the power of the written word and its ability to convey Truth, Goodness, and Beauty in a way that surpasses the very word itself. Katerina enjoys rock climbing, hiking, travel, and learning about new cultures. In the future, Katerina plans to attend graduate school and hopes to one day be involved in classical education for the underprivileged abroad.

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Hannah Rogers is a junior from Lubbock, Texas. She is a University Scholar major concentrating in Great Texts and Classics. These concentrations stem from a love of Greek and literature. She is particularly interested in the history of modern thought and is working on an analysis of Dostoevsky and Nietzsche for her honors thesis. She hopes to attend graduate school in order to study Cicero or nineteenth-century literature and later become a professor of literature. Hannah works as a

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Charlotte Weston is a senior majoring in marketing and anthropology planning to graduate in December 2017. She was born and raised in New Braunfels, Texas, but she is a dual citizen and spends her summers with family in Ottawa, Canada. She is a member of the BIC and Honors programs, Delta Delta Delta, and serves as the Chief Justice of the Student Court. She volunteers as a digital marketing assistant for Pack of Hope, a Waco nonprofit. She helped to found an archaeological research project with Baylor professors in Italy, and she is planning a trip to northern Israel to work on a dig at Tel Shimron. In her spare time, she enjoys reading about Maya culture and the first peoples of the Americas. She has spent time in the Yucatan, Mexico, Turkey, and Greece. Upon graduation, she is going to work with Teach for America in Wisconsin, after which she hopes to live abroad before returning to the US to teach at the university level. By sharing her writing with the Baylor community, she hopes that other students will be inspired to take an anthropology class and learn more about the ways in which mankind views our own and other cultures.

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Jamie Wheeler is a sophomore University Scholar with concentrations in Classics and Renaissance/Early Modern Studies. Her interests include narrative in Latin poetry, Roman political thought, and early modern classical reception. Besides Horace, she particularly enjoys studying Virgil, Propertius, and Lucan. In her free time, she enjoys reading, crocheting, and playing the fiddle, as well as volunteering at her church, Redeemer PCA. She is proud to be a part of Baylor's Honors Residential College, where she serves as Librarian. In the future, she hopes to attend graduate school in Classics and become a professor. Throughout her studies, her goal is to bring together language, literature, and history across different eras to achieve a deeper understanding of the human condition, both past and present.