By Musheer Kamau
Developments regarding the idea of global citizenship, what Plato’s Socrates called being a “citizen of the world,” continually push political analysts, ecologists, theorists, and other social scientists to comment on its relationship to the concepts of sovereignty and sovereign immunity. On the one hand, some political theorists argue that as long as sovereignty remains clearly defined and distinct, the institution of the state as we know it will continue to prosper, and therefore civilization, as it exists, will continue peacefully without change. On the other hand, there are those who contend that, in light of advances in technology and education, increasing mobility, and unprecedented global threats, the idea of global citizenship will prove stronger than concerns about domestic sovereignty. For these latter observers, modernity has witnessed fundamental changes in global dynamics that exceed the boundaries and capacities of the traditional nation-state.
There exists a possible scenario by which the tension between nationalism and globalism might be mollified, a scenario that emerges from the exploration of the [PC1] development of the traditional definition and evolution of citizenship. Ultimately, this exercise leads one to examine whether one’s own citizenship absolves one of responsibilities to citizens of other nations, thereby revealing the conditions that would be necessary for the rational individual to ascribe to world citizenship. How can the contemporary, rational, traditional citizen be thus convinced or modified? An examination of the historical evolution of citizenship yields some important concepts that can help theorize the conditions necessary to achieve the establishment of global citizenship in this contemporary age.
The concept of citizenship has undergone several historical modifications to accommodate the specific political and social paradigms of the relevant periods. Each of these modifications has contributed to the contemporary concept of citizenship. Most people envision the idea of global citizenship as an expanded version of citizenship as conferred by the state – a type of citizenship that operates supranationally. Hence, the evolution of the concept of world citizenship is directly affected by the development of state citizenship as an institution. The mechanism for a rational actor to ascribe to the ideology of world citizenship would be similar to that which enabled the concept of state citizenship to be intrinsically acclaimed – the rational individual will have to be socialized into accepting the “institution” of global citizenship as something that is beneficial and, perhaps, necessary.
Citizenship from then to now: an evolution
A contemporary theorist understands citizenship to be a formal inclusion in a political community, i.e. holding a passport and having the rights that go with it. Several obvious components create the foundation for this definition. Consequently, citizenship may be further defined in sub-categories (from which the holistic definition is synthesized): political, legal, and social.
In 1950, J. H. Marshall’s typology adequately addressed these three components of citizenship in his work Citizenship and Social Class. Political citizenship refers to the right to participate in the political process as a candidate or as a voter. Civil citizenship refers to everyday freedom of speech, movement, work, property ownership, and the right of all citizens to have those freedoms equally protected by judicial process. Social citizenship refers to the enjoyment of rights to such things as an education and to a decent and secure standard of living according to the norms of one’s society. Marshall’s typology did not create these definitions, but it collected the various aspects of citizenship in one formal location; hence Marshall’s typology is the earliest and most comprehensive definition of citizenship. A brief examination of the historical development of the components of Marshall’s typology reveals the depth and intricacies of citizenship.
J. G. A. Pocock describes the early development of citizenship concepts in “The Ideals of Citizenship Since Classical Times.” In his work, Pocock describes the contribution of the Greek and Roman civilizations to citizenship ideology. “The classical account of citizenship as an Athenian ‘ideal’ is to be found in Aristotle’s Politics… In this great work we are told that the citizen is one who both rules and is ruled… Citizens join each other in making decisions where each decider respects the authority of the others, and all join in obeying the decisions they have made.” Aristotle’s prerequisites citizenship include being a male of known genealogy and a patriarch, warrior, or master of the labour of others. In other words, the citizen was derived from the political structure of the ancient Greek society. The nature of the political interaction elucidated specific obligations from the citizen: he was required to interact with the system, to obey and be obeyed (in a collective sense by being included in the process of decision-making). The citizen of the ancient Greek society was not an observer of the political process; in many ways, he was the political process.
The classical definition of political citizenship described the function of the actor. The citizen had tangible resources to contribute to the development of the society in which he dwelt. Pocock emphasizes that the classical ideal was and is a definition of the human person as a cognitive, active, moral, social, intellectual, and political being. A further and more careful examination of these and other prerequisites for citizenship in Greek and subsequent civilizations indicates that they contributed to the longevity of the polis. In particular, these equipped the citizen to be a political entity in the polis, an important aspect of Marshall’s typology. Since the polis was built on the attributes and contributions of the person, citizenship emphasized the necessity of having the most appropriate individual take on the title of citizen.
The Romans, for their part, were aggressive conquerors and their regimes were defined by this major preoccupation. The civil and legal aspects of citizenship emerge from this period of conquest. The Romans replicated their legal system throughout their empire to assure citizens of stability of property ownership. In effect, Roman citizenship included a component of acting upon things: “his relation to things was regulated by law, and his actions were performed in respect either of things or of the law regulating actions. A citizen came to mean someone free to act by law, free to ask and expect the law’s protection, a citizen of such a legal community of such and such a legal standing in that community.”
The Roman citizen maintained his ties to his polis through his possessions as well. This concept is one of the factors responsible for the expansion, stability, and success of the Roman Empire for such a long period of time. Since the time of Roman domination, the status of citizen has come to denote membership of shared or common law which may not be identical with a territorial community. Contingent on the development of these intricate legislative and protective aspects of governance was the strengthening of tax systems. Citizens were taxed, and they received tangible services from the state in return: “As the price of their citizenship, ancient Romans could be called on to serve as soldiers and had to supply their own weapons. The origins of modern taxation can be traced to wealthy [citizens] paying money to their king in lieu of military service.”
The third component of Marshall’s typology, social citizenship, emerged in early modern times. The evolution of social citizenship can be traced to Rousseau’s Social Contract; however, more definite aspects of social welfare interaction between the state and the citizen became more obvious in Germany during the 1880s. After Germany was united in 1871 under the direction of Otto von Bismarck, the nation developed a common government structure and social policy. The fact that this united Germany had been formed out of four kingdoms, five grand duchies, twelve duchies, twelve principalities, and three free cities was a crucial factor in the way social welfare was administrated.
After unification social welfare policy was increasingly formulated on the national level, while the social insurance programs implementing national policy were aimed at different social strata and were administered in highly decentralized ways. Thus the citizen received an efficient social interchange with his government that facilitated his developing into a social citizen. The citizen became socialized into responding to the unified state – it came to define him and his expectation of what the state should provide in exchange for his allegiance.
In this model, the citizen interacts with the state in the establishment of a mutual relationship in which more material gains are extended to the individual. The adaptation of citizenship to embrace the social aspect encouraged the strengthening and growth of the polis, now called the nation-state. The nation-state distanced itself from being defined in traditional ways (viz. church, king, etc), and the state grew in strength as its people identified themselves with it. The revolutions of this period demonstrated that the people progressively sought social provisions, and states no longer had the option of ignoring the social needs of the people. The economic and social rights that citizens enjoyed under the purview of social citizenship also contributed to the strengthening of the state, especially since the future was less discounted – a revolution was no longer an imaginary phenomenon. New philosophies emerged which contributed to the establishment of a paradigm that tied the success and longevity of the polis to the economic and social welfare of the citizen. Social citizenship could be thought of as an investment in the longevity of the polis (see Rousseau’s Social Contract).
An important and perhaps ignored dimension of citizenship that warrants attention is the concept of identity. While Marshall’s typology may appear to address this phenomenon, it does not do so unambiguously. From a contemporary perspective, identity should be explicitly included in the construction of any definition of citizenship. Consider the many immigrants in countries in which they play no direct role in the political process. However, with the advance of international legal and political systems, they are afforded some basic social and legal rights. Naturally, the question arises, “Even when qualified, why do these individuals refuse to apply for the conferment of citizenship from the country of residence?” This brings one to a fourth aspect of citizenship: communal citizenship.
Communal citizenship refers to utility that a citizen derives from belonging or ascribing to a particular community with which he may be able to identify, and hence achieve some measure of self-definition. Many states have been formulated on the basis of the unique identity provided for their citizens. Consider: what is american about Americans?, or what is german about Germans? Can one who is american be Canadian?, and even “is it possible to describe an American?” The early formation of the nation-state serves as a good starting-point for the evolution of this ideology.
The Peace of Westphalia (1648) did more than address religious issues and relations among states. It gave birth to the idea that the state is able to define itself without interference by external entities: the state achieved absolute sovereignty. However, within this concept of sovereignty was the idea that people within the state shared some commonalities that assisted in the definition of the state itself. Associated with this concept is the idea of community and communal sharing. Citizens began to define themselves according to the community in which they shared some enduring aspect (heritage, history, or language, for example).
All four aspects of citizenship—political, legal, social, and communal—provide specified frameworks in relation to which the actor (citizen) can be defined. As this brief historical account of the idea of citizenship shows, the institution of citizenship has evolved to accommodate the changes within society, thereby making the institution more efficient. As Hobsbawm has argued, “The case for the nation was that it represented a stage in the historical development of human society, and the case for the establishment of any particular nation-state, irrespective of the subjective feelings of the members of the nationality concerned.” These changes were necessary to ensure the success and longevity of the nation.
Moving to world citizenship
A survey of responses to world citizenship today would demonstrate that the concept suggests to people one-world government, a complete disintegration of the nation-state as we know it, and, perhaps, the rule of an “antichrist.” Contrary to what common media globalization pundits may articulate, strains of ideas of global citizenship predate our modern civilization. Several prominent historical personalities have made claims to world citizenship during the last three millennia. However, the import of such a claim made during the 5th Century B.C.E is quite different from that of one made during the 20th or even the 21st century. Due to the changing social and political environments, world citizenship takes on slightly different connotations.
Diogenes the Cynic was one of the earliest to aspire to world citizenship. When asked where he came from, he declared, “I am a citizen of the world.” In Cultivating Humanity, Martha C. Nussbaum claims that “Diogenes meant that he refused to be defined simply by his local origins and group memberships, associations central to the image of a conventional male [citizen]; he insisted on defining himself in terms of more universal aspirations and concerns.”
Socrates went a step further to explain that he was neither Athenian nor Greek, “but a citizen of the world for he did not confine himself to Sunium, Taenarum, or the Ceraunian mountains.” Socrates’ comments are drawn from a dialogue on exile. Perhaps, Socrates’ real claim is that his influence and interaction with society need not be tied to the Athenian state. If exiled, Socrates would still continue doing what he had been doing for approximately twenty-five years: interacting person to person (Aristotelian political citizenship). He asserts that he finds citizenship in any part of the world where he can continue doing what he did before his exile.
Additionally, Diogenes believed that “the only real community is one that embraces the whole world.” The Stoics embellished Diogenes’ philosophy: “each of us is a member of two communities: one that is truly great and one that is truly common… in which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our nation by the sun; the other, the one to which we have been assigned by birth.” Nussbaum continues to explain this Stoic-refined philosophy:
The accident of where one is born is just that, an accident; any human being might have been born in any nation. Recognizing this, we should not allow differences of nationality or class or ethnic membership or even gender to erect barriers between us and our fellow human beings. We should recognize humanity – and its fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity – wherever it occurs, and give that community of humanity our first allegiance.
In this statement, Nussbaum echoes the claims of Socrates, Diogenes, and the Stoics. She infers that there should be some aspiration to the attainment of communal citizenship on a global scale. She identifies reason and moral capacity as being sufficient characteristics to distinguish the “community of humanity.” It seems that this aspect of world citizenship precedes any other. As I will demonstrate below, communal world citizenship—as opposed to political, legal, and social world citizenship—is perhaps the only model that can satisfy those who desire to define a world citizen in this contemporary age, in which state sovereignty seems unlikely to buckle under the pressures of globalization.
The Stoics were among the first to formalize the idea of concentric circles of identity. Ranging from the self, to the extended family, to the city-state, concentric circles of identity surround each individual. Stoics believed that the largest circle was the “circle of humanity:” “We need not give up our special affections and identifications, whether national or ethnic or religious, but we should work to make all human beings part of our community of dialogue and concern, showing respect for the human wherever it occurs, and allowing that respect to constrain our national or local politics” [emphasis added]. This constraint ties political action of the individual to communal world citizenship, thereby indirectly creating an avenue for political world citizenship; however, there are many other important criteria necessary for a more complete manifestation of such. In any case, a dimension of action can be incorporated into the concept of world citizenship as theorized by the Stoics.
Many centuries later, Thomas Paine gained a widespread reputation for being a citizen of the world. Paine, like many contemporary people who ascribe to global citizenship, laboured outside of the land of his birth. His concept of global citizenship hinged more on action, where the effect of one’s work is felt. While he was born in England, Paine was adopted by the American people and made a French citizen. He was a participant in both the American and French revolutions. Paine published numerous articles and other literary works that endeared him to states with which he had no natural connections. Delanty’s remarks on global citizenship are apropos to Paine: “It might be concluded that for cosmopolitan citizenship the fundamental criterion of citizenship is no longer birth, as is the case with most kinds of national citizenship, but residence and the cultivation of a critical discourse of identity as multilayered.”
Thomas Paine’s sentiments of global citizenship remained a relic of oratory for subsequent years, including much of the 20th century. Rather than Paine’s world citizenship, the prevalent model was that instituted by The Treaty of Westphalia (1648). This treaty set the stage for the nature of interaction among states; moreover, it served to solidify the necessity of ensuring states the absolute sovereignty they needed in order to curb problems such as those that were experienced in the past. According to the treaty, sovereign states were recognized as political units associated with a population that had a common cultural, linguistic, religious, or historic heritage. Sovereignty was embodied in the monarch who ruled without interference from other authorities and enjoyed formal equality with other monarchs. With the democratic revolutions that followed the treaty, particularly those in Europe and America in the 18th century, sovereignty attained a more popular connotation in place of the monarchic one.
The development of the post-Westphalian state, coupled with the democratic revolutions, impacted the concept of global citizenship in two main ways. In the first instance, the attention shifted from supra-state affairs to more domestic ideologies – this was now the state’s turn to flourish. As evidenced during the early part of the 20th century, the idea of the state grew in importance, and the concept of nationalism engaged the attention of many societies as well. To be “German,” “French,” or “American” began to take on specific meaning.
The second way in which the development of the post-Westphalian state together with the democratic revolutions negatively impacted latent global citizenship concepts was in the mechanics that were in place to effect the stable and rapid establishment of the state. In establishing distinctive features of the specific nation, a greater sense of division pervaded international relations. A citizen of Germany was not only defined in terms of his geographical origin, but also in terms of how different he was from a Frenchman, or Englishman, or an Italian. Certainly, the expression or the exhortation to be a global citizen was not looked upon favourably at the beginning of the 20th century. The pursuant of such a claim seemed to be lacking the essential national pride that was pervasive at that time and could not be fully considered a citizen of that country.
The effects of the changes since the Treaty of Westphalia culminated in World War I. [PC2] After the war, the main world actors began looking at ways in which they could promote peace and security among nations. The League of Nations was born as a direct result of the necessity for global security. The League was supposed to provide a mechanism by which nations could find solutions to their disputes through arbitration.
Later events of the 20th century, including the modification of the international order, contributed to reversing the decline of global citizenship sentiments. The League of Nations was the political predecessor of the United Nations which was established after World War II. The world political system was more amenable to such an organization especially with the restructuring of power within the body’s most powerful council, the Security Council. The Security Council adopted the five-permanent-members-veto arrangement, thereby reversing the League Council’s previous arrangement that required unanimity.
During the post-WWII period, many new countries were established as decolonization spread and former imperial powers reeled from the financial and social expenses of the war. The world saw the tremendous migration of millions of people. While much of the migration in Europe was initiated to find safety, migration after the war was mainly for economic motives: “The movement of skilled and unskilled labour grew in scale and significance, while at the same time war, civil unrest, economic hardship, and violent regimes caused vast movements of refugees and displaced persons.” This migration also included the deployment of individuals to other countries to work with the many international organizations that were established worldwide. The identities of millions of people throughout the world had to be modified in order to accommodate the drastic adjustments that were necessary after the war.
Making it relevant: thinking about global citizenship today
Rhetoric about global citizenship started to become more prominent during the last part of the 20th century. In most cases, when such rhetoric appears, it relies heavily on notions co-opted from conventional state citizenship. When asked why citizenship should be considered in a global context, John Alessio explained the gravity of world problems and the necessity for a global solution:
As the millennium nears, people all over the world are struggling with problems of a magnitude no other generation has faced. Even in the most affluent nations, millions of people suffer from hunger, homelessness, and unattended health problems. Wars, civil conflicts and invasions take the lives of millions more. Global changes in the climate are creating severe local weather conditions, destroying lives and property. Human projects continue to despoil the land, water and air.
Lately, the Internet has been the main avenue of communication of different ideologies regarding the world citizen. The concept of global citizenship has taken shape as an extension of ideologies associated with local citizenship as the proponents understood it [PC3] :
“New patterns of identity and allegiance, rights and obligations are springing up in an increasingly globalized world, making utopian notions like global citizenship surprisingly relevant.”
“Although the people who are going about with two or three passports in their pockets may not think of themselves as global citizens in an idealistic sense, they have moved into a new terrain where the sense of national identity is less clear than it once was. [PC4] ”
“The basic idea of membership in a universal society that transcends all others is as old as the Stoics of ancient Greece and Rome. Today, it is being revived as part of a widespread move toward new social contracts, new ways for people to understand their political allegiances, rights and obligations.”
Walter Truett Anderson’s article attempts to link components of Marshall’s typology to world citizenship. Appropriating the components of citizenship of Marshall’s typology, however, is not as straightforward as the article attempts to make it. The practicality of the matter is more contentious than he recognizes. Several groups tout globalization, and, like Anderson, argue that global citizenship is an inevitable phenomenon. Superficially, these arguments may seem plausible. However, many technical problems still persist.
According to some proponents, because the world is shrinking under the forces of globalization, state borders are becoming less significant. Multinational corporations are sometimes seen as excellent enhancers of world citizenship status as they move citizens from state to state. The argument exists that technology increases the ease of interaction via communication and transportation of members of different states, and thereby decreases the contrast among citizens. These factors are deemed as the cause of a melding of identities. Consider the German who is able to proclaim his European identity as easily as his German identity. It almost seems like a reversal of the effects of Westphalia – a regionalization of identity that could perhaps lead to a globalization of the same. However, this presents only one aspect of globalization.
Responding as Global Citizens
The Pew Global Attitudes Project demonstrates one irony of thinking about globalization and world citizenship. The study indicates that people from most countries believe that globalization is a good thing for themselves and their families. However, Kenya produced a unique result in that respondents believed that increase in foreign trade and business was good for the state but not as good for the individual. These results may be explained by another study conducted by Nancy Powers and Petya Kostadinova. They concluded that greater trade exposes citizens to a competitive environment and to labor market conditions in which their social citizenship could be undermined; greater exposure to the global economy via trade is associated with lower social spending levels. As long as social and civil aspects of citizenship remain important, another institution is more likely to fill in where state citizenship has defaulted. Given the correct political infrastructure, global citizenship could accomplish this task. To date, however, no such political infrastructure exists.
All components of Marshall’s typology entail the rendering of rights to the citizen. The question is now, who would apportion rights to the world citizen? A right is something that is due to an individual or governmental body by law, tradition, or nature. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (1966), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) contain examples of rights that should be enjoyed by all. International law requires citizens to observe the rights of people who belong to states other than their own. Although these rights have been integrated into international law, the international community has witnessed the difficulty of enforcing their provision.
In order to concretely establish political, social, and civil citizenship, other structural modifications must also be effected – a world government with legislative, executive, and judicial arms would have to be established together with appropriate enforcement agencies. Although the argument may be made that the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice are appropriate judicial bodies, and that the United Nations acts in both executive and legislative capacities, the truth is that none have compulsory jurisdiction and all are, in essence, powerless. They have no citizens, for state sovereignty still trumps them all. Unless the state becomes subordinate to these bodies, they would not be able to apportion political, social, or civil rights to the world citizen. They would continue to act as monitoring agencies to compel the sovereign governments to grant these rights to their citizens.
Making the point
The absence of any real political governing authority makes it difficult to translate the exact old definition of state citizenship to global citizenship. The effects of globalization and the new collective threats facilitate the ascription to a common identity, which must be defined. The previous anchor to which the citizen was tied was the polis. What could be the “anchor” for the global citizen? Since everyone shares in the “community of humanity,” actions that benefit this community are defined by communal interests: health, prosperity, security, or advancement. The world citizen does not have a state with which he can interact and derive his rights; however, “the community of humanity” can adequately serve this purpose.
Today, events that occur in one part of the world impact the least likely of places. One year after 9/11, the Maltese economy was still being affected adversely:
“The Maltese economy was by no means spared the effect of the startling events that took place one year ago today and the after effects of the ensuing economic downturn are still being felt…”
"The American economy does not appear to be improving and of course the European economy is also linked in the chain. This means the EU, which is important for Maltese trade, could also face further decline."
Borders have become more permeable and are no longer being drawn by political lines on land and sea, but by interests. The new polis is the sphere of influence where one makes his contribution.
“Patria est, ubicumque est bene.” (One’s country is wherever one does well).
While a citizen acts in order to promote the longevity of his state, a citizen of the world acts in order to preserve the existence of collective humanity. When he recognizes the necessity of his role in the preservation of the world, the global citizen acts accordingly. This philosophy has been the motive of many environmental campaigns: “Think globally, act locally.” To think globally would imply the recognition of a universal responsibility to the rest of humanity: everyone does his part in order to combat a universal problem. It is in this manner that the world was able to eradicate smallpox in 1977 and to reduce the incidence of tuberculosis during the 1990s.
At present, everyone is implored to do his part to combat terrorism. While the realists may argue that these individual actions are not for any charitable reasons, but rather motivated by the selfish desire for self-preservation, it is undeniable that the individual is now interacting with a principle or concept that is much larger than his state. Combating the problem of the ozone layer appeals not to the American identity first, but to the human identity. Similarly, combating the problem of HIV and depleting environmental resources require the same focus and effort. There are many geographically separated individuals who are as concerned about North Korea’s nuclear capabilities as the Japanese are. When threats directly attack our humanness, they elicit that identity first, and that human identity resides above the purview of the state. Just as more actors adopted the idea of political, legal, social, and communal citizenship when it became more beneficial, actors today may be expected to ascribe to global citizenship whenever it becomes a more efficient institution for solving pressing problems.
A citizen who acts within and without his national borders by supporting his domestic society eventually helps in establishing a more secure world community. Although his actions are focused domestically, the effects are global. A sense of dualism in action is implied. The citizen of today must conduct his affairs, duties, and responsibilities within his state with the notion that, because of a closely-related international market economy and global society, the success of his state affects the success of the global community, and the interaction between both is dynamic and mutual. The citizen must understand that his actions spill over, and the community has expanded across borders. The new global citizen is responsible to state and global community.
The present weaknesses of political, social, and legal world citizenship concepts do not entirely negate the practicality of the broader adoption of global citizenship based on a communal model. Until adequate structural and political adjustments are made to fully apportion these three aspects to the world citizen, this rational concept of world citizenship will simply remain unattainable. However, many of the largest threats are no longer localized and definable. Solutions as large as these threats must be utilized in order to mollify their impacts. Communal world citizenship provides a strong, rational basis from which these solutions can be established and applied even in the face of absolute sovereignty. This is the primary domain from which the world citizen may determine his identity – in the community of humanity.
 Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 119-31.
 J.G.A. Pocock, "The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times," Queen's Quarterly, Vol.99, No.1, Spring 1992, pp.35-55, in Shafir, pp. 31-41.
 Ronald Beiner, Theorizing Citizenship, (New York: State University of New York, 1995), 30-31.
 Ibid, 32.
 Ibid, 36.
 Ibid, 37.
 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 41.
 Martha Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 52
 Arthur Richard Shilleto, Plutarch Morals: Ethical Essays, (London: George Bell and Sons, 1908), 381
 Martha Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 58.
 Ibid, 58.
 Ibid, 58-59.
 Ibid, 60.
 Ibid, 61.
 Gerard Delanty, Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics, (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2000), 67.
 The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 ended a more than 80-year-long war in Europe, a war that was fought out as a world war on every then-known continent. Its origin was geopolitical manipulation, and the flame of war was nurtured by geopoliticians who used religion and economic questions to pit the people of Europe against each other.
 Nationalism played an important role in motivating civilians to go to war on behalf of their state, especially within Europe.
 Julie Andrzejewski & John Alessio , “Education for Global Citizenship and Social Responsibility,” Progressive Perspectives (Spring 1999).
 Walter Truett Anderson, “Global Citizenship – A New Reality of 21st Century Politics,” Pacific Press News Service (June 12, 2003).
 This study was published in July 2003 by the Pew Research Centre for the People and the Press.
 Nancy Powers and Petya Kostadinova, Citizenship at the Millennium: Testing the Effects of Trade on Social and Civil Citizenship, (Latin American Studies Association XXII Congress, 2000), 14.
 Marika Azzopardi and Ray Abdilla, “A Year on 9/11 Effects Still Felt,” The Malta Financial and Business Times, (11th September, 2002).
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