Graduate Philosophy Colloquium
The Graduate Philosophy Colloquium is an important part of the philosophical community enjoyed by graduate students in the Philosophy Department. Its goals are to facilitate discussion of student work and to afford an opportunity for students to develop important professional skills.
For presenters, Colloquium is a time to get feedback on an idea they are working on, to refine a paper they are preparing to submit to a conference or for publication, or to get practice presenting a paper and responding to questions and comments. For attendees, Colloquium is a time to hear what their colleagues are working on, enjoy a lively philosophical discussion, and learn how better to write and present papers of their own. The atmosphere is congenial, and comments are friendly, constructive, and encouraging, as befits a community of Christian philosophers.
Colloquium plays an important role in fostering students’ professional scholarly activity, which includes presenting papers at meetings of the APA, SCP, and other prestigious national and international conferences, and publishing in peer-reviewed journals such as Faith and Philosophy, Religious Studies, Synthese, History of Philosophy Quarterly, and International Journal for Philosophy of Religion.
Colloquium meets weekly during the semester, and attendance is expected. Faculty are welcome and frequently attend. Colloquium is led by a student coordinator who creates a schedule for each semester and emails all the philosophy graduate students and faculty each week with an abstract or draft of the paper to be presented.
Colloquium schedules for current and recent semesters are below.
At this week's Colloquium: Graduate student Nick Colgrove will present “Molinism and Explanatory Priority: Recasting Adams' 'Anti-Molinist Argument'.”
Thomas Flint (1998) rejects Robert Adams’ “Anti-Molinist Argument” (1991) since it relies on an equivocal use of “explanatory priority." Further, Flint tells us, a successful rendering of Adams’ argument requires the use of a transitive and univocal concept of explanatory priority throughout. I will argue that Flint is wrong about these requirements. Specifically, I will show that by wedding pieces of Adams’ argument to pieces of a revised version of Peter van Inwagen’s “Consequence Argument,” the spirit of Adams’ argument endures – namely, that the Molinist’s account of libertarian free will is in trouble.