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CONTENTS

Empirical Adequacy: Balance Between Two Extremes......................6
KRISTEN ANDERSON

This paper argues that Bas van Fraassen’s empirical adequacy, the belief in the evidence of a scientific theory, is a clear middle ground between scientific realism and radical empiricism. Scientific realists argue for the belief in the truth of a theory, which is epistemically too audacious. Radical empiricists claim not to believe in anything that is not observable, greatly limiting them in scientific inquiry. Van Fraassen says that belief in the empirical adequacy of a theory is sufficiently cautious and makes sense of the scientific picture of the world.

The Trolley Problem and the Ends of Dignity..............................15
MICAH FURLONG

This paper examines the concept of Kantian dignity and seeks to find a solution to several objections raised to the theory in various scenarios. It does so by looking at two different interpretations of the second categorical imperative from a deontological and consequentialist perspective. The paper ends with a conclusion that requires another principle to be adopted in order to solve the problems that arise. In this way, the paper hopes to help solve the problem of applying Kant while avoiding inactivity.

Beauty and Theology...............................................................33
OLIVER HA

This paper examines the competing claims of Immanuel Kant and Étienne Gilson regarding the nature of beauty in art and in the natural world. The former posits that statements with predicates of value such as “this waterfall is beautiful” refer not to the object in question but rather to the emotional state of the subject. In contrast, the latter argues that statements with predicates of value refer both to the object in question and to the degree that the object participates in Beauty.
Indispensability of Functions with Regard to Indexicals .......... 41
LAUREN HIBBS

Kaplan and Davidson attempt to employ functions in order to solve the problem of indexicals. The paper argues that their solution is not indispensable and other options that fit with nominalism are explored.

Nietzsche: Heir or Usurper of the Nominalist Tradition? .......... 48
WILLIAM STÖVER

This paper utilizes a close reading of Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy of morality in order to trace the ideological genealogy of his philosophy. Through an examination of the influence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s nominalism upon Nietzsche, questions regarding their apparent contradiction emerge. Nietzsche’s philosophy is shown to be an elaboration and clarification of Rousseau’s position, with certain subjective elements removed. Behind the bright joyous aspect of humanity which Rousseau posits looms the dark visage of Nietzsche’s abyss. They are both drawn from the same philosophical principles but differ only in application. It is thus shown that Nietzsche stands not as a rejection of the Enlightenment tradition, but rather its heir, logically following the tenets set forth by Rousseau to their necessary and harsh conclusions.

About the Authors ........................................................................................................ 56
This paper argues that Bas van Fraassen’s empirical adequacy, the belief in the evidence of a scientific theory, is a clear middle ground between scientific realism and radical empiricism. Scientific realists argue for the belief in the truth of a theory, which is epistemically too audacious. Radical empiricists claim not to believe in anything that is not observable, greatly limiting them in scientific inquiry. Van Fraassen says that belief in the empirical adequacy of a theory is sufficiently cautious and makes sense of the scientific picture of the world.

Empirical Adequacy: Balance Between Two Extremes

Kristen Anderson

In The Scientific Image, Bas van Fraassen argues that the aim of science is to give empirically adequate theories and not true theories. Similarly, it is rational to believe a theory to be empirically adequate, but not to believe it is true. He claims to take an anti-realist stance against the idea that the aim of science is to offer a literally true picture of nature. In support of constructive empiricism, he uses a minimal argument that states the belief of the empirical adequacy of a theory is epistemically less audacious than the belief of the truth of a theory. I agree with van Fraassen and will defend his arguments from various criticisms.

A scientist trusts in the empirical adequacy of a theory because empirical adequacy is based on observable facts. A theory summarizes a hypothesis that has been supported with repeated testing. If enough evidence accumulates to support the hypothesis, it becomes accepted as a valid explanation of a phenomenon. However, realists believe in the truth of a theory even though “truth” has no empirical basis to support it. Radical empiricists, on the other hand, cannot believe in anything that is not observable (even those things that are empirically adequate), which limits them severely in their scientific testing. The solution: constructive empiricism, a clear balance between radical empiricists and realists. The empirical adequacy of a theory is its backbone; it is
the evidence necessary to back the claim. Any scientific theory must be based on a careful and rational examination of the facts, which can be observed and/or measured.

Van Fraassen states, “A theory is empirically adequate exactly if what it says about the observable things and events in this world, is true—exactly if it saves the phenomena.” In other words, an empirically adequate theory is a theory that makes correct and accurate empirical predictions of the phenomena under observation. A simple example is the theory “Hot air rises.” If hot air indeed rises, then the theory is empirically adequate; if it sinks, then the theory is empirically inadequate. We should not trust in a theory that is empirically inadequate because it does not correctly describe our world. Likewise, scientists test empirical adequacy of astronomy by measuring the positions of Venus and Saturn every night at the same time for an entire year. They compare the results of their measurements against the predictions of the theory. If the theory makes the correct predictions to the desired level of accuracy, then the theory is empirically adequate with the observations.

Van Fraassen describes the scientific realist stance when he says that “science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true.” A “literally” true picture of the world involves a theoretical discussion about protons, electrons, or other unobservable entities. Realists would need to understand these entities in a literal sense. Protons and electrons are not meaningless terms, but these theoretical terms bestow ontological commitment to entities. Scientific realists say science tells a true account of nature. Science is understood as a truth-seeking enterprise, and the key to realism is the idea that scientific theories aim to be true.

When a constructive empiricist accepts a theory, however, one regards it, not as true, but as empirically adequate. Belief in the empirical adequacy of a theory allows scientists to regard the activity of science as an activity the empiricist can endorse fully and safely. The individual has a choice: assert a theory to be true and call for belief, or assert its empirical adequacy and call for acceptance. Both situations demand individuals to go beyond the evidence. Van Fraassen notes, “In either case we stick our necks out: empirical adequacy goes far beyond what we can know at any given time. (All the results of measurement are not in; they will never all be in; and in any case, we won’t measure everything that can be measured).” However, belief in the empirical adequacy of a theory
is still a weaker assertion than belief in the truth of a theory. One must accept that the weaker assertion is better, because constructive empiricists reject the arguments that suggest that one is rationally obligated to believe in the truth of a theory.

Constructive empiricists stand in the middle ground: they are not realists and have no belief in the truth of a theory because it violates empirical scruples, and they are not radical empiricists who claim that empirical adequacy is unachievable because they only believe in strictly observable entities. Why must we stick our necks out for empirical adequacy in the first place? One may argue that the safest position is radical empiricism. However, I would argue that the best stance is a balance between radical empiricism and scientific realism. Gideon Rosen, a Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University and author of “What Is Constructive Empiricism,” states:

The radical empiricist can make no good sense of those aspects of science, which involve the use of theories to form definite expectations about the future. But this means that he cannot make sense of even the most basic features of experimental practice. As is well known, when a scientist tests his theory by experiment he takes for granted a whole range of theoretically informed beliefs about how his equipment will behave.

The constructive empiricist has something that the radical empiricist lacks, the ability to rely on the empirical adequacy of a theory. The former is able to reasonably engage in practices, while the latter is limited in one’s scope of reason and scientific testing. A constructive empiricist evidently has a certain capability to look towards the future. The radical empiricist has serious setbacks in making sense of areas of science that demand us to look forward at future expectations. For example, if scientists were confident that their chemical compound would explode, it would not make sense to run the experiment. The radical empiricist running the experiment has no rational thinking behind his choice to elect not to run the experiment, but the constructive empiricist, because he knows that his knowledge of the compound is empirically adequate, does. The person that believes in the empirical adequacy of a theory is able to look toward the future and use theories as means to rationalize and continue scientific activity. The extreme position severely limits and
hurts scientists in their scientific activity. Thus, empirical adequacy is most compatible with empiricism in that it renders the phenomena of scientific activity fully understandable.

There is no rational reason to believe in the truth of a theory because truth is not found in phenomena. However, observable entities are; therefore, the belief in the empirical adequacy of a theory is backed by nature. One must believe in the empirical adequacy of a theory. Van Fraassen argues, “it is not an epistemological principle that one might as well hang for a sheep as for a lamb.” Yes, both assertions go beyond phenomena. However, believing that a theory is empirically adequate is cautious enough to allow one to remain faithful to empiricism. In other words, constructive empiricists do not wish to “hang for a sheep” because they would be far removed from empiricism. Rather, to “hang for a lamb” is to be a committed empiricist. Van Fraassen’s main tactic is to argue that the belief in the empirical adequacy of a theory makes sense of the scientific picture of the world and is the minimal outlook that does so. To adopt a stronger realist position would involve useless assumptions. If individuals go further than the empirical adequacy of a theory, then they take unnecessary epistemic risks for no empirical gain. The extra strength of the realist position is misleading. Thus, belief in the empirical adequacy of a theory is the weakest attitude scientists are able to adopt while successfully making sense of their scientific activity. Now, I will defend his argument against attacks purported by other philosophers.

John O’Leary-Hawthorne claims that van Fraassen does not understand what the “belief in the truth of a theory” involves. O’Leary-Hawthorne points out that van Fraassen defines “desire for truth” as an individual’s theory of the world to be true. However, O’Leary-Hawthorne says that “desire for truth” is really a desire to believe a plurality of truths. Thus, he finds van Fraassen’s idea of empirical adequacy uncompelling.

However, I find O’Leary-Hawthorne’s line of defense inadequate because it overlooks the fact that desire and intention say nothing about the aim of science. O’Leary-Hawthorne points to a passage in van Fraassen’s Laws and Symmetry. It follows,

One point is that reasons for acceptance include many which, ceteris paribus, detract from the likelihood of truth. In constructing and evaluating theories, we follow our desires for in-
formation as well as our desire for truth. For belief, however, all but the desire for truth must be “ulterior motives.” Since therefore there are reasons for acceptance which are not reasons for belief, I conclude that acceptance is not belief. It is to me an elementary logical point that a more informative theory cannot be more likely to be true...  

Van Fraassen states that people are inclined to believe the weaker of two theories. However, more informative theories are stronger because they say more about the world. Scientists cannot believe in both the truth of a weaker theory and the informativeness of the stronger without contradiction. If scientific realists were correct, the desire for truth would serve as the only guide for what to believe. The empirical adequacy of a theory, that is, the actual evidence, would not be reason enough to believe the more informative theory. In believing the “weaker” theory, the scientific realists are not basing their beliefs about the world upon actual observations. This epistemic approach does not follow, so individuals should only believe propositions that are epistemically safe.  

O’Leary-Hawthorne argues that “desire for truth” is a desire to believe as many truths as possible. From this perspective, believing one truth is good, but believing two truths is even better. Thus, if one believes in the logically weaker of the two theories, it will help satisfy the desire for truth in van Fraassen’s point of view. However, it will not help satisfy the desire for truth for the scientific realist, as the scientific realist does not stray from the empirical adequacy of a theory. A desire for truth is a desire to gain a better picture of nature. O’Leary-Hawthorne continues that this desire for truth does not work against believing in empirical adequacy, thus weakening van Fraassen’s argument.  

However, the claim that scientists desire truth and ultimately desire to expand their knowledge of the world says nothing about the aim of science. The constructive empiricist is committed to the claim that empirical adequacy is sufficient in itself, and that one does not need to believe that our accepted theories are true in order to make sense of scientific practice.  

A scientist agrees that the theory “hot air rises” is empirically adequate because the data in the world matches the predictions of the theory. However, the scientist’s thoughts or desire for truth does not
coincide with the brute fact that the theory is empirically adequate. Van Fraassen cautions against merging the aim of science with the intentions of an individual and gives a descriptive example in *The Scientific Image*:

> The aim of science is of course not to be identified with individual scientists’ motives. The aim of the game of chess is to checkmate your opponent; but the motive for playing may be fame, gold, and glory. What the aim determines what counts as success in the enterprise as such, and this aim may be pursued for any number of reasons.⁷

Constructive empiricism is not an account of intentions, but a belief that the best theories chart observable motions. The aim of science is to gain successful theories that actually describe observables in nature.

Marc Alspector-Kelly argues that the belief in a theory as empirically adequate goes beyond the deliverances of experience. John Worrall also says that, if van Fraassen is to advocate for a rival to realism, he must do so more persuasively. These philosophers argue individuals could simply believe that a theory is true in its statements about what has been actually observed. Worrall, in “An Unreal Image,” poses a question:

> If scientists when they accept a theory are to be considered as holding beliefs (that the theory saves all the phenomena), which in the nature of the case cannot be justified, then why debar them from a little extra belief (that the theory is at any rate our present best guess as to the truth), which they anyway seem generally to hold, and which now fails to clash with any general principle?⁸

In other words, what real argument is there for only going a little beyond empirical adequacy to acceptance of truth? Constructive empiricists who reject empirically inadequate theories do the same as the realist, after all. The caloric theory is seen as empirically inadequate to both sides. However, Worrall fails by missing the fundamental aim of science, which is merely to find empirical adequacy. Truth does not suffice for the aim because there is no warrant behind claims of truth. Since truth as belief has no backing, realists must make an audacious jump. Worrall claims that van Fraassen has no compelling reason to
“hang for a sheep,” but realists really do cling to something that has no security. Scientists should not aim at something that is not tangible. Thus, be a constructive empiricist.

Likewise, Alspector-Kelly makes a similar mistake. He pays insufficient attention to the fact that constructive empiricism is a stance about the aim of science, in that science aims to give us theories which add up to what is actually observed. Constructive empiricism is not involved in a particular epistemic position, yet “someone who accepts a theory may of course have beliefs that go beyond that, or not.” Likewise, a constructive empiricist does not need to be a scientific agnostic or a scientific gnostic.

I will now use sources to support van Fraassen’s claims. Peter Forrest introduces the term “scientific agnostic.” A scientific agnostic is someone who believes the science to be empirically adequate, but does not believe it to be true. The contrary is a “scientific gnostic,” someone who believes the science he accepts to be true as well as empirically adequate. Constructive empiricists and realists are two types of philosophers with differing views of what science is, but scientific gnostics and agnostics do not need to be philosophers at all. There is a tendency to confuse constructive empiricism with scientific agnosticism. However, constructive empiricists could even be scientific gnostics, because the empiricist position is not a distinct epistemological position. If realists argue that we ought to abide by the epistemological principle of truth, then any beliefs one might argue for do not need to interfere with the notion of empirical adequacy. Thus, we have no logical reason to put our necks out any further than what we are already doing.

James Ladyman points out that one could agree that the aim of science is mere empirical adequacy and still maintain that scientific theories are true. He continues in “A Defense of van Fraassen’s Critique of Adductive Inference: Reply to Psillos:”

This view of science could accompany many different attitudes towards it, its value, its worthiness of acceptance, its chances of success. Traditionally, empiricists have both held up science as a paradigm for rational enquiry and been critical of its reach.
Ladyman claims that constructive empiricism allows various attitudes only if the empirical adequacy of a theory is the aim of science. Scientists should not concern themselves with an individual’s personal beliefs as long as one is working within the “paradigm.” That is, scientists’ work, not necessarily their personal beliefs, must maintain the standards of constructive empiricism.

If empirical adequacy were no longer adequate for the belief of a theory, scientists would argue that the belief in the truth of a theory is worth the epistemic risk. The epistemic modesty of empiricism encourages an individual to reject the belief that a theory is true in favor of the belief that the theory is empirically adequate.

Van Fraassen illustrates a complete picture of empirical adequacy. He convincingly defends the notion that the belief in the empirical adequacy of a theory is better than the belief in the truth of a theory because the latter involves more risk for no epistemic gain. The extra strength from a realist perspective is misleading. Particularly, Worrall, O’Leary-Hawthorne, and Alspector-Kelly miss the point that personal intentions are separate from the aim of science. Through the insight of Monson, Ladyman, and Rosen, I have shown that the epistemic risk is not worth the belief in the truth of a theory, and that the belief in the empirical adequacy of a theory is superior.
NOTES

2 Ibid., 8.
3 Ibid., 69.
9 Monton and van Fraassen, “Constructive Empiricism and Modal Nominalism.”
10 Ladyman, Douven, Horsten, and van Fraassen, “A Defense of van Fraassen’s Critique of Adductive Inference: Reply to Psillos,” 318
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This paper examines the concept of Kantian dignity and seeks to find a solution to several objections raised to the theory in various scenarios. It does so by looking at two different interpretations of the second categorical imperative from a deontological and consequentialist perspective. The paper ends with a conclusion that requires another principle to be adopted in order to solve the problems that arise. In this way, the paper hopes to help solve the problem of applying Kant while avoiding inactivity.

The Trolley Problem and the Ends of Dignity

Micah Furlong

A trolley is speeding out of control toward a group of five workers trying to fix the tracks. All five will surely die if the conductor does not act. The only way to save the five workers would be to divert the train so that it follows another line where only one worker's life would be lost. My moral intuition tells me to sacrifice the one worker for the five.\(^1\) Perhaps the only major opposition to this answer comes from a deontological reading of Immanuel Kant. Kant's second categorical imperative provides a deep insight into the importance of the individual human being. Does that make it right to protect the one and sacrifice the five? Kant here seems blatantly wrong. Is there a way to reconcile Kant to common morality? By understanding the second categorical imperative, we might find the answer to this debate. We will begin by understanding how Kant establishes the idea of dignity, the criterion given by Alan Donagan to read Kant properly, and Marcus Singer's objections to Kant's moral construction. Next, we will examine Thomas Hill's deontological reading. In contrast, we will hear David Cummiskey's consequentialist reading, and engage in a debate between the two. Then, we will evaluate a third way to reconcile the view with my intuition offered by Frances Kamm. In conclusion, we will see that Kant's moral construction can only be rectified with common morality with significant qualification.

Kant's Setup, Donagan's Criterion for a Proper Reading, and Singer's Objections
Kant’s second categorical imperative is an attempt to create a moral theory that will coherently incorporate the importance of human rationality. He claims that nothing “could be called ‘good’ without qualification except a good will.” The good will is good because it desires solely (or, at least, overridingly) to do what is right. He pictures the world in two ways, the phenomenal and the noumenal. Viewed as phenomenal, the world is a place in which outside influences affect humanity’s moral decisions. Viewed as noumenal, the world is free of such considerations and biases. The only motivational structures that a person possesses in this noumenal perspective are the reason and the will. Good can only be determined in this realm, since the good will must be free from determination by all other desires. Kant here implies that “if an end is good, it must be set by reason; and if an action is done under the full direction of reason, then the end must be good.” Good will is entirely dependent upon reason, and the good will imparts goodness upon other things. Due to this relationship between good will and reason, “rational nature exists as an end in itself [emphasis in original].” It is worthy of protection because it endows other actions and things as ends worthy of pursuit, since good is a rational evaluative concept. Human beings are separate from other creatures due to “the distinctive feature of humanity, [which is] the capacity to take a rational interest in something” beyond animalistic instinct. The ability to set ends is an end in itself, and creatures able to set such ends also exist as ends in themselves. Kant uses this understanding to ground the second categorical imperative: “Act in such a way as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of anyone else, always as an end and never merely as a means.” Kant believes that this categorical imperative is simply another way of understanding the universability requirement of the first categorical imperative, since the respect of persons would result in the same moral conclusions. Kant believes that the second categorical imperative will clarify the technical language of the first and serve to emphasize the importance of each person’s rational capacity.

The respect of each individual’s rational capacity is dependent on the dignity of human beings. We can evaluate the importance of dignity through the use of different value concepts which consider ends. As Allen Wood explains, an end “is that whose value provides [a] terminus in a chain of reasons for an action.” Wood explains that Kant conceives of three distinct value concepts: the end in itself, the existent end, and absolute worth. The end in itself is an objective end, in contrast to a relative end, “whose worth...is unconditional [emphasis in original][,] independent of desire[,] and valid for all rational beings.” The first categorical, in declaring, “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law,” is essentially
a question of pursuing objective ends beyond any consideration other than that imperative.\textsuperscript{15} If desire plays a part in one’s consideration on the first categorical imperative, then it has ceased to be an accurate consideration in its proper terms, because it is subject to desire. An existent end is a good which already exists and has some worth, seemingly beyond individual desire. This is clarified when placed in opposition to an “end to be effected.” An end to be effected is a good which “does not yet exist but is to be brought about through an agent’s causality.”\textsuperscript{16} Rather than bringing new things about, existent ends place limits on human action in order to preserve a good, such as obeying a safety warning in order to preserve one’s own life. Absolute worth is a description of the idea of dignity, which is invaluable. Dignity is “above all price and therefore admits no equivalent;” its value “cannot be compared to, traded off against, or compensated for by any other value.”\textsuperscript{17} Dignity is a priceless value assignment. These three conceptions are logically independent of one another. Animals, for example, may be existent ends that are neither ends in themselves nor beings with absolute worth. Wood implies that Kant believes humans are unique because “humanity is an end in itself by being an existent end having dignity or absolute worth.”\textsuperscript{18} Through these value concepts with regard to ends, the dignity of humans in Kant’s view is the highest end for which we can strive.

The debate over the effect dignity has on the second categorical imperative defines the struggle between Kantian deontologism and consequentialism. Alan Donagan offers a criterion for evaluating these competing interpretations. He explains that the “generation of moral dilemmas is to moral rationalism...an indispensable sign that a particular theory is defective.”\textsuperscript{19} Inconsistency is the first sign of the death of a theory. Donagan defines a rationalist moral theory as one which holds that practical reason requires all people to observe “some rule or precept which it assumes that all human beings can observe in all situations to which that rule or precept applies.”\textsuperscript{20} Kant, as a moral rationalist, constructs his moral theory around such a principle. As such, Donagan implies Kant could not have developed the theory with internal inconsistencies. Donagan defends his point by clarifying that “the possibility of moral error is not a conflict of duties,” but is rather a signal that the individual incorrectly assessed the proper rational conclusion.\textsuperscript{21} Rather than dismissing the theory for failing in an isolated case, it is simpler to assume the theory can come to the correct analysis of the case, and that the problem is on the part of the individual. Donagan seems a bit anxious to embrace this excuse, since his attraction to Kant’s theory is based on the fact that “it draws clear and definite lines between what is permissible and what is forbidden.”\textsuperscript{22} Perhaps its ability to correctly sort cases in most instances provides Donagan with sufficient security
to rest assured in Kantian moral theory. From this conviction, he essentially asserts that the only way to understand Kant’s writing properly is to evaluate its consistency. More importantly than his private doubts, Donagan provides the framework for evaluating the two particular interpretations on the basis of moral dilemmas for the purposes of internal consistency.

Marcus Singer objects to Kant’s second categorical imperative on several grounds. He begins by outlining a case in which a murderer asks a witness where his fleeing victim has gone. The witness could save the life of the victim with a lie. Common morality seems to dictate that the witness should therefore lie to the murderer and save the victim’s life. But Singer believes Kant would disagree. He claims that Kant would declare that lying to the murderer would be to use him merely as a means to the victim’s desired end. The desire of the victim to live is based purely on her own desire to live, and desires must be eliminated in the noumenal consideration of the case. A lie cannot ever be told, because to do so would be to treat humanity as less than rational nature requires. Thus, according to the second categorical imperative, the witness must tell the truth to the murderer. A Kantian might seek to rebut this claim by pointing out that in telling the murderer the victim’s whereabouts, the witness is failing to treat the victim in accordance with her full rational nature. But Singer might well counter that then the moral theory fails by giving the witness two equally forbidden moral choices, neither of which is the fault of the witness. As Donagan points out, a rationalistic moral theory which results in a dilemma “must be inconsistent and so false.” The Kantian then has a choice; either the second categorical imperative posits an end contrary to common morality, or the theory is inconsistent and therefore false.

Singer goes on to point out an inconsistency between the first and second categorical imperatives. The Kantian, however, may counter that the first categorical imperative clarifies the results of the second. The witness may ask, “Would I be willing to universalize the principle that if someone’s life was on the line, someone could tell a lie?” In this case, it seems that the witness may readily choose to lie, since a world in which witnesses lied to murderers would be one in which more lives are saved, and therefore a better one. But this result directly contradicts the result of the second imperative, which would forbid such a lie. Kant claims these imperatives are synonymous, yet here they bring about vastly different consequences. Common morality would willingly obey the first imperative in this instance. The witness is once again in Donagan’s damning dilemma, forced to choose between two forbidden options: abetting in murder and lying to a person with dignity. The theory seems subject to these serious critiques of inconsistency.
Donagan’s admonition gives rise to two rival interpretations of the second categorical imperative, based largely on a dispute on the idea of dignity. Any Kantian must seriously resist the possibility of inconsistency between the two imperatives as illustrated by Singer. The debate between deontologism and consequentialism arises out of an attempt to solve his objections. The deontological position acts to respect the rational capacity of each individual to the greatest extent possible, without consideration for alternative consequences. The consequentialist position counters that it is better to respect the rational capacity by occasionally choosing between values on the issue of dignity, and choosing the lesser of two evils. Perhaps one of these two views will be able to reconcile Kant and my intuition.

The Deontological Interpretation

Thomas E. Hill Jr. proposes a deontological reading of Kant’s second categorical imperative. Deontological ethics claims that actions should or should not be done based on a moral conception, independent of the possible consequences which may come from such an action. Hill asserts that “value concepts are inseparable from ideas about what it is rational and reasonable to do.” The ends that an individual pursues define what he or she sees as the ideal path, based on his or her own preferences and inclinations. For example, when someone says that she values wealth, she will adopt a group of related stratagems to achieve the end of wealth. Hill explains that “an assertion that something has value (e.g. dignity) is more like an abbreviation for a cluster of related judgments about the policies and attitudes” that should be adopted. Recognizing a human being as a being with inherent dignity changes the way in which one would interact with such a creature. The second categorical imperative gives the Kantian related judgments on how to treat human beings.

As a system for understanding the second categorical imperative, Hill outlines six related judgments that preserve the dignity of the human person. First, the Kantian must treat his or her fellow person as an impartial observer would deem appropriate and justifiable. This is simply reinforcing the first categorical imperative, and reiterates its relationship with the second categorical imperative. Second, a moral consideration cannot be made with the thought that the value of persons is commutable. Saying that all persons have equal dignity “refers to their common standing with rights and desires under moral principles, not ‘the same amount’ of exchangeable value.” This distinction forms the basis of the disagreement between the two readings as they relate to dignity, as a Kantian consequentialist like Cummiskey thinks that human
dignity is valued higher than all other ends, but that it can be traded for other amounts of dignity. Third, the Kantian must allow others to act in accordance with their own will or moral system, even if their actions might result in lesser goods than might be otherwise possible. The deontological respect for persons is so deep that to interfere in the individual’s choice, even to improve outcomes, fails to recognize his or her dignity. Third, the Kantian must allow others to act in accordance with their own will or moral system, even if their actions might result in lesser goods than might be otherwise possible. The deontological respect for persons is so deep that to interfere in the individual’s choice, even to improve outcomes, fails to recognize his or her dignity. Fourth, human lives are objective ends that all rational actors should respect, which means that they take priority over all subjective ends. But Hill counters Singer’s objection by claiming that to “make the preservation of life an absolute value, however, would generate many paralyzing moral dilemmas.” While Singer points to common morality as the litmus test for the validity of a theory, Hill retorts that the respect of human dignity goes beyond simply saving the most lives. Fifth, “dignity calls for expressions [emphasis in original] of respect and honor for persons,” which include positive actions beyond just the restrictions offered by the first categorical imperative. Sixth, the Kantian must also consider the personal ends of others as important in his or her own consideration. Hill believes that these six related judgments naturally develop from a deontological reading of Kant’s second categorical imperative.

The Consequentialist Interpretation and a Debate over Interpretations

In contrast, David Cummiskey proposes a consequentialist reading of Kant’s second categorical imperative. Consequentialist ethics is a form of moral theory that determines the degree of right or wrong in relation to the consequences of an action. He suggests that there are two tiers of value on which to evaluate decisions, where “the distinction between dignity and price marks off the two tiers of value and the lexical priority of rationality.” I will henceforth refer to the tier related to dignity as the first tier and the tier related to all other values, which he here calls price, as the second tier. These two tiers cannot be compared to one another, for the former has no equivalent in the latter. The dignity of human beings, therefore, simply cannot be exchanged for any value other than dignity. He believes that the second categorical imperative should be read consequentially, for it would respect the dignity of the individual the most to create the best possible outcome for him or her.

Cummiskey describes one of the key differences between the consequentialist view and the deontological view as the question of whether or not it is morally permissible from a Kantian perspective to exchange values on the first tier. In the trolley example, Cummiskey
posits that the deontologist would be paralyzed in inaction, a state that is clearly opposed to common morality, which would sacrifice the one on behalf of the five. Hill would quote Kant in an early formulation of the categorical imperatives that “I ought never to act in such a way” as to violate dignity or morality. This is a negative declaration meant to prevent action, implying that inaction would be in keeping with Kantian morality. In accordance with his fourth judgment, Hill’s deontological ethics would posit that it is always wrong to cause the death of an individual. This means that the actor cannot act, because he or she now becomes guilty of murder regardless of the outcome. The consequentialist, on the other hand, would be able to sacrifice the one since the dignity of one is clearly less than the dignity of five. The consequentialist can appeal to the first categorical imperative and ask, “Am I willing to universalize the rule claiming that, when the life of one can save the life of many, the life of one should be sacrificed?” Here, Cummiskey would say that the first and second categorical imperatives each show that the moral actor in the situation should sacrifice the one worker for the five. The question is “whether objects with dignity are not equivalent to each other or are simply not equivalent to any other kind of object.” The deontologist, of course, would claim that “there is no scale of equivalencies” on which to evaluate an exchange of dignity. But the consequentialist claims that one amount of dignity may be exchanged for a greater amount of dignity. In such a scenario, it seems that the consequentialist has won this test in regards to common morality.

Hill could counter with an instance in which the consequentialist fails to keep with common morality. Imagine the trolley example, but now, instead of a worker down the track who is accidentally related to the trolley’s diversion, there is a rather large man standing on a bridge looking down on the tracks. After a quick calculation, it becomes evident that pushing the large man in front of the trolley will stop its progress and save the lives of the five workers. Numerically, the calculation regarding the loss of life is the same as in the original example. Yet common morality protests that one should not push the bystander in front of the trolley and urges us not to search for various justifications for this heinous act. Something seems different about this example, at least in my intuition. In this instance, it seems as though the consistent consequentialist must be willing to sacrifice the fat man to save the five workers. Yet this seems wrong. It is as if any action here would be to put the fat man into unnecessary harm, when he was reasonably expecting to live his life without any involvement with trolleys. The deontologist could respond that his dignity is inherently valuable, and to involve him in this situation would be to use him as a means to an end rather than an end in himself. While the consequentialist won the debate of common
morality in the first instance, the deontologist seems to be closer to the mark in this second case. Hill further points out that consequentialism, taken to its logical conclusion, results in the sacrifice of the innocent.\textsuperscript{40} While the deontologist is forced into inaction in the trolley example, the consequentialist willingly participates in the sacrifice of the individual worker for the five workers. But consequentialist limits seem to be found arbitrarily, independently of any Kantian conception of goodness. According to consequentialism, some dignity must be evaluated against other dignities, and the greater sum should be chosen. Yet Cummiskey seems to slip into exchanging the dignity of the few for some lesser value of the many, in the name of protecting the “dignity” of the many. Suppose that a society is promised by their dictator that if they force a little girl to be subjected to absolute horror for the rest of her life, the happiness of the community can be preserved.\textsuperscript{41} As Cummiskey himself says, “a Kantian may have to sacrifice some rational beings, or be sacrificed, in order to promote the existence of other rational beings; or a Kantian may have to sacrifice the happiness of a few, including his or her own happiness, in order to sufficiently promote the happiness of other persons.”\textsuperscript{42} This claim has departed significantly from the idea that we must act in accordance with the dignity of other persons. The consequentialist may be forced to say that the respect they afford to the community is greater than the dignity they strip from the little girl and make the exchange accordingly. The logic used in the trolley example must be implemented here as well. “Am I willing to universalize the law that one may be sacrificed for the many?” In this case, my intuition tells me to be horrified at the prospect of sacrificing an innocent young girl for communal happiness. To make it clear that common morality would condemn the action, consider the obvious negative reaction of most to the crime of gang rape. Many individuals gain pleasure (and arguably happiness) from the victimization of one individual, but common morality still clearly condemns the act. With this in mind, Cummiskey’s Kantian consequentialism sounds like another version of rule utilitarianism, completed by a “greatest dignity” principle. Cummiskey seems to forget that Kant has ascribed to individuals a worth greater than and incommensurate with all other values. Hill explains that the value of dignity is “always to be honored and respected, never violated.”\textsuperscript{43} The consequentialist thus violates the second categorical imperative, since the little girl is being used as a means to the end of communal happiness. This suggests that the deontological answer is truer to Kant’s intention, and wins the opinion of common morality in this instance.

On the other hand, Cummiskey’s response to Singer’s objections gives his interpretation a good deal of weight. Singer presents the scenario in which a murderer asks a witness where his potential victim has
hidden. The consequentialist can respond that, while he does fail to respect the dignity of the murderer, he would do even more damage to the victim’s dignity if he were to reveal her location. The witness would do damage against the rational nature of the murderer, but this damage would be temporary at most, whereas the death of the victim would be a permanent damage. This solves the additional problem of inconsistency between the first and second categorical imperatives. It does not seem to violate the universalizability principle to say that lying to save an individual's life would be permissible in Kantian moral theory. The dignity of the individual is preserved, inconsistency is erased (which solves Donagan’s dilemma), and Kantian rigorism seems to be countered. These three reasons lend some credibility to a consequentialist reading of Kant.

Hill may counter that Kant’s moral ethic is intentionally restrictive in nature. The deontological position assumes that Kantian morality generally acts as a limiting factor, pointing out that the act of lying is always wrong, regardless of the consequences. Acting is given a high standard, since one must will his or her maxim to become a “universal law of nature.” According to Hill’s third judgment, it would be better not to act at all when acting requires a violation of dignity. There may certainly be a good to be preserved in this scenario, but the witness limits the rational options of the murderer. Perhaps Hill would argue that the deontologist cannot consider the negative ends of his or her fellow person, but must instead be held responsible only for those persons whom their action directly affects, in this case the murderer. Hill may argue that the witness has the option either to be silent or to inform the murderer where his victim can be found, but plead with him to respect her dignity as well. Or Hill could appeal to his sixth judgment and claim that the witness must consider the ends of another person, namely the victim, and decide to act according to her end. But the fact that the theory could be used to justify both options renders it futile in Donagan’s dilemma. In order to clarify that the theory is internally consistent, Hill declares that for the deontologist, “the most fundamental value is, to respect humanity in each person, not to promote an outcome that is maximally desirable by some other standard.” This would take logical priority over the sixth judgment, and result in the witness either being silent or being honest to the murderer.

Another difference between these two views is the moral requirements placed on each person by the existence of others. Cummiskey explains that consequentialists believe “they show appropriate respect for persons by maximizing” the dignity of persons to make their lives more worth living. Cummiskey claims that deontologists cannot make the same move, presumably since they cannot act with
consequences in mind. To act would be to fail to “constrain or conform one’s actions in accordance with the moral requirements generated” by the dignity of the individual.\textsuperscript{47} But Hill here points to his fifth related judgment from his reading of the second categorical imperative, which states that dignity necessitates signs of respect.\textsuperscript{48} Furthermore, the deontologist is capable of effecting ends, as long as they comply with the categorical imperatives. The fact that a deontological reading of Kant is committed to the rightness and wrongness of certain principles does not also require inaction; the deontologist is encouraged to pursue ends which would be to the benefit of humanity. Thus, Cummiskey’s rebuttal fails to serve as a convincing proof not to accept the validity of the deontological view.

Hill objects further that the consequentialist attempt to maximize goods is inconsistent with Kantian metaphysics. Consequentialism posits some sort of good, and assumes that “we ought always to maximize this value” to the greatest degree, in the name of respecting the dignity of various persons.\textsuperscript{49} But the good that Cummiskey postulates does not exist in Kantian metaphysics. Instead, “good is whatever is rational and reasonable to choose, not an independent natural or metaphysical property that can be measured or aggregated.”\textsuperscript{50} Good cannot be maximized, since good is a value conferred by the will of rational choice. Something is good because it has been chosen by the will, and all things are chosen by the will equally. No objective standard of good can exist outside of rational choice; without the rational will of human beings, “nothing of absolute value could be found.”\textsuperscript{51} The greater good Cummiskey assumes, while inherent to consequentialist ethics, does not reflect Kant’s perspective. The problem of reconciling common morality and the consequentialist conception of the greater good with Kantian philosophy lies not in the philosophy of Kant, but “[i]n internal to consequentialist approaches.”\textsuperscript{52} The consequentialist might respond that the greater good in the cases described thus far does exist beyond the purely subjective will of individuals. The dignity principle assumes that humans have some value that cannot be traded for anything other than dignity, and as such, providing goods for the betterment of humanity would fulfill our moral responsibility. But such a response portrays consequentialism as a thinly veiled rule utilitarianism without a hedonist account of the good. Some rules must be followed, yes, but the theory is concerned with the greatest good for the greatest number. Kant is interested in understanding our moral obligation, not in creating the best of all possible worlds. The deontologist can point out that the consequentialist is guilty of trying to trade second tier for first tier values, i.e. dignity, by claiming to respect the dignity of persons by increasing their happiness or some
other value. The tiers are hence blended into one, and dignity becomes meaningless beyond a rule for utility in the consequentialist model. I doubt Kant would tolerate such a misreading of his theory.

Cummiskey would respond that such a reading of Kant is more accurate, and objects that the real problem is that the deontological perspective begins by presupposing the rightness and wrongness of actions before the imperatives are even utilized. He is convinced that Kantian considerations would naturally result in this form of nonhedonistic rule utilitarianism. When Cummiskey asks himself, “Am I willing to universalize the principle that the dignity of persons should always be maximized?” his answer appears to be yes. He believes that deontological “reasoning presupposes that we have a standard of unacceptable conduct that is prior to the dignity principle” and that deontologists seek to puritanically enforce these rules. But Hill seems to be able to respond that Cummiskey is now using humanity as a means to maximizing some value, rather than as an end in itself. We could not universalize that dignity should always be maximized, because to do so would be to set an end, and then to disrespect the dignity of others by using them as a means to that end. In this way, the second categorical imperative serves to clarify the meaning of the first categorical imperative. Again, Cummiskey assumes a good and seeks to use Kantian metaphysics to prove that it is accurate. The consequentialist framework seems to be forced into Kant’s work, rather than representing his views. Cummiskey fails to prove that it is consistent with Kant’s intention, which suggests that Kantian consequentialism might be a contradiction in terms.

The deontological ethic, then, appears to be the more accurate reading of Kant’s vision of morality. But I am left unconvinced by the validity of the theory. The fact that the Kantian is left paralyzed in certain situations, especially in the trolley example, leaves me with serious doubt as to the legitimacy of the view. My intuition states that it is better to save the lives of the five workers and to sacrifice the one in such a scenario. The one worker would be used as a means, yes, but the end for which he would be sacrificed respects the dignity of the others. Would it be better to sacrifice the lives of the five in the name of pursuing a principle? Perhaps such a view would be more ‘noble’ in some strange sense of the word, but it does not seem to be the more moral decision to make on the matter. A theory could be founded on the language present in the second categorical imperative, which allows a person to be used as a means, as long as they are an end as well as a means. Let us borrow from the consequentialist reading only that principle that a lows us to compare violations of dignity on a tier of value that cannot be compared to anything else. There are greater and lesser violations of dignity, and we should strive to violate dignity the least.
As long as the two tiers of dignity are not blended, we will remain in keeping with Kant’s true intention. From this insight, we can find a compromise between the two views.

**Kamm’s Principle as a Solution**

Frances Kamm suggests a third way between the two sides. She proposes that a primary law to be established within the first categorical imperative is the Principle of Permissible Harm. Kamm is fundamentally concerned with how the lesser evil is related to the greater good. The principle has four parameters to serve as a rulebook on when it is appropriate to harm persons. The first parameter states “that an act is permissible if (i) a greater good...causes a lesser evil.”\(^5\) This principle is generally consistent with common morality. In the scenario of the murderer, the witness, and the victim, the witness is justified in lying to the murderer, a lesser evil, in order to preserve the life of the victim, a greater good. In this case, we will allow that if the witness must choose between violating the dignity of the murderer by lying or the dignity of the victim by allowing her murderer to carry out his deed, the witness must choose the lesser evil. This judgment, of course, depends on universalizing the entirety of the principle of permissible harm. The second parameter states “that an act is permissible if... (i) a means that has a greater good as its noncausal flip side causes a lesser evil.”\(^6\) By “noncausal flip side” she means that the greater good must be the direct effect of the means, while the lesser evil must be an accidental property of the means. In the trolley example, diverting the trolley from killing the five workers and thus sacrificing the one worker is morally permissible under this principle. The greater good is clearly saving the five workers, if we allow that both greater and lesser violations of dignity have taken place. The means to that greater good is diverting the trolley. Diverting the trolley would not have affected the greater good if the one worker had not been there, which means that the lesser evil is in no way causally necessary to saving the lives of the five workers. The death of the one worker cannot even be considered a “sacrifice” since it is not directly causally linked to the salvation of the five workers. It could be said that the one worker is not being used as a means, since his death is an accidental property. The second parameter will be referred to as the accidental side effect clause. Taken together, these two parameters establish when it is permissible to do harm.

The third and fourth parameters of the principle establish when it is clearly impermissible to do harm. The third parameter states, “it is not permissible for an act (i) to require lesser evil (or someone’s involvement leading to lesser evil) as a means to a greater good.”\(^7\) This parameter
serves as the flipside of the accidental side effect clause. Restated, lesser evil may not serve as the means to a greater good. In the utilitarian example of the little girl’s torture for the happiness of the society, it would be impermissible under this clause to hand over the little girl to the dictator. This would be to use the little girl “merely as a means [emphasis in original]” to the end of communal happiness. As the deontological reading has shown us, the Kantian must limit his or her self from violating dignity, and the first tier value of dignity violated in that little girl cannot be compared to the second tier value of happiness. The fourth and final parameter of the principle of permissible harm states that “it is not permissible for an act...(iv) to directly cause a lesser evil as a side effect when it has a greater good as a mere causal effect unmediated by” the accidental side effect clause. This is a slight modification of the second and third parameters for the purpose of complete clarity. In the case of the fat man, Kamm provides the answer in this final parameter. While the death of the one worker is an accidental property of the means to saving the lives of the five workers, the death of the large man is an essential property of saving their lives. While we could make the argument that the one worker is not being used as a means since his death is not necessary to save the five, the same argument could not be made for the large man. His sacrifice is essential to saving the five, which means he is being used in this situation as merely a means. Therefore, the sacrifice of the large man is impermissible. The principle of permissible harm has thus proven to reconcile Kant’s deontological ethics to common morality.

Conclusion

The principle of permissible harm thus serves to solve the major objections made against the deontological reading of Kant. It requires a concession on the part of Hill, for we must be willing to accept as accidental some violations of dignity for others. However, it does not go so far as Cummiskey to suggest that dignity can be the guiding force of a Kantian consequentialist nonhedonistic rule utilitarianism. If the principle of permissible harm is universalized, it coheres with the second categorical imperative in such a way as to give it life and allow it to reconcile with common morality in ways that Hill’s strictness does not allow. I believe Kant would be most pleased with (i) a deontological reading of his texts with (ii) the principle of permissible harm enforced and (iii) the ability to differentiate between violations of dignity.

Through this paper, we have accomplished our goal establishing at least one way to reconcile Kantian ethics and the trolley problem by understanding the second categorical imperative. We have examined
how Kant conceives of it as a theory, and evaluated several arguments in favor and opposition of the imperative itself. Next, we evaluated the criterion on which a coherent moral philosophy must rest in order to avoid contradiction. Then, we looked at a deontological and a consequentialist reading of the text. It became clear that strict rigor on either side leads to a misunderstanding of Kant's intention and problematic dilemmas. Consequentialism appears impressed upon the text, while deontologism results in further problems. The deontological ethic needed to reconcile with common morality and to overcome its own inactivity to achieve the status of a coherent moral philosophy. The principle of permissible harm, with a concession to consequentialism, allows for a coherent deontological reading of Kant's second categorical imperative. With these allowances, Kantianism becomes a much less rigorous perspective and perhaps could be more accessible to the general public, as Kant had originally intended.60
NOTES

2 Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, 5.
3 Ibid., 27.
5 Ibid., 34.
6 Korsgaard, *Creating the Kingdom of Ends*, 15.
8 Ibid., 29.
9 Korsgaard, *Creating the Kingdom of Ends*, 114.
11 Kant, *Groundwork*, 149.
12 Ibid., 28.
14 Ibid., 115.
18 Wood, *Kant’s Ethical Thought*, 118.
20 Ibid., 12.
21 Ibid., 19.
22 Hill, *Virtues, Rules, and Justice*, 195
23 Singer, *Generalization in Ethics*, 234.
25 A strict Kantian might object that the witness is here attempting to grant himself a special exemption for his situation. “Is it right to lie?” when universalized seems to show that lying should not be allowed. But perhaps this a false positive. It seems that it is all right to lie if a million lives are on the line. If this is so, the question may need to be specified to a greater degree. “Is it right to lie when ten dollars is on the line?” results in a different answer than “Is it right to lie to save children?” The witness does not seem to be concerned in this particular case, so the Kantian should be satisfied that he is simply trying to act in accordance to his own good will.
26 Crisp, “Deontological Ethics,” 188.
27 Hill, *Virtues, Rules, and Justice*, 198.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., 199.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., 200.
32 Griffin, “Consequentialism,” 156.
34 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Again, I am in debt to Michael Sandel for this example.
39 I would worry that my intuition is simply wrong, except that Sandel's class struggled with the same apparently inconsistent view.
40 Hill, *Virtues, Rules, and Justice*, 193.
41 Once again, I am in debt to Michael Sandel for this example.
45 Hill, *Virtues, Rules, and Justice*, 191.
47 Ibid., 125.
48 Hill, *Virtues, Rules, and Justice*, 200.
49 Ibid., 192.
50 Ibid.
51 Kant, *Groundwork*, 29.
52 Hill, *Virtues, Rules, and Justice*, 192.
53 Cummiskey, *Kantian Consequentialism*, 130.
54 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Kant, *Groundwork*, 29.
60 Or at least it becomes more accessible to the trolley workers’ union.
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This paper examines the competing claims of Immanuel Kant and Étienne Gilson regarding the nature of beauty in art and in the natural world. The former posits that statements with predicates of value such as “this waterfall is beautiful” refer not to the object in question but rather to the emotional state of the subject. In contrast, the latter argues that statements with predicates of value refer both to the object in question and to the degree that the object participates in Beauty.

Beauty and Theology

Oliver Ha

Scope and Introduction

“Beauty is in the eye of the beholder.” Though we consider it a trite statement today, the implicit assumptions within these words have been the subject of intense debate for centuries. A more academic rendering reads, *de gustibus non est disputandum*. The truth of these two accounts would yield great consequences for aesthetics, philosophy of language, and metaphysics. As John Haldane noted during a guest lecture at Baylor University, the discipline of aesthetics has shifted in the modern era in relation to its treatment of beauty. Our understanding of beauty has shifted from recognizing beauty as a meaningful feature of reality to perceiving beauty as a mere expression of our own sensibility. We talk of beauty as something inherent to our humanity rather than something inherent to reality. The question at the center of Kant’s *Critique of Judgment* is “How, if at all, is it possible to judge something in nature (or in art) as beautiful on the basis of something very subjective, a feeling of pleasure, and yet demand for our judgment a universal assent?” Étienne Gilson addresses the same concern in his book *Arts of the Beautiful*, and the central metaphysical claim of his work is that “the beautiful is a transcendent…therefore it participates in the primary, irreducible, and not deducible character of the first principle, namely Being.” These authors argue for two fundamentally different postures on the Beautiful.
I will begin with a brief treatment of Kant’s theory of the beautiful. Then I will explicate the major points of Gilson’s theory relevant to Kant. After weighing both theories, I will show what each does and does not accomplish and which we are to prefer on philosophical grounds. In light of these two theories, I will conclude by arguing in favor of Gilson’s position from an idealist perspective in contrast to a materialist perspective.

**Kant’s Critique of Judgment; Subject-Referent Claims and their Universality**

Immanuel Kant questions aesthetic judgments and claims that “if something is beautiful...what we want to know is not whether we or anyone cares about the thing’s existence, but rather how we judge it.” He recognizes the inherent subjectivity of such a position, though; for one to say an object is beautiful, “what matters is what [he] does with this presentation within himself.” Kant’s eighteenth-century contemporaries assumed that beauty was objective and actually existed independently of our minds. They also assumed that one could expect universal assent to a claim of beauty. In essence, if one said that “Michelangelo’s Torment of St. Anthony is beautiful,” one meant that it would be recognized by all rational beings as beautiful.

Kant refutes this notion by saying that such a judgment is subjective and refers only to the object’s presentation to the subject. He claims that when we speak of an object with the intention of describing it as beautiful, we are actually not describing the object itself but rather the emotions that the object invokes within us. He argues further that “an objective principle of taste is impossible: critics cannot expect the determining basis of their judgment to come from the force of proof, but only from the subject’s reflection on his own state of pleasure or displeasure.” A disjunct between the subject and the object of aesthetic experience opens up. The criterion for an object to be considered legitimately beautiful is the degree to which it incites pleasure within its subject.

Kant not only attacks the validity of claims concerning universal beauty, but he also denies their universality. Kant recognizes that if one makes an aesthetic judgment of an object, the judgment-forming subject also necessarily assumes the judgment to be true for many other subjects. He writes, “when judgment determines an object as beautiful,
it is connected with the feeling of a pleasure that the judgment declares
to be valid for everyone.” It is neither the “agreeableness nor the per-
fection nor the object’s concept of the good” that contains the basis
of such a judgment, but purely its ability to incite pleasure. Thus, the
beauty that we consider universally communicable in making an aesthet-
ic judgment inheres in “the subjective purposiveness in the presentation
of an object, without any purpose.” No artifact, nothing man-made,
can be universally identified as beautiful under Kant’s framework.

Therefore, Kant’s first claim denies that objects can merit predi-
cates of value, in this case, predicates regarding beauty. In his view,
descriptions of value only refer to the emotional state of the subject.
Second, if all predicates of value are only subject-referent, then they
are not binding on any persons besides the subject making the claim.
To say, “this waterfall is beautiful” does not mean that it is beautiful for
all people everywhere. It only means that it is beautiful to the person
making that claim.

**Gilson’s Arts of the Beautiful, Object-Referent Claims and Beauty
as Inherent**

Étienne Gilson begins his refutation of Kant by framing the
nature of beauty in relation to the arts. His first distinction is between
industrial arts and fine arts. Gilson’s definition of beauty clarifies the dif-
ference between industrial and fine arts. He argues that the “beautiful is
known to us by this, that it is an object of admiration,” and admiration is
“the spontaneous reaction of man, of his sensitivity and intelligence, to
the perception of any object whose apprehension is pleasant in itself.”
Gilson distinguishes the fine arts from the industrial arts as those whose
proper function are to produce objects expressly willed and conceived in
view of their beauty alone—“they have no other proximate reason to be
than to be beautiful.” The nature of the fine arts is to produce beauty,
and such a beauty can be universally communicable. While there is no
opposition between beauty and usefulness, Gilson contends that beauty
is not made in view of its possible utility: it is desirable for its own sake.

On the difference between beauty in nature and beauty in art,
Gilson argues that art is “perceived as being the work of a man, namely
the artist.” Yet behind nature there is no such human agency. Instead,
there is a seat which, Gilson claims, can only be filled by God. God
thus creates beauty when he creates nature. In contrast, Kant holds
that our tendency to make universal claims about beauty “stems from a deeply hidden basis, common to all human beings, underlying their agreement in judging the forms.” He goes on to say that this hidden basis can be termed common sense, and thus universal claims, when speaking on aesthetic judgments, are grounded in the kinds of beings we all are as a species. Kant grounds his claim to universality in man. Beauty as a universally recognizable attribute does not inhere in reality but rather inheres only in man’s humanity.

Gilson offers the opposite perspective. He argues that God “constitutes nature in its proper being, then leaves it to accomplish its operations on its own,” that humans experience the “objective conditions of the beautiful taken in its complete indetermination to nature” which “turns the mind toward the primary notion of being.” Whereas Kant cannot find the purpose of creation anywhere outside of himself and thus looks for it only within himself, Gilson is led outside of the self and into the primary notion of being, the first principle: God.

To reiterate Kant’s claim, when we make beauty judgments of nature, Kant says we are judging “not so much the object, as [we judge] the mental attunement in which we find ourselves when we estimate the object.” If, for example, he were regarding a mountain range, Kant would think that it was not the mass of the rock before him that was beautiful. Rather, the act of apprehension that his mind exercised over it created emotions that lead to a false projection of “beautiful” onto the mountain. He maintains that “true sublimity must be sought only in the mind of the judging person, not in the natural object the judging of which prompts this mental attunement.”

Furthermore, Kant states that nature is called sublime “merely because it elevates our imagination, making it exhibit those cases where the mind can come to feel its own sublimity.” Kant’s comments on the sublime make evident the extent to which modern aesthetics has shifted from its pre-modern roots, a time when objects were said to merit their descriptions independent of a person’s mental state. For Kant, beauty is “not contained in any thing of nature, but only in our mind, insofar as we can become conscious of our superiority to nature.”

Gilson further turns the Kantian view on its head when he places priority on the objective rather than the subjective character of beauty. Gilson pointedly argues that “nothing is more objective than beauty itself; since it is a transcendental mode of being,” and regarding our own mental states, “nothing is more subjective than the sensibilities to which
such objects are offered.” Referring to the sensibilities, Gilson suggests that we can ensure that we are understanding the same words and ideas as our interlocutors to a certain extent. It is more difficult to contend, however, that all people experience seeing and hearing a work of art in the same way. Thus, Gilson calls for a return to the medieval and classical conceptions of beauty in which beauty functions as a real feature of reality. He writes that “despite the general trend of modern philosophy toward idealism, salvation lies in a return to wisdom…recognizing the primacy of being from which proceed all intelligibility, creativity, truth and beauty.” Indeed, Gilson calls for no less than a full break with Kantian thought.

The importance of such a disparity of conclusions cannot be overstated. Implicit in the manner of how each responds to the beauty of nature is the way each sees man in relation to nature and, more importantly, man in relation to God. Competing conceptions of anthropology, theology and cosmology are at odds here. If Kant is correct in saying that all predicates of value are merely subject-referent and are not universally binding, then the consequences extend beyond just aesthetics; the disciplines of ethics and metaphysics are deeply affected as well. For example, say one makes the ethical claim that “x is wrong.” Upon applying Kant’s two-pronged argument, one could conclude that since a) predicates of value are subject-referent and non-universally binding and b) wrongness is a predicate of value, therefore c) the claim that “x is wrong” is merely true for the subject making the claim, and furthermore cannot be said to be universally true for all people everywhere. The metaphysical implication of Kant’s claim is to deny that descriptions of the world can correspond to the objects of those descriptions. Kant drives a deep wedge between the way objects appear and the objects themselves and denies human language the power to describe the world as it really is—what Kant calls the noumenal/phenomenal divide.

To summarize, Gilson argues that Beauty exists independent from our minds, and objects may merit descriptions of beauty insofar as they participate in Beauty. He refutes Kant’s argument that claims containing predicates of value (specifically beauty) refer only to the subject and his or her emotional state. He maintains rather that such claims are not mere expressions of preference or taste, but in fact inhere in reality and correspond to their objects.
Conclusion: Gratitude in the Context of Beauty

Therefore, though Kant’s *Critique of Judgment* and Gilson’s *Arts of the Beautiful* pertain only to matters of aesthetics or philosophy of art, the implications of their arguments bear much greater consequences. For this reason, I side with Gilson and the classical aestheticians. In the final analysis, the phrase “beauty is in the eye of the beholder” is itself a statement which includes a predicate of value. Therefore, for it to be both objective and universal, one could not accept its most fundamental claim. The project proves to be self-defeating and must be rejected on philosophical grounds.

In conclusion, Kant holds that beauty is subjective and resides in the eye of the beholder. Gilson argues to the contrary, and says that descriptions of beauty are objective and refer not to the describing subject but rather to the object in question. In the end, Gilson recognizes that one’s attitude in approaching the beautiful is far more important than proving with certainty that beauty is either inherent to reality or contingent upon man. For Gilson, the lover of art “loves a work of art for the joy it brings him; he is grateful to it for this gift and...releases it in expressing his gratitude and love.”27 Haldane likewise calls us to a second innocence in experiencing the beautiful, one that serves to “reconnect the beauty of nature [as] seeing in it something to be savored and not eschewed.”28 In recapturing a disposition of gratitude one consciously decides to adopt the perspective that creatures ought to have as part of creation. Instead of elevating the self to the exclusion of the creator, such a posture allows one more readily to participate in the beauty resplendent in all things.
NOTES

1 “Concerning tastes, there is no dispute.”
2 Haldane, “Modern Aesthetics.”
3 Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, xlvii.
5 Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 45.
6 Ibid., 46.
7 Ibid., 149.
8 Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 66.
9 Ibid., 66
10 Ibid.
12 Ibid., 22.
13 Ibid., 21.
15 Ibid.
16 Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 79.
18 Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 168.
19 Ibid., 112.
20 Ibid., 113.
21 Ibid., 121.
22 Ibid., 123.
25 Gilson, *Arts of the Beautiful*, 140.
27 Gilson, *Arts of the Beautiful*, 182.
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Kaplan and Davidson attempt to employ functions in order to solve the problem of indexicals. The paper argues that their solution is not indispensable and other options that fit with nominalism are explored.

Indispensability of Functions with Regard to Indexicals

Lauren Hibbs

Within semantic pragmatics, Donald Davidson and David Kaplan have both attempted to come up with a solution to the problem of indexicals within sentences. Both Davidson and Kaplan posit the existence of functions in order to explain away the problem of indexicals. This paper will claim that positing the existence of these functions breaks the nominalism of Metaphysics, and commits the theories to the existence of “strange entities.” The paper will then put forward a response to this problem (the Quine-Duhem indispensability claim) and show how the claim is not helpful in validating Davidson’s and Kaplan’s use of strange functions. Finally, the paper will attempt to show how Davidson and Kaplan’s theories could possibly be nominalized.

An indexical (or alternatively, deixis) in a sentence is a word where the reference changes depending on who utters the word. Examples of indexicals are words such as “I” or “she.” Indexicals pose a problem for truth-condition theories of meaning (theories in which the meaning of the sentence is tied up in whether or not the sentence is true or false) because if a sentence contains an indexical two different people can utter the same sentence but the sentence can have a different truth-value. If two sentences that mean the same thing can have different truth-values, then this would suggest that meaning could not be equivalent to a truth-value, posing problems for both Davidson and Kaplan.

To solve the problem, Davidson and Kaplan want to say that the truth-value of a sentence is computed with regard to the context in which a given sentence is uttered. The way that the context is taken into account is by introducing functions into their theories. Davidson introduces the function α, “that will look at a deictic element occurring
in a context and tell us what the element contributes in that context to propositional content.” Davidson leaves exactly what α is and does rather vague. Kaplan further attempts to explain what α is by stating that it is a function from contexts to intensions, which Kaplan calls contents.

A problem with using the function α to help explain indexicals is that functions are an abstract and strange entity. Therefore, Kaplan and Davidson’s theories are not acceptable under a nominalist conception and view of Metaphysics. If one is a nominalist then they “deny that numbers, functions, sets, etc. exist, [and must] deny that it is legitimate to use terms that purport to refer to such entities, or variables that purport to range over such entities, in our ultimate account of what the world is really like.” Because nominalists prefer to engage only with concrete entities that are found in the world, the only use they would have for the functions of Kaplan and Davidson is to keep truth-value theories of meaning intact. The functions do not have any root or grounding in the world, which would not make them legitimate entities to posit within a theory.

An indispensability claim much like the one Willard V.O. Quine and Pierre Duhem put forward in regard to Philosophy of Mathematics can be used to respond to the criticism that the theories put forth by Kaplan and Davidson contain weird abstract entities. Indispensability claims state that if an entity is indispensable to a theory that makes the best sense of the world, then we should have an ontological commitment to that entity, even if it is abstract. If something qualifies as indispensable to a theory, then the entity in question’s abstractness should be overlooked and no longer seen as a problem for that theory. Quine states, “a theory is committed to those and only those entities to which the bound variables of the theory must be capable to referring in order that the affirmations made in the theory be true.”

Under this definition of indispensability, it is much easier to see how certain mathematical properties could be thought to be indispensable than it is to see how the function α could be indispensable to a language theory. Mathematical properties used within scientific theories are much more conclusively based on concrete evidence and bound variables measured from the sensible world than are language properties. Scientific methodology has proven itself to be a successful way of learning about the world, whereas the truth condition theories of language do not have a large privilege over other theories of language in regard to how successfully they explain and elucidate facts about the
world. Therefore, α does not seem as though it is indispensable because it is not part of a theory that has a strong enough claim to making better sense of the world.

In addition to the more stringent indispensability condition given above, there is also a weaker characterization of indispensability that can be applied here in order to give the language functions a greater chance of meeting the qualifications for indispensability. The weaker characterization states, “The fact that reference to a certain class of objects is theoretically useful provides reason to believe in such objects. Simplicity, unification, expressive, and explanatory power are all virtues that are commonly invoked in support of the objects in question.” There are thus many ways in which an abstract entity can be indispensable to a theory. The virtue that can most easily be invoked to support the functions of Davidson and Kaplan is that of explanatory power or usefulness. Explanatory power as it will be used here is not the most stringent use of explanatory power as something that elucidates the world. The stipulated function has explanatory power within a given system instead of the broader notion of a function as explanatory of the sensible world. Functions have explanatory powers within the given theory because positing these functions allows Davidson and Kaplan to explain how indexicals can be part of a truth-value system of meaning. If a function helps explain an otherwise plausible and workable theory, then the function could be indispensable.

A response to the fact that functions could be counted as indispensable because they give a theory explanatory power is simply that utility does not equal truth. Just because a certain idea is useful in explaining a theory or making that theory more coherent does not make the idea true. Positing the existence of functions may be useful within language theories, but it does not logically follow from usefulness that these abstractions actually exist. Usefulness for explanation is not a quality that validates or grounds the positing of abstract entities. The other options (simplicity, unification) can be eliminated as ways in which the functions could be indispensable because it is not clear, or at least has not been shown to be true, that positing functions is the simplest or most unifying way to get out of the indexical problem. In order to deny coherently that Davidson and Kaplan’s solution is the simplest, however, a simpler alternative theory must be posited. There is hope for
a simpler theory because deixis is a concrete phenomenon that exists in the world, and therefore its explanation would make more sense if it were also concrete and world-oriented.

Since the function $\alpha$ cannot easily or obviously said to be indispensable, the criticism that it is a weird entity still stands, and efforts should turn to formulating a simpler, completely nominal way to deal with the problem of indexicals. Formulating a simpler theory would take away the claim that Davidson’s and Kaplan’s theories could meet an indispensability claim under the simplicity condition. A more practical and simpler way to relativize truth to contexts comes out of a realistic realization of the fact that humans are not always able to understand the meanings of indexical sentences, and that indexicals should be turned contextually inward.

In some instances, people will lack relevant contextual information and will be ignorant of truth-values and not know the full meanings of indexical sentences. The person who spoke or uttered the indexical sentence, however, will always know the meaning. Context is therefore internalized, and even though most indexicals can be comprehended, their true meanings often cannot be known by anyone but the speaker. A person cannot know the true and full meaning of an indexical sentence without knowing all of the relevant contexts in which it is being used. In addition, a person cannot say whether a sentence is true or false without knowing all of the relevant contexts in which the sentence is being used. In some cases, such as “I” sentences, it seems as though no one but the speaker can be expected to know the truth-value of the sentence. Castaneda holds this belief about “I” sentences and internalization and “thus seems to express the view that…strictly speaking he could not even grasp [my ‘I’ propositions].” The speaker of the sentence, however, can always grasp all the relevant contexts, and so meaning can still be equated to truth-values.

In opposition to the belief that many times people do not know the meaning of indexical sentences, Kaplan states that “ordinary English speakers surely know the meanings of everyday deictic sentences even when they do not know the contextual parameters that would fit those sentences’ contents.” If people know the meanings of deictic sentences, it is because the speakers attempt to be clear about reference when using deictic elements in order to make themselves understood. Mere comprehension of the words within a given sentence is not equal to knowledge of the meaning of a sentence. Relevant contexts must be
known in order to know the meaning, and in some cases (“I” cases), maybe only the speaker will be able to assign a truth-value. Thus, in the internalization theory, there is no need for a function to pick out the relevant contexts because the contexts are not found in the world, but are only in the minds of the people who know the meaning of the sentence.

A criticism of internalizing contexts is that this really does not help explain anything. It does not work to nominalize theories about indexicals or make indexical problems simpler because it is not really a helpful theory. Internalizing contexts makes it acceptable that sometimes no one other than the speaker will be able to assign truth-values and know the meanings of sentences. It is natural to say that if a person can comprehend the sentence, then they should be able to assign a truth-value to it. This criticism, however, does not take into account the nature of deictic sentences. An inability to know the meanings of deictic sentences all the time seems to be inherent in how personal and how endemic deictic sentences are to their speakers and their given contexts.

Davidson and Kaplan both attempt to posit the existence of a function that will solve the problem of indexicals in order to keep their truth-condition theories of meaning intact. These functions, however, come up against the criticism that they are strange, abstract entities, whose existence nominalists deny. The indispensability condition tries to block the abstraction criticism, but it does not have much success in doing so. Because of this, in order for the theories about how to deal with indexicals in language to remain plausible they should be nominalized and the function $\alpha$ will have to be taken out of the equation.
NOTES

1 Lycan, Philosophy of Language, 139.
2 Field, Science without Numbers, 1.
5 Chisholm, The First Person, 43.
6 Lycan, Philosophy of Language, 142.
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This paper utilizes a close reading of Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy of morality in order to trace the ideological genealogy of his philosophy. Through an examination of the influence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s nominalism upon Nietzsche, questions regarding their apparent contradiction emerge. Nietzsche’s philosophy is shown to be an elaboration and clarification of Rousseau’s position, with certain subjective elements removed. Behind the bright joyous aspect of humanity which Rousseau posits looms the dark visage of Nietzsche’s abyss. They are both drawn from the same philosophical principles but differ only in application. It is thus shown that Nietzsche stands not as a rejection of the Enlightenment tradition, but rather its heir, logically following the tenets set forth by Rousseau to their necessary and harsh conclusions.

Communicable Disease Center: The South’s Role in the Federalization of Public Health

William Stöver

As he is commonly perceived, Friedrich Nietzsche represents a radical and fundamental change in the course of the western intellectual tradition. His ideas concerning the nature and origin of morality are viewed as a marked departure from their predecessors. The ramifications of this reading of Nietzsche have been immense. Henri de Lubac writes that “never, before Nietzsche, had so mighty an adversary arisen, one who had so clear, broad and explicit a conception of his destiny and who pursued it in all domains with such systematic and deliberate zeal. Nietzsche was thoroughly imbued with a sense of his prophetic mission.” If Nietzsche is seen as a radical innovator, he becomes a dark and malevolent figure, brutally overturning the foundations of society, heedless of the floodgates of turmoil thereby opened. In support of this view, one could produce a myriad of quotes, not the least of which is “I am the most terrible opponent of Christianity, and have discovered a mode of attack of which even Voltaire had not an inkling.” When reading Nietzsche in the context of his ideological forebear Rousseau,
however, one may adduce a different picture. Instead of viewing Nietzsche as a rebel against his intellectual predecessors, one can view his philosophy as a logical clarification and restatement of the western, post-scholastic tradition. If his philanthropic baggage is stripped away through close reading, friendly Rousseau begins to take on an aspect not so different from the German whose name has come to indicate harsh, brutal reality, devoid of kindness or compassion.

Locke and Rousseau, among other Enlightenment thinkers, divorced instituted religion from natural morality. Friedrich Schleiermacher essentially relegated instituted religion out of existence. It is to a particularly religious morality that we must turn to examine this paradigmatic shift. There has been a patent transformation in the way in which humanity and human behavior are examined. Despite the professed Christianity of the authors of the Enlightenment, the course of their thought has led to a profound reorientation of the western mind and the creation of a post-Christian society. An integral facet of this revolution is the nominalism which crept into European thought in the high Middle Ages and continued to fester and spread, eventually supplanting more orthodox views of existence. This nominalism, which came to a cogent formulation in the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, emphasizes a univocal, rather than an analogical view of being. His works reject the concrete, syllogistic approach to knowledge utilized by the scholastics, dismissing abstract realities in favor of a reality defined by the name we give to it.

In seemingly stark contrast to idealistic and philanthropic authors like Rousseau, the shadow of Nietzsche menacingly looms as an apparent rejection of the liberal western tradition. Although his approach was different, a spark of continuity did indeed endure. Independent-minded as he was, Nietzsche accepted only eight thinkers, including Rousseau, as worthy to pass judgment on his works. Both Rousseau and Nietzsche take human inequality as the starting point of their respective elaborations of inequality. Rousseau begins the “Exordium” of his *Discourse on Inequality* with a brief note firmly identifying the origin of inequality as markedly human, a product of society rather than nature. This inequality, Rousseau asserts, “depends on a kind of agreement and is established, or at least authorized, by the consent of men.” This sentiment lends itself to a profoundly humanist understanding of morality, in consonance with a nominalist position and devoid of abstract personal
distinctions. Rousseau very cogently rejects the idea that differences of status among men are inherent, dismissing even the inquiry as “unfit for rational and free men in search of truth.”

Thus, from this primordial equality, with inequality having been established, the twin concepts of right and law were born. In the state of nature, which according to Rousseau all preceding philosophers failed to discern, justice and injustice, and consequently, any concrete idea of morality, are absent. Denying the plausibility of any sort of historical model of man in the state of nature, Rousseau demands that we “set aside the facts” and construct the state of nature from a purely reasonable and hypothetical model. Paying homage to the prevailing Christianity of his day, Rousseau affirms the inscrutability of the actual history of man, which is directed by God. Having given religious sentiment its due, he outlines the true nature of his project, which is “to form conjectures based solely on the nature of man, and the creatures around him, concerning what the human race might have become.” Characterizing Rousseau’s works is what could be termed a hopeful philanthropy, affirming a natural compassion and an aversion to harming others, a far cry from the bellicose state of nature theorized by other Enlightenment thinkers, among whom Rousseau names Hobbes as a notable example.

In contrast to this, Nietzsche argues for an understanding that is precisely historical. Nietzsche departs from Rousseau in both the form and matter of his argument. First, Nietzsche approaches the issue of nature without the philanthropy of Rousseau, finding little pleasantness in nature, affirming instead that there is only “plain, bitter, ugly, foul, unchristian, immoral truth.” Furthermore, the nature of his inquiry differs markedly from Rousseau’s. Whereas Rousseau dispenses with historical evidence, preferring the abstract and theoretical, Nietzsche is profoundly grounded in philology. He devotes a significant portion of his first essay to establishing the basis of his ideas in the context of the history of words themselves.

Nietzsche represents a reprise of Rousseau’s criticism of contemporary society. Karl Löweth argues that “Nietzsche was to the nineteenth century what Rousseau was the eighteenth century. He is a Rousseau in reverse, because of his equally penetrating criticism of European civilization, and in reverse because his critical standards are the exact opposite of Rousseau’s ideal of man.” Thus Nietzsche follows Rousseau, treading new footprints along the same path. Nowhere is this
opposite parallelism more patent than in their contrasting views concerning the nature of inequality among mankind. Rousseau proclaims that “inequality is scarcely felt in the state of nature, and that its influence is almost nonexistent.”\footnote{11} For Nietzsche, a cloudier picture emerges. Even before inequality gave birth to strife and conflict, potent inequality existed. Whereas Rousseau argues that inequality is possible only in the context of society, not in nature, Nietzsche does not trouble himself with attempts at discovering natural man. Rather, he grounds his work thoroughly in historical, philologically attested man. To this concrete man, inequality is born out of his own choice. Thus, “all noble morality grows out of a triumphant saying ‘yes’ to itself.”\footnote{12} The origin of inequality is not the external acquisition of land or material which Rousseau described, but rather a personal movement of soul. Nevertheless, this is not the individual turn-to-the-subject which was espoused by the Enlightenment tradition, since that “yes” is most cogently evinced in the dealings of the noble man with other men. The antithesis of the noble man is the adherent of the slave morality, who “says ‘no’ on principle to everything that is ‘outside,’ ‘other,’ ‘non-self.’”\footnote{13} This is the natural man of Rousseau’s world, concerned with nothing save his own immediate well-being.

In Nietzsche Contra Rousseau, K. Ansell-Pearson argues that Rousseau is the lens through which Nietzsche views the problems of modernity, despite the latter’s critiques of the former. Indeed Nietzsche’s radical views are not entirely novel and unprecedented, but are rather the logical and coherent result of the Enlightenment tradition, stripped of its finery and trappings. Thus, the question endures: does Nietzsche’s radical deconstruction of morality represent a natural outcome of the nominalist tradition in which scholars place him? There are certainly elements within his work which would seem to place him firmly within that tradition. In particular, his argument concerning the origin of the dichotomy between “good” and “bad” lends itself easily to a nominalist interpretation.\footnote{14} He conceives of the “origin of language itself as a manifestation of the power of the rulers.”\footnote{15} For Nietzsche, good and bad are pure descriptions, honest identifiers of human actuality, devoid of moral judgment or connection to an external abstract. The inequality which he describes is not an inequality born of social position, but simply a statement of natural fact. This certainly seems to place him at odds with Rousseau, who espouses a much more philanthropic model. When his natural man laments “the endless crimes, wars, murders, and
horrors” which characterize the experience of societal man, he is of necessity invoking an external abstract standard. Here Nietzsche stands stoic and silent. Whereas Rousseau posits that “moral inequality, authorized only by socially prescribed right, is contrary to natural right,” Nietzsche would riposte that such a recourse to the abstract and un-historical is untenable. Rousseau, however, goes on to add the caveat “whenever it is not accompanied by a proportionate degree of physical inequality.” It is in this that Nietzsche and Rousseau can be brought together. In opening the door to societal inequality based on physicality, Rousseau has paved the way for the harsh physical world of Nietzsche, wherein the ultimate moral inequalities are physical and mental.

Ultimately, Nietzsche and Rousseau set out upon the same path, that of discerning the genesis of human interaction as they see it. Nietzsche most clearly emphasizes this goal when he proclaims that the very subject of his polemic is no more than “my thoughts on the descent of our moral prejudices.” Likewise Rousseau opens his work with the intention of “knowing men themselves” in order to “know the source of inequality among men.” In that Nietzsche views the development of “morals” as an outgrowth of the distinctions between human types, it can thus be said that they are both seeking the same end. Rousseau however carries with him a certain philanthropic outlook which keeps him tethered to abstract notions of natural law and the goodness of man. Consequently, it is with an engaged sense of judgment that he examines the hypothetical course of human history, even affirming it to be grievous that man has moved “farther away from its original state.” Nietzsche does not trouble himself with such an encumbrance. Rather, he takes the nominalist position to its conclusion, reducing even morality to mere subjectivity. Despite making abstract religious morality empty and devoid of potency by his insistence on its subjective nature in his “Creed of the Savoyard Priest,” Rousseau still clings to moral judgments concerning the state of mankind.

However, without a firm, dogmatic foundation is it not inevitable that even these most basic moral judgments must fall before the advance of nominalism? Consequently, we see in Nietzsche a more honest assessment of the state of human affairs than in Rousseau. Whereas Rousseau turns away from the abyss opened by the Enlightenment, Nietzsche stands and looks into it, seeing that there is indeed nothing left of truth, save what man makes for himself. Thus, in the madman of The Gay Science, Nietzsche gives voice to an intellectual tradition coming
to grips with what it had done. Just as the madman demands to know “whither is God” while carrying a lamp in the light of the sun, Nietzsche, while carrying the nominalism that blinds him to the transcendent, looks for the *telos* of humanity. Still, like the light of the lamp, his goal shall remain unglanced, not because it is not there, but because it cannot be seen in the sunlight. Inevitably, the answer comes in the terrible words: “We have killed him, you and I.” Nietzsche makes no excuse, puts forth no pretense, but stands boldly in face of that awful truth. Rather than hiding behind a face of subjective philanthropy, Nietzsche stands before the void and asks if this is truly all there is. Thus it can be said that Nietzsche is not driven by a mere hatred of Christian morals. Indeed, he even condemns those who feign the pursuit of truth out of a “certain subterranean animosity and *rancune* toward Christianity.” Rather, from his boyhood skepticism and longing for concrete terminology, thoroughly imbued with the academic atmosphere of nominalism, Nietzsche matured into a creature of abiding desire. Not content with the suppositions which undergird the philosophy of Rousseau, he tears down the hypothetical and the theoretical, seeking a concrete answer, but he finds only the despair that “God remains dead. And we have killed him.” In light of this brief utterance, one might certainly dismiss him as a crazed soul, a far cry from the paced and reasonable Rousseau. Indeed, the very idea of reconciling Nietzschean philosophy with Christian philosophy has been dismissed as “an impossible and monstrous idea.” Both, however, find their ultimate demonstration in the death of God, recognizing the abyss thereby created, and struggling to find meaning therein.

Thus, instead of viewing Nietzsche as the rejection of the nominalism of Rousseau, it is more consonant to view him as his logical heir, unsuccessfully trying to wrench himself free from Rousseau’s philosophical grip, and yet finding behind the veil of philanthropy mere emptiness. In the very despair of Nietzsche, de Lubac sees the resurgence of his humanity, asserting that although he “saw the divine sun setting on the horizon of our old Europe, he did not hail the coming night as a triumph.”
NOTES

1 De Lubac, *The Drama of Atheist Humanism*, 118.
4 Rousseau, *The Essential Rousseau*, 143.
5 Ibid., 143.
6 Ibid., 144.
7 Ibid., 145.
8 Ibid., 146.
13 Ibid., 21.
14 e.g., C. Cox, in his *Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation*
17 Ibid., 201.
18 Ibid.
20 Rousseau, *The Essential Rousseau*, 137.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 231-292.
24 Ibid.
27 Fraser, *Redeeming Nietzsche*, 3.
28 De Lubac, *The Drama of Atheist Humanism*, 118.
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